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A B S T R A C T 
Cognitive Appraisals in O C D and other Anxiety Disorders, 
by Jaclde MacCallam 
This research applied ideas from the cognition-emotion literature to some of the theories in 
the OCD literature, and in so doing took'Va multi-dimensional approach to the 
understanding of OCD. The aim of the study was to explore the nature of 'emotional-
cognitive profiles'^ of people with OCD,. and to compare these 'profiles' with those of 
people with other anxiety disorders and people from a non-clinical population.. Participants 
from the three groups i.e. an OCD group, ah anxiety group and a non-clinical group were 
asked to rate a number of appraisal dimensions, in response to four vignettes. There were 
10 participants in each group (N=30). The vignettes were constructed to evoke feelings of 
anxiety, guilt, anger and pride. The responses of each group were then compared. The 
results showed that when anxiety is evoked, both people suffering with OCD and people 
suffering with other anxiety disorders, perceived more personal responsibility and more 
harm to self than the non-clinical group. The OCD group also seemed to perceive more 
personal responsiblity in the situation of guilt, which provoked discussion about the nature 
and role of guilt and responsibility in the aetiology and maintenance of this disorder. The 
results also led to some debate about the relationship between anxiety, depression and 
OCD and finally, a formulation of OCD was proposed. The formulation was an attempt to 
incorporate thinking from both cognitive and psychodynamic perspectives and to draw 
together some of the theories and models of OCD, which had been discussed in the study. 
Pattern of responses across a number of identified appraisal dimensions 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Theories; 
As the search for an explanation into the relationship between cognition and emotion 
continues, so have theories of cognitive appraisal continued to develop e.g. Smith & 
Ellsworth (1985/87), Smith et al (1993). The appraisal theories suggest that cognitions are 
causal antecedents of emotion and both attributions and appraisals have been associated 
with this role. However, the most recent literature has identified the latter as having the 
most significant relationship with emotional experience. For example. Smith et al (1993) 
found that when attributions were controlled for, appraisals still accounted for a significant 
amount of the variance related to emotion. The explanation which was given for this was 
that appraisals act as a mediator between attribution and, emotional response. One way to 
conceptualise this process is to imagine that the attribution acts as a kind of assessment of 
causation and the appraisal acts as a kind of evaluation of this assessment. Two types of 
such an evaluation have been identified, in the form of primary and secondary appraisals. 
According to Lazarus & Smith (1988) the former refers to the perception of whether or not 
a situation is relevant to ones' well-being and the latter refers to the perception of ones' 
potential resources to cope with that situation. Smith et al (1993) add to this by defining 
the former as referring to whether or not the situation is motivationally congruent and 
relevant and identifying the latter to include accountability/responsibility; coping potentials, 
both problem focused and emotion focused and fliture expectancy. 
In relation to this there have been a number of studies which have looked at the pattern of 
appraisals associated with differing emotional experience e.g. Frijda (1987); Manstead & 
Tetlock (1989); Roseman (1979/1984); Roseman & Spindell (1990); Smith &, Kluegel 
(1982) Smith & Ellsworth (1985/1987); Smith et al (1993) and Weiner & Lerman (1979). 
Many of these authors have made an attempt to identify specific appraisals/appraisal 
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dimensions or combinations of appraisals which can be associated with specific emotions. 
For example. Smith & Ellsworth (1985) discovered six dimensions.:of appraisals in terms of 
which emotions were being distinguished. These dimensions were pleasantness, human 
agency, certainty, attention, anticipated effort, and situational control. Legitimacy was also 
named as an independent factor but was linked to responsibility and pleasantness. Two 
examples of how these may distinguish one emotion from another are 1) that anger and guilt 
are thought to be distinguishable in terms of human agency, the former requiring high other 
agency and the latter requiring high self agency, 2) that fear and anger are said to differ in 
terms of certainty, the former requiring appraisals of high uncertainty and the latter 
appraisals of a greater degree of certainty. Manstead & Tetlock(1989) followed on from 
this with the addition of the dimension of expectedness and the notion that consistency 
(with ones' own standards or those of others) is another important factor which may 
influence appraisals of pleasantness and personal agency. (In the case of the latter it is 
possible that consistency is measuring something similar to legitimacy, as in the Smith et al 
study). 
At this point it seems pertinent to point out that the complexities of the relationship 
between attributions, appraisals and emotions could form a thesis in their own right. For 
example, there is continued debate about whether or not cognition necessarily precedes 
emotion e.g. Lazarus (1982,1984), whether the two processes are independent e.g. Zajonc 
(1984) or whether the relationship between these two factors is more of a two-way process 
e.g. Weiner et al (1979), Teasdale (1983). In itself, this is not the focus of this particular 
project. However, a significant point from these studies, which is related to the focus of this 
research, is that without denying the inevitable individual and cultural differences, there is 
some agreement that a variety of 'typical' appraisals probably does exist in relation to the 
experience of particular emotions. Some empirical support for this assumption is shown in 
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a study where 15 emotions were correctly predicted over 40% of the time on the basis of 
corresponding cognitive appraisals (Smith et al 1993.). This-may not appear impressive from 
a statistical point of view. However, it was quoted as being more than six times what one 
would expect by chance and the clinical relevance may far outweigh the statistical 
significance. The clinical relevance of cognitive appraisals also brings the content of this 
introduction more toward the main focus of this study. 
In evolutionary terms emotion is often seen as a way of mediating and controlling the self in 
relation to the environment, or according to Oatley and Johnson-Laird's (1987) theory, 
"basic emotions have evolved to serve important biological and social ftmctions, and to 
determine priorities when conflicts arise in ongoing plans and goals" (Mathews and 
Macleod 1994 p43). For example, fear is often quoted as providing the cue for predicting 
danger, so inducing the fight or flight responses as ways of promoting safety and survival. 
In this way emotion also becomes the antecedent to behaviour. This is a very simple 
example and as we have seen above, emotional responses are generally considered as having 
more complexity than this example might imply. However, it does bring to mind the 
question of why people may feel and/or behave differently in very similar situations. In the 
above example one would ask why some people flee and some fight? 
This kind of reasoning and questioning can also be applied to issues of mental health. For 
example, it is generally acknowledged within the field of psychology that 'symptoms' can be 
understood as a way of responding to and/or avoiding certain, usually unpleasant, 
emotions. However, this still leaves the question of why some people develop obsessive 
compulsive symptoms, some people develop symptoms of extreme anxiety with no 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms and some develop neither? A psychologist's answer to 
this last question may differ depending on the theoretical perspective taken. However, if 
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one takes a cognitive perspective and assumes attributions and appraisals precede emotion 
and consequent behaviour then one can quickly hypothesise that the ans\yer may well lie in 
the nature of the appraisals. 
Cognitive theorists have recognised that people who are anxious tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a negative event e.g. Mineka & Sutton (1992) and are 
likely to appraise situations as being more threatening than non-anxious people e.g. Clark 
(1989), Davy et al (1992). A perceived 'sense of low control' has also been associated with 
anxiety e.g. Bariow (1988), Davey et al (1992), Salzer and Berenbaum (1994), Torestad et 
al (1990). Davy et al (1992) also suggested that anxiety was associated with appraisals of 
responsibility for positive , but not negative outcomes. Chambless and Gracey (1989) have 
also named 'control' as being a significant feature in both OCD and anxiety. 
However, it was Carr (1971/1974) who began to look at the nature of cognitive appraisals 
with reference to obsessive-compulsive disorder and who "first recognised the aetiological 
significance of unrealistic threat appraisals in obsessive-compulsive neurosis" (McFall & 
Wollersheim 1979 p64). 
A f i l l description of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder(OCD) and a fiill description of the 
criteria used to define OCD can be found in de Silva and Rachman (1995) or Thyer (1988), 
but in brief, OCD is a disorder where the person displays or complains of either obsessions 
(unwanted, intrusive, recurrent and persistent thoughts, images or impulses, which are 
experienced as senseless or repugnant), compulsions (repetitive and seemingly purposeful 
behaviours that are carried out because of a strong feeling of compulsion to do so and are 
usually performed according to certain rules or in a stereotyped fashion) , or both. The 
person experiences the obsessions or compulsions to a degree that affects daily fijnctioning 
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and/or causes distress. An example of an obsession might be a persistent, intrusive image 
of oneself gouging out the eye of another, and an example of a.compulsion might be having 
to check the door is locked over 100 times before beingable to leave the house. 
Cafr (1971/74) presented a model whereby people with obsessive-compulsive disorder were 
said to make inaccurate primary appraisals of threat by over-estimating the probability and 
cost of the occurrence of unfavourable and/or negative events. In support of a threat-
related hypothesis, Lavy et al (1994) presented evidence, using a Stroop test, that people 
with OCD "selectively attend to threatening stimuli associated with their fears", with no 
attentional bias for positive words which were related to the fears. 
Referring back to Carr (1971/74), he suggested that through always making inaccurate 
appraisals of threat the potential for 'ordinarily unthreatening' events to be perceived as 
'threatening' becomes increased. It is in this way that relatively unimportant activities, such 
as checking the door is locked, can become a matter of life or death for someone who 
suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder, in the case of this example, leading to the 
compulsive behaviour of excessive checking. 
In the model described above, OCD is viewed as an anxiety disorder and the compulsive 
symptoms are seen as a response aimed at lowering the probability of a negative outcome 
and reducing the anxiety. Rachman (1976) also pointed out that, as well as reducing 
anxiety, compulsive behaviour might also serve to create a sense of control for the 
individual. The role of perceived control in the aetiology of OCD has also been raised by 
others. For example, McFall and Wollersheim (1979) suggest that a loss of control is a 
factor in the development of OC symptoms and Jahoda(1969) proposed that superstitious 
beliefs, often characteristic of people suffering from OCD, create the feeling of having some 
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sense of control. The subjective experience o f losing control' has also been noted in clinical 
cases e.g. Walker (1973). 
There has been tentative empirical support for both of these positions i.e. that OCD is 
associated with the need to reduce anxiety and the need to increase control. Firstly, 
measures of physiological arousal were found to decrease following ritualistic behaviour 
(Carr 1971) and secondly, clients with OCD showed characteristically low tolerance of 
uncertainty e.g. Volans (1976) and were more cautious of becoming involved in risk taking 
behaviour than other "psychiatric" groups (Steinerl972) cited in van Oppen & Arntz (1994) 
The theoretical understanding of this time also acknowledged the role of secondary 
appraisals. For example, Carr (1974) suggested that one way in which secondary appraisals 
were distorted in people with OCD was through the belief that "compulsive behaviour is 
effective in dealing with perceived threaf. The themes of perfectionism and responsibility 
were also thought to characterise the beliefs of people with OCD e.g. McFall & 
Wollersheim (1979). An example of sUch a thought might be that "making mistakes or 
failing to live up to one's perfectionistic ideals should result in punishment or 
condemnation". It was not suggested that the individual is necessarily consciously aware of 
such beliefs and appraisals, but more that their existence had a consequential effect on 
emotion and behaviour. On an emotional, rather than cognhive level, it was also suggested 
that ritualistic behaviour may be more tolerable for the individual than the feelings it was 
supposed to reduce. At this stage the primary emotion experienced in OCD was considered 
to be anxiety. However, feelings of guilt were, also being associated with this disorder; an 
area which will be referred to again later. 
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Since the 1970's, knowledge and understanding of OCD continued to grow, and as it did 
so, it. became apparent that the earlier models could not account for some of the mOre 
unique features in the presentation of this disorder, nor^  indeed, some of the research 
evidence. For example, why was it that anxiety was seen to increase for some people 
following ritualisation, why was it that reassurance reduced anxiety for some sufferers and 
what was the explanation for the observed relationship between OCD and depressed mood? 
(Salkovskis 1990). It is also true to say that although a number of dysfunctional beliefs 
were identified as being specific to OCD, many of the appraisals that were supposed to be 
being made by people in this client group were very similar to those which were supposed 
to be being made by people with anxiety. So, why were some people, but not others, 
developing symptoms of OCD? Is it a good enough explanation that the differing underlying 
beliefs were distorting the appraisals enough to make this difference? This may be so, but 
even if it is, it still leaves the question as to what specific features of such beliefs and 
appraisals need to be present in order to make this difference happen. 
In an attempt to answer these kinds of questions one is drawn to the work of Beck (1967, 
1976, 1979). The idea that people with OCD hold certain, characteristic beliefs can be 
compared to Beck's theory of cognitive schemas. Beck assumed that individuals prone to 
certain emotional disorders have more extensive schema where the content of that schema 
relates to the particular disorder. For example, depressive prone individuals would have 
more extensive schema relating to loss. It was Salkovskis (1985/89) who first applied this 
approach more directly to OCD and put forward the idea that "exaggerated" or "inflated'' 
(personal) responsibility was the characteristic feature of the schema relating to this 
disorder. 
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Salkovskis(l 985/89) proposed a cognitive-behavioural model of OCD, where the 
characteristic schema become activated and consequent appraisals of exaggerated 
responsibility are made. The individual is then thought to engage in 'neutralising' behaviour 
(i.e. obsessive rituals or compulsive behaviour) in order 'put things right'. In this way 
feelings of responsibility are thought to be reduced, along with the anxiety which is 
assumed to accompany this process. The role of intrusive thoughts is also prominent in this 
model. Intrusive thoughts have recently been shown to be part of 'normal' experience, e.g. 
Rachman & de Silva (1978). However, for people with OCD such thoughts are: seen as 
becoming a trigger and focus for appraisals of inflated responsibility. In short, it is not the 
occurrence of intrusive thoughts, but rather the appraisal of them which is of interest in 
understanding the aetiology of OCD. 
In summary, Salkovskis argues that primary and secondary appraisals relating to threat are 
not enough to explain the more unique features of OCD and that the perception or appraisal 
of inflated responsibility for a negative outcome is needed to precipitate neutralising 
behaviour. He quotes that " i f automatic thoughts arising fi-om the intrusion do not include 
the possibility of being responsible in some way....then neutralising is very unlikely to take 
place and the result is likely to be heightened anxiety and depression rather than obsessional 
symptoms" (Salkovskis 1985 p.579). 
Salkovskis's claim, therefore, is that neutralisation is a response to the appraisal of 
personal responsibility for harm to oneself or another, but that without the appraisal of 
responsibility neutralising behaviour would not occur. He has provided some evidence for 
this by showing that subjects who reported neutralising behaviour, as opposed to those 
who did not, had higher ratings on beliefs of responsibility, but not on attitudes of threat or 
loss without a component of responsibility (Dent & Salkovskis 1989) Other researchers 
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have also attempted to clarify the relationship between appraisals of responsibility and 
appraisals of harm/threat. For example, van Oppen & Amtz (1994) suggested that anxiety • 
is due to the appraisal of fiiture harm, depression is due to the appraisal of responsibility 
for past negative outcomes and CCD is due to a combination of the both of these i.e. 
appraisal of high responsibility for fliture harm or negative outcome. Rheaume et al (1995) 
also suggested that the threat appraisal model was one which could be applied across the 
anxiety disorders, but agreed with Salkovskis (1985/89) that perceived responsibility was a 
feature more specific to OCD. In addition, Rheaume et al (1995) again highlighted the role 
of perfectionism in OCD. They found that 'perfectionism' was predictive of OC 
symptoms, albeit to a lesser extent than was found to be true of measures of responsibility. 
Overall, there seems to be little doubt that that the link between the threat and responsibility 
appraisal systems is somehow important to the understanding of OCD. The literature 
presents some agreement that appraisal of threat is a necessary, but not necessarily a 
sufficient factor in the development of OCD. However, the question still remains as to 
whether or not this is also true of inflated responsibility, or if, indeed, it is actually the 
nature of the combination of these two appraisal systems which is the more significant 
feature in the understanding of OCD. 
Inflated responsibility seems to have been widely observed with both clinical and non­
clinical intrusive thoughts e.g. Foa & Steketee (1983), Rachman & Hodgson (1980), 
Salkovskis & Warwick (1988). As a concept it has also been used to explain some of the 
anomalies which have been observed in OCD. For example, Rachman & Hodgson (1980) 
note that when an "obsessional subject is divested wholly or partly of responsibility for the 
act he or she experiences little discomfort". The explanation for this being that when 
another takes the responsibility the triggers for perceiving inflated responsibility are 
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reduced, with the consequent effect of reducing discomfort and 'need to put things right'. 
Rachman (1.993) also suggested that the decrease in symptoms which is often observed 
when a person with OCD enters a "new" environment is due to the initial lack of perceived 
responsibility. The symptoms are only thought to reappear once a sense of responsibility is 
achieved. Appraisals of responsibility can also be used to provide an explanation for Why 
depression can sometimes cause an increase in OC symptoms and sometimes a decrease. It 
is thought to depend on whether or not the person is suffering from the "hopelessness" 
subtype depression i.e. in the case of "hopelessness" type depression, one would hold 
strong beliefs that one could have no influence over outcome and therefore the likelihood 
of perceiving inflated personal responsibility is greatly diminished. 
Overall, there seems to be a degree of clinical acknowledgement that inflated responsibility 
is probably important in the understanding of OCD. There has also been some empirical 
support for the role of responsibility in OCD. Freeston et al (1992) studied the structural 
dimensions of intrusive thought experience and found five factors relating to cognitive 
intrusions. The third of these was identified as evaluation and included measures of 
responsibility, disapproval and guilt. This factor was associated with depression, but was 
also identified as being the only significant predictor of self reported measures of 
compulsive behaviour. In agreement with these findings Bouvard et al (1989) (cited in 
Clark & Purdon 1993) had previously found responsibility to be a salient dimension in. the 
structure of obsessive thoughts. Additionally, Freeston et al (1992) found that people with 
OCD reported that they would feel more responsible if the content of intrusive thoughts 
were to happen, than matched medical outpatients and control participants. 
In a study by Rheaume et. al (1994) responsibility was moderately correlated to OC 
symptoms, thought suppression , irrational belief and obsessional thoughts, with no such 
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correlation with aiixiety and depression. Additionally, in studies where there has been an 
experimental manipulation of a decrease in responsibility or of beliefs about responsibility 
there has been a corresponding change in the compulsive urge to check e.g. Lopatka & 
Rachman (1995), Lacoudeur (1995). 
At this point it is worth noting some of the difficulties that some of the research evidence 
quoted above has to face and some of the anomalous, results which need flirther explanation. 
For example, many of the conclusions are based on correlational comparisons and-self-
report measures and many of the correlations and/or predictive relationships are only cited 
as moderate. Clark & Purdon (1995) have also questioned the validity and reliability of 
some of the measures used and much of the research focuses heavily on non-clinical, rather 
than clinical populations. (Dependent on whether or not OCD is viewed on a continuum of 
'normal' experience the latter may or may not prove to be a significant difficulty). 
There are also several examples of anomalous, results. In the studies where there was a 
manipulation of responsibility the compulsive behaviour i.e. checking, did not decrease 
when the manipulation of responsibility was weak (it only decreased when manipulation 
effects were high and influenced 'pivotal power'). An increase in symptoms following 
experimental manipulation of level of responsibility was not always significant and where 
two groups differed on level of manipulated perceived responsibility, then perceived anxiety 
was also noted as a significant distinguishing factor between these groups. 
If Salkovskis's formulation is correct one would also expect 'inflated responsibility' to be a 
general, rather than a specific feature of thinking in people who have OCD i.e. the 'inflated 
responsibility' schema may only be triggered by certain stimuli, but one might expect an 
individual to be responsibility-prone if they held such beliefs. However, there has already 
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been some suggestion that the interaction between responsibility and OCD is more situation 
specific and idiosyncratic than this theoretical explanation would allow e.g. Rachnian; et al 
(1995). Rachman cites a number of arguments for the latter position. For example, inflated 
responsibility can be observed in the absence of OCD, some OCD clients welcome 
responsibility in some areas of their lives and psychometric studies have not been successful 
in identifying a unitary factor of responsibility . 
Given the above, one begins to question whether or not inflated responsibility can provide 
the answers to the questions surrounding OCD. The perspective that inflated responsibility 
may not hold all the answers is also supported by studies which have found only minimal or 
no correlations between measures of perceived responsibility and OCD symptoms e.g. 
Steketee & Frost (1993), Frost, Steketee et al (1994), Freeston et al (1991). Rheaume et al 
(1995) also cite two flirther studies which failed to identify responsibility schema associated 
with OCD in both clinical and non-clinical populations. (Letarte et al 1992; Rheaume, 
Lemarche et al 1992). 
These differences in the findings may well be explainable in terms of measures and 
methodologies. For example, the latter experiments used the Stroop test, where 
confounding variables such as the emotionality of the words make it difficult to interpret 
results. It is also unclear how reliable Stroop test data are in identifying schemata in clinical 
populations. Also, in relation to the first two studies, the measure of responsibility which 
was used was taken from the Jackson Personality Inventory and it is thought that this 
measure does not necessarily correspond to responsibility in OCD. 
However, whatever the explanation, one is still left with interesting, but slightly equivocal 
findings which continue to beg the questions as to what is the exact nature and role of 
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responsibility and what is. the complete answer in terms of understanding the aetiology of 
OCD? 
Some of the suggested answers to these questions have included the need to look at 
specific aspects of responsibility, such as "pivotal power^", described by Rheaume et al 
(1995), thought-action fiasion, e.g. Rachman et al (1995), moral responsibility e.g. Rheaume 
et al (1995) or a lack of "omission bias^", a phrase coined by Spranca et al (1991). The 
latter concept comes from the observation that people with OCD seem as concerned for 
what they do not do as for what they do and a-hint that, clinically, people with OCD feel 
less responsible for causing deliberate harm than for causing an event by accident e.g. 
Salkovskis et al (1995). 
However, the factors of perfectionism and control must also not be forgotten. For example, 
Purdon & CIark(1995) found that intrusions which lead to neutralising had higher guilt and 
disapproval ratings, but were not necessarily higher on ratings of responsibility. Freeston et 
al (1991) found that participants who reported greater disapproval of intrusive thoughts 
displayed more anxious, depressed and obsessional symptoms. (In these instances 
disapproval is being construed as an evaluation of not living up to expected standards, so 
making the link with beliefs relating to perfectionism. Turner et al (1992) also suggested 
that uncontroUability and unacceptability may be central to the distinction of 'normal' 
experience of intrusive thoughts as opposed to the obsessive-compulsive- experience and 
finally, O'Kearney (1993) presented a case study where cognitions related to control, rather 
than appraisals of responsibility, were instrumental in initiating neutralisation. 
From the evidence so far it seems unlikely that one avenue of investigation will lead to the 
' Belief that one is centrally responsible for provoking or preventing.subjectively crucial negative outcomes 
" Belief that one is not as responsible for something one omitted to do, as for something one did do 
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answer. In fact, it seems intuitive to conclude that one needs to consider a wide range of 
factors and the relationships and interactions between tiiese factors iri any.comprehensive 
formulation of OCD. In cognitive terms this would suggest that one needs to consider a 
wide variety of schema and appraisals and their relationship with one another. With this in 
mind the literature so far reviewed seems to highlight appraisals of threat e.g. Carr (1971), 
appraisals of control e.g. O'Kearney (1993), beliefs about perfectionism e.g. Rheaume et 
al(1995) and appraisals of responsibility e.g. Salkovskis (1985). 
Rheaume et al (1995) have already begun to make a theoretical link between responsibility 
and control, by suggesting that "pivotal influence" relates to the belief that one has control 
over outcome. They go on to suggest that looking at the combination of responsibility and 
control schemas is the next step in increasing our understanding of OCD. Clark & Purdon 
(1995) reiterate this last point by proposing the hypothesis that it is the combination of the 
"need to control thoughts" and the "perception of responsibility" which leads to OCD. 
Furthermore, Freeston et al (1995) found that a decrease in symptoms of OCD was 
accompanied by changes in cognitive variables including appraisals of danger, appraisals of 
responsibility and irrational beliefs about obsessions, so, again, adding "threat appraisals" to 
the concept of a multi-appraisal formulation of OCD. As will be seen later, this research 
attempts to encompass this multi-faceted view. 
From a psychodynamic, rather than a cognitive point of view, some others e.g. O'Kearney 
(1993) have emphasised the need to look at the individual meaning of OC behaviour and 
raised the hypothesis that OC symptoms may be a way of embodying emotions. Indeed, it 
might well be the case that the meaning of OCD for a given individual could be better 
understood if one were to consider emotionality a little more closely. According to 
Salkovskis,. it is the nature of the cognitive appraisal which gives the intrusive thoughts 
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emotional significance. However, the role of emotional significance has also been the focus 
of attention in its ownf ight. . • . 
To begin an exploration of this area one can turn tO Rosen (1975) who suggested that 
where unacceptable impulses/thoughts lead to guilt, the development of OC symptoms can 
be seen as a form of self-punishment: Rosen speculates that learned guilt acts as a drive 
which motivates the compulsive behaviour. The compulsive behaviour is seen as a self-
inflicted punishment, which in turn produces drive reduction and so relieves the feelings of 
guilt. This model is similar to the anxiety model, also described in Rosen (1975) , except in 
this case the learned drive is obviously anxiety and the compulsive behaviour serves to 
reduce this anxiety. The guilt model is assumed only to be applicable i f the perceived guilt 
is greater than perceived anxiety. This formulation would seem to put OCD in the realms of 
being a "guih disorder^' as well as, or as opposed to being an anxiety disorder. These 
models also raise the question of whether the combination and/or the relative balance 
between the emotions of guilt and anxiety can provide some explanation for the 
aetiological differences between anxiety disorders and OCD. 
Rosen is not the only one to have associated guilt with OCD. It was originally referred to by 
Freud (1896) and again was referred to in the theories of the 1970's. Rachman & Hodgson 
(1980) have suggested a similar link between OCD and guilt in that the indecisiveness and 
doubting observed in this disorder may be due to attempts to avoid feelings of guilt and 
Salkovskis (1989) notes that thoughts associated with responsibility schema are those of 
guilt, punishment and blame. Thyer (1988) also makes the comment that guilt and remorse 
are major components of the clinical presentation of OCD. These kinds of observations and 
suggestions raise a number of questions. For example, is guilt a causal agent in this disorder. 
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is it an epipiienomenon or are excessive feelings of guilt a consistent and primary feature 
of tliis disorder? 
Common sense tells us that it is not a surprising conceptual leap from responsibility to guilt, 
or vice versa. The relevance to OCD also becomes even more apparent when one considers 
the explanations of guilt, as stated by Tallis (1995) i.e. guilt is likely to be experienced if 
one violates an "inner rule" or as stated by Wicker et al (1983) i.e. that "guilt is said to 
follow from acts that violate ethical norms, principles of justice... or moral values. Guilt is 
accompanied by feelings of personal responsibility. One can imagine that 'inner rules' or 
"principles of justice" are probably more likely to be violated i f they are based on beliefs 
which aspire to perfectionism, as is suggested to be the case for people with OCD. 
Rachman (1971) also informs this assumption with the suggestion that "the aetiology of 
obsessional thoughts and impulses is likely for those who have a strict moral background 
and "high standards of conduct and morality; hence they regard a large percentage of their 
thoughts, impulses and images as unacceptable" (Rachman & Hodgson 1980 p.267). 
There is a limited amount of research literature relating to this area, but what is available 
tends to be supportive of the idea that guilt is a significant factor in OCD. A significant 
amount of the information about guilt comes from observational material or case studies 
and, not surprisingly, is often linked to responsibility. For example, Tallis (1994) and 
McGraw (1989) cite case examples where symptoms of OCD were triggered by situations 
which provoked intense feelings of guilt and responsibility. Niler and Beck (1989) noted 
that sufferers of OCD often experience strong feelings of guilt over the content of their 
obsessions, Rachman (1993) commented that people with OCD are more easily apt to feel 
guilt for the actions of others as well as those of themselves' and Dpllard and Miller (1950) 
suggested that fear and guilt "usually become obvious if the patient is forced to stop 
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performing tlie compulsive response." Perliaps it siiould be noted here that even at tliis 
early stage i.e. 1950.'s, feelings relating to .both anxiety and responsibility were being 
associated with this disorder. 
There are also a variety of empirical studies which indicate guilt as being a specific feature 
of OCD. For example, Niler and Beck (1989) reported guilt as a better predictor of the 
frequency, tenacity and distress associated with intrusions than depiression or anxiety, 
Steketee et al (1987) found feelings of guilt to be. more prominent in people with OCD than 
in people with other anxiety disorders and Frost et al (1994) found that people scoring 
above a certain cut-off point on measures of OCD syraptomology experienced more guilt 
than those scoring below this point. 
Further to this, Steketee (1991) undertook a study which examined the relationship between 
religiosity, guilt and OCD. In this instance, people with OCD were not found to be more 
religious than people with anxiety disorders, but there was a correlation between high guilt 
ratings and the severity of OCD symptoms; a correlation which was not apparent in the 
other anxiety disorder groups. Also, in Salkovskis's theory OC symptoms are linked to the 
appraisal of an intrusive thought and Purdon and Clark (1994) found that high obsessionals 
rated their most upsetting intrusive thoughts as happening more frequently, being more 
unpleasant, more guilt-inducing and more difficult to control than low obsessionals. The 
theme of control, again being present, as well as guilt, in these evaluations. 
Some of the research evidence related to guilt comes from the studies which were cited 
earlier, e.g. in the study by Freeston et al (1992), the evaluation factor, which was 
predictive of compulsive experience, consisted of guilt, as well as responsibility and 
disapproval. 
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As is the case with the research into responsibility one needs to be cautious about drawing 
conclusions about clinical populations from infr)rmation gathered from non-clinical groups 
and about making generalisations from observational and correlational data . It can also be 
difficult to fully separate out feelings of guilt as opposed to feelings of responsibility. 
Additionally, there is some evidence which questions the specific link between guilt and 
OCD. For example, one study did not show an association between guilt and negative 
intrusive thoughts (Salkovskis and Reynolds 1991). Machanda et al (1979) also found that 
they could not distinguish people with depression from people with OCD on the basis of a 
guilt scale. The latter study raises the question as to whether guilt is associated with the 
depressive symptoms so often associated with OCD, rather than the OCD itself 
In summary, it seems that in spite of some of the limitations, there remains a very strong 
suggestion that guilt has a part to play in the development of OCD, probably linked to the 
notions of responsibility. Indeed, some might say that the focus on guilt has, to some 
extent, replaced the focus on anxiety in this field. Needless to say the waters do not stay still 
at this point, but become yet flirther muddied, in that some suggest that neither anxiety nor 
guilt are the best descriptors of the emotional state experienced by people with OCD I For 
example. Reed (1985) argues that anger is a more accurate description. 
At first this may seem counter intuitive to the other areas of investigation. However, 
feelings of anger can be easily linked to feelings guilt. For example, "Beck (1976) argues 
that anger is the result of a perceived transgression of one's rules by another, whilst guilt is 
the transgression of those rules by oneself (Reynolds and Salkovsksis 1991). In 
psychodynamic arenas, guilt is also often acknowledged as an internalisation of anger which 
a person has been unable tp express externally. In addition 'anger turned inwards' is the 
classic Freudian basis for depression, where the individual is again feels unable to direct the 
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anger outwardly (Abramson and Freud 1911, 1917). Rachman (1993) points out that people 
with OCD often find difficulty in expressing anger externally. In itself this would fit-with 
the notion that people in this client group feel more guilty, i;e. that which cannot be 
expressed toward others as anger is being expressed towards oneself in the form of guilt. 
In terms of research literature there seems to be much less available here than in the other 
areas which have been discussed. Also, what little there is, is usually in the form of 
observational data or case study material. For example, Rachman (1993) made; the 
observation that, for some clients, learning to express anger results in a decrease in 
symptoms. One could argue that this effect is the equivalent to a reduction of guilt i.e. by 
being enabled to express anger externally, there becomes less need to internalise this feeling 
as guilt. Nevertheless, this kind of observation does put anger into the arena for fiiither 
investigation. Ryz (1992) also uses a case example to illustrate how OCD might be used as 
a defence against anger; in this case in a boy who felt it was not allowable to voice being 
angry. 
As in the other areas of research, the fact that the evidence for the role of anger in OCD is 
mainly represented through case studies does not necessarily make the evidence less valid. 
However, this fact does affect the generalisations and conclusions one might otherwise be 
in a better position to make. 
As an overall summary to reviewing the literature in this area it seems fitting to repeat the 
statement made earlier that no formulation of OCD will be complete unless it encompasses 
a wide range of influential factors, including both cognitive and emotional perspectives. In 
addition, it seems that a logical next step is to explore the relationships between some or all 
of these factors. One example which illustrates an attempt to explain some of the links 
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between cognitive and emotional experience, is seen in an article by Tallis (1992). Tallis 
describes two case exarnples where children had specific learning experiences which could 
easily have led to increased feelings of both guilt and responsibility and beliefs about 
thought-actioii flision. In both examples, the child had experienced thoughts about wanting 
a certain person to die or disappear, which within a week became reality when that person 
actually died 
Another alternative perspective on the understanding of OCD might come closer to the 
suggestion made by Rosen (1975) i.e. that different formulations and treatments may be 
needed for individual people and/or people who are experiencing different types of OC 
symptoms. An example of this can be drawn from the literature relating to inflated 
responsibility, as it has more recently been suggested that this feature may play a more 
significant role in symptoms of 'checking behaviour', as opposed to other symptoms e.g. 
excessive washing (Lopatka & Rachman 1995). Rachman and Hodgson (1980) have also 
suggested that 'cleaners' and 'checkers' sometimes "responded differentially". 
It is from this review of the literature and the variety of questions and debates that have 
been raised, that the following research was conceptualised and proposed i.e. 
a) an attempt was made to farther exaniine whether or not appraisals of responsibility, along 
with several other cognitive appraisals, made by people suffering from OCD are different 
from appraisals made by people who are not suffering with this disorder. 
b) an attempt was made to link emotionality into the process in a more controlled way than 
has previously been explored. In this way the cognition-emotion relationship was 
considered more as a two way process. 
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c) an attempt was made tp offer some indication as-to wiietbier or not inflated responsibility, 
. or, indeed any of the other appraisal dimensions which are included, might be considered 
as a general,- rather than a specific feature of OCD. 
d) an attempt was made to investigate OCD as a 'multi-appraisal disorder', by developing 
research which considered several appraisal dimensions, as opposed to concentrating on 
only one. In this case appraisals of responsibility, control, threat (in the form of harm versus 
benefit) and consistency with standards (in the form of unacceptability) were considered'. 
To begin to explain the thinking behind this research approach one first needs to go back to 
the beginning of the introduction, where the relationship between cognition and emotion 
was briefly discussed. The study undertaken by Manstead and Tetlock (1989) identified a 
number of appraisal dimensions which were found to be useful in the differentiation of a 
variety of emotions e.g. anger and guilt. On examination of these dimensions it is not 
difficult to make a connection with features of OCD: The four dimensions which these 
authors made explicit were 1) Pleasure, ranging from pleasant to unpleasant; 2) Personal 
agency (in other words responsibility), ranging from high to low personal responsibility; 3) 
Level of unexpectedness, ranging from expected to unexpected and 4) Level of situational 
control, ranging from high to low levels of control. Another appraisal was also drawn out in 
this study i.e. consistency versus inconsistency with one's own standards and those of 
others. Although the latter was not found to be a dimension in its own right it influenced the 
first two factors of pleasantness and responsibility. 
Taking the dimensions fi"om above one finds that control, responsibility, consistency with 
standards (in the form of perfectionism) and pleasure, or rather distress, ( in the form of 
emotional disturbance) all seem to fit neatly into the profile of OCD. If, as the cognition-
emotion literature suggests there are certain 'typical' patterns of cognitive appraisal relating 
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to certain 'typical' emotions then one begins to ask the question as to whether or not there 
rhight be different features in these cognitive patterns for some one experiencing symptoms 
of OCD. 
Secondly, if one now refers back to the literature relating to the different areas of research 
into OCD it would seem to make sense to investigate the nature of cognitive patterns in 
situations of guilt, anxiety and anger, using appraisals of harm/threat; control; 
agency/responsibility and perfectionism. In order to ascertain whether or not certain 
appraisals are significantly different from the 'norm' when people are suffering from OCD a 
comparison needs to be made. The most obvious comparison is with people from the so-
called 'normal' population, a comparison which was adopted by this study. Another 
comparison group was also chosen for this study, in the form of an anxiety group. Although 
it has been disputed by some, OCD has been , and is still, usually identified as an anxiety 
disorder (DSM IV). Consequently, it was considered relevant and important to make a 
comparison with the appraisals made by people who suffer from high levels of anxiety, 
without experiencing symptoms of OCD. It was hoped that the latter comparison would 
facilitate consideration, or not, of specific differences in appraisals between two clinical 
populations, in addition to the consideration of the differences between clinical and non­
clinical populations. 
Thirdly, a number of hypotheses become apparent if one reflects on the literature as a 
whole. For example, if one supports the current cognitive-behavioural model e.g. 
Salkovskis (1985/89), the hypothesis that people with OCD are likely to be appraising and 
experiencing emotional situations more highly in terms of personal responsibility, 
than people who are not suffering from this disorder, becomes obvious. If, however, 
"inflated responsibility" is supported as being specific to certain situations and 
30 
is not a general feature of OCD thinking e.g. Rachman et al (1995) then one might not 
expect such an hypothesis tp be met. 
Therefore, with the above points in mind, this study was set up to investigate whether or 
not there were differences in the specific cognitive appraisals and/or cognitive appraisal 
patterns/profiles of people with OCD when compared to people with anxiety or people who 
were not suffering from either of these disorders. Guided by the literature, the study was 
also set up to focus only on the appraisals made in certain emotional situations i.e. guilt, 
anger and anxiety. In addition, an emotional situation involving pride was included as well. 
The reasons for including a positive emotional situation will be discussed more frilly in the 
chapter on 'Methods', but two supporting themes from the literature are one, that Rachman 
(1993) reported that people with OCD take less responsibility for positive events and two, 
that Reynolds and Salkovskis(1991) found the feelings of guilt to be negatively correlated 
with pleasant intrusive thoughts. These four emotions had also been included in one or 
several of the studies which looked at the relationship between cognition and emotion. The 
conclusion from such studies was that it is probably possible to distinguish these emotions in 
terms of their associated cognitive appraisal dimensions. Such conclusions meant that it was 
considered justifiable to consider each emotional situation separately in this study, with the 
focus being on the group comparisons in each case. 
1.2. Research Questions: 
The resulting research questions were then specified as follows : 
1) In situations of anxiety, guilt and anger does" the pattern of cognitive appraisals differ 
between people suffering from OCD, people suffering from anxiety or people from a non­
clinical population? 
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2) Is the appraisal of.personal responsibility a factor which can be used to distinguish people 
suffering, from OCD from people, suffering with anxiety or people from a non-clinical 
population? 
3) Are there any other specific appraisals, relating to any particular emotional experience 
which can be seen to differentiate people suffering from OCD from people suffering with 
anxiety or people from a non-clinical population? 
1,3. Research aims 
the aims of the study were: 
1) To measure the nature of a number of cognitive appraisals in situations of anxiety, guilt, 
anger and pride for people suffering fi-om OCD, people suffering from anxiety and 
people from a non-clinical population. 
2) To compare measures of these cognitive appraisals in situations of anxiety, guilt, anger 
and pride between people suffering from OCD, people suffering from anxiety and people 
from a non-clinical population. 
3) To explore whether or not the appraisal of personal responsibility is a factor which can 
be used to differentiate people suffering from OCD from people suffering from anxiety or 
people from a non-clinical population. 
Overall, using a term adopted by the researcher, this research was developed to compare 
'emotional-cognitive profiles'^ and certain, specified appraisal dimensions between people 
with OCD, people with anxiety, but without symptoms of OCD and people from a non­
clinical/ 'normal' population. 
Pattern of responses across a number of identified appraisal dimensions 
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1.4. The Hypotheses. 
.HYPOTHESIS Ob]E: 
la) In response to the anxiety vignette, the three groups will show different profiles 
across the fourteen appraisal dimensions, as shown by a significant interaction 
between group and appraisal dimension scores. 
lb) In response to the guilt vignette, the three groups will show different profiles 
across the fourteen appraisal dimensions, as shown by a significant interaction 
between group and appraisal dimension scores. 
Ic) In response to the anger vignette, the three groups will show different profiles 
across the fourteen appraisal dimensions, as shown by a significant interaction 
between group and appraisal dimension scores. 
Id) In response to the pride vignette, the three groups will not show different profiles 
across the fourteen appraisal dimensions, as shown by a non-significant interaction 
between group and appraisal dimension scores. 
If these hypotheses were met it would support the overall theoretical position that "how 
individuals process emotional information may be a causal factor (or at least an important 
factor) in the development or maintenance of emotional disorder"(Mathews and Macleod 
1994 p.27). 
The next five hypotheses make predictions about how such appraisals may differ between 
people with OCD, people with anxiety but no diagnosis of OCD and people in a non-clinical 
population. 
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Using the Appraisal Questionnaire, each appraisal score was measured on an analogue 
scale. The Appraisal Questionnaire (see section entitled "Measures" for flirther details) 
measured 16 dependent variables in this way, as listed below: 
Perceived pleasure; perceived personal responsibility, perceived level of responsibility 
attributable to other people, perceived personal control, perceived control of other people, 
perceived level of situational control (in other words 'chance'), acceptability of one's own 
actions by self, acceptability of one's own actions by other people, acceptability o f one's 
own feelings by self, acceptability of one's own feelings by other people, perceived harm to 
self, perceived benefit to self, perceived harm to others, perceived benefit to others, 
likelihood of experiencing current symptoms in the given situation and likelihood of 
experiencing current symptoms in another similar situation. 
NB. From this point in the text the phrase 'in the situation of will be used to refer to the 
four vignettes Le. those of anxiety, guilt, anger and pride. 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: 
2) In the situations of anxiety and guilt the OCD group will perceive more personal 
responsibility than the anxiety and non-clinical groups i.e. the OCD group will show 
lower scores on this appraisal dimension than the other tvvo groups. 
2a) In the situations of anger and pride there will be no differences between the 
groups on measures of this appraisal. 
If hypothesis two is met it would provide support for Salkovskis's cognitive-behavioural 
model, where appraisals of high personal responsibility are thought to be a specific feature 
of OCD. It would also support the importance of both anxiety and guilt as emotional 
features of this disorder and highlight the link between the appraisal of personal 
responsibility and these emotional experiences. In addition, i f part 2a, as well as part 2, of 
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the hypothesis is accepted then it would also provide support for appraisals of responsibility 
being emotion and/Or situation-specific, rather than- being a general feature of OCD 
flunking. If not met, the results may be used to suggest the reverse. 
The formulation of the next hypothesis makes the assumption that for people with OCD, 
the need to "create a sense of control" e.g. Rachman (1976) is triggered by the person 
perceiving a low degree of control in a situation, as is suggested for people with: anxiety 
e.g. Chambless and Gracey (1989) Salzer and Berenbaum (1994). 
HYPOTHESIS THREE: 
3) In the situations of anxiety the O C D and anxiety groups will perceive less personal 
control than the non-clinical group i.e. the two clinical groups will show higher scores 
on this appraisal dimension than the non-clinical group. 
3a) In the situation of guilt the OCD group will perceive less personal control than 
the anxiety and non-clinical groups i.e. the O C D group will show higher scores on this 
appraisal dimension than the other two groups. 
3b) In the situations of anger and pride there will be no differences between the 
groups on measures of this appraisal. 
If Hypothesis three is met it would provide support for the theoretical position that the 
perception of control is an important feature in the aetiology of anxiety disorders, including 
OCD. i.e. if appraisals of control were found to be different in situations of anxiety, for both 
clinical groups, this would confirm the link of these appraisals with this particular emotional 
experience, a feature common to both 'anxiety' and OCD. In addition if appraisals of 
perceived control made by the OCD group were found to differ from those made by the 
other two groups, in situations of guih (an emotional experience which has been specifically 
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linked with OCD) then this would have theoretical implications as to how such appraisals 
influence or are linked- to this emotional experience for this client group. Part 3b of the 
hypothesis again promotes exploration of whether or not the appraisal of control is 
emotion and/or situation specific, rather than being a general feature of thinking in OCD 
and /or anxiety disorder. ' 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: 
4) In the situations of anger and guilt the OCD group will find the feelings of anger 
and guilt less acceptable than the anxiety and non-clinical groups i.e. the O C D 
group will show higher scores on this appraisal dimension than the other two 
groups. 
The results pertaining to this hypothesis will allow debate relating to the theoretical 
position that anger and guilt are emotional experiences which people with OCD generally 
find difficult to accept and deal With. If this, hypothesis is found to be true then it may also 
provide some support for the notion that these emotional experiences may have a particular 
significance in the development and maintenance of OCD. 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: 
5) In the situation of guilt the O C D group will perceive their actions to be less 
acceptable than the anxiety and non-clinical groups, i.e. the O C D group will show 
higher scores on this appraisal dimension than the other two groups. 
If this hypothesis is met it provides some support for a theoretical link between the 
experience of guilt and the beliefs about the standards/acceptability of one's own behaviour. 
In other words it would allow discussion about the links between the theoretical position of 
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people with OCD having particular standards (thought to be high moral standards), and the 
theoretical position of the experience of guilt, being associated with OCD 
HYPOTHESIS SIX: 
6) In the situation of anxiety the OCD and anxiety groups will perceive more 'harm 
to self than the non-clinical group i.e. the two clinical groups will show lower 
scores on this appraisal dimension than the non-clinical group. 
6a) In the situation of guilt the OCD group will perceive more 'harm to self than 
the anxiety and non-clinical groups i.e. the OCD group will have lower scores on this 
appraisal dimension than the other two groups. 
6b) In the situations of anger and pride there will be no differences between the 
groups on measures of this appraisal. 
Firstly, if hypothesis 6 is met it would provide support for the "threat appraisal" hypothesis, 
which has been linked to both anxiety e.g. Clark (1989) arid OCD e.g. Carr (1971/74). If 
hypothesis 6 is met it would also support the idea that the increased perception of threat is 
a feature of anxiety in general rather than being a specific feature in the aetiology of OCD. 
Secondly, if part 6a is supported, this would provide further support for the role of threat 
appraisal in OCD e.g. Carr (1971/74), but would also provide support for the link between 
appraisals of threat and guilt being a feature specific to OCD. In addition, guilt has obvious 
links with responsibility and so support for this part of the hypothesis could also be 
interpreted as providing support for Salkovskis's (1989) model of OCD; Finally, if part 6b 
was met it would support the theoretical position that an over estimation of threat is 
specifically associated to anxiety, and guilt, rather than to any other emotional distress. 
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The last hypothesis makes a prediction about which appraisals will be correlated with the 
perceived likelihood of the occurrence of symptoms i.e. symptoms of anxiety and/or OGD. 
The perceived likelihood of the occurrence of symptoms was also measured in the Appraisal 
Questionnaire using an analogue scale. 
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: 
7) Appraisals of high levels of harm to self and appraisals of highilevels of personal 
responsibility will both be significantly correlated with the perceived likelihood of the 
occurrence of symptoms of OCD, whereas only appraisals of high levels of harm to 
self will be significantly correlated with the perceived likelihood of the occurrence of 
symptoms of anxiety. 
If hypothesis 7 is met it would again provide support for Salkovskis's model (1985/1989), 
in that not only appraisals of threat, but also appraisals of high levels of perceived 
responsibility, are associated with the development of OC symptoms. In other words, it 
would support the position that one needs to consider appraisals both of responsibility and 
threat if one is to understand the aetiology of OCD, rather than the aetiology of anxiety per 
se. 
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Chapter 2: METHODS 
2.1.. Design 
This study consists of four quasi-experimental designs, one for each of the four emotional 
situations i.e. anxiety, anger, pride and guilt. Each design involves one independent variable 
(group), 14 dependent variables relating to the appraisal dimensions and 2 dependent 
variables relating to the likelihood of symptom occurrence. For the purposes of the first 
four analyses the 14 appraisal dimensions were considered as within-subject factors. 
2.2. Participants 
Participants for the two clinical comparison groups were recruited fi^om the mental health 
psychology departments of two local NHS Trusts and fi-om a local TOP self help group. 
The self help group included people suffering with phobic anxiety and people suffering from 
OCD. 
The mental health psychologists were asked to identify clients from their caseload, who 
were suffering from a) OCD or b) phobic anxiety, where anxiety symptoms were the main 
presenting problem and where there was no 'label' of OCD. In both cases the psychologists 
were asked not to include anyone who was currently experiencing 'psychotic' symptoms. 
The criteria for inclusion and exclusion in/from the OCD and anxiety groups were not made 
any more specific than this, based on the assumption that psychologists would be familiar 
with these diagnostic terms. It was also assumed that i f the clients were carrying the 
'labels', then a more formal diagnosis had probably been made previously. The scores on 
the Padua Inventory (PI) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) also tneant that there was 
the possibility of a retrospective check of level of symptoms in both these groups. 
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With regard to the anxiety group, the inclusion criteria were not restricted to any particular 
type of phobic anxiety, other than to exclude people who-had a primary and significant fear 
of public speaking. The latter exclusion criterion was primarily employed to avoid biasing 
the chosen anxiety vignette, which described a scenario involving public speaking. 
However, it was also used to avoid placing, these clients in a situation which might evoke 
very high levels of anxiety unnecessarily. ( It was acknowledged that a fear of public 
speaking was likely to be present for many people who were anxious; it was only where it 
was considered to be a primary and significantly heightened difficulty that the psychologist 
was asked not to approach that person). 
The psychologists then approached appropriately identified clients to determine whether or 
not they might be willing to take part in this research project. This process involved giving 
the client the Information Sheet pertaining to the research (see Item 8 in the Appendix). The 
client was not required to give a decision immediately, but was able to take the Information 
Sheet away for perusal. At this point, cUents were informed that they could conmiunicate 
their willingness to participate by either a) informing the relevant psychologist, who would 
then inform the researcher b) leaving a message on the contact number or c) leaving a 
contact number/address for the researcher to contact them directly. Clients were also made 
aware that if they did not make contact or leave a telephone number/address it would be 
assumed that they had made the decision not to participate and no fixrther contact would be 
initiated. 
Participants who were recruited from the self help group, were treated in the same way, 
except that they had direct contact with the researcher fi-om the outset, rather than first 
being approached via another psychologist. 
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The participants for the non-clinical group were recruited by approaching staff groups or 
individuals from a variety of staff groups e.g. nursing staff, administration staff and 
accountancy staff. In this case the research was explained, vvith the additional explanation 
that they were being asked if they would be willing to participate in the non-clinical group 
i.e. people who were not suffering from OCD or anxiety. Unless someone stated that they 
did not want to take one, the Information Sheets were given out to interested individuals. 
The researcher was available to answer any questions and/or concerns and then'people were 
given time to consider whether or not they would be willing to participate. As with the 
other two groups it was always emphasised that participation in this research was 
completely voluntary, with no obligation to participate. A meeting with the researcher was 
only arranged if an individual affirmed his/her willingness to participate. 
For the purposes of this study, the three groups needed to be differentiated by scores on the 
Beck Depression Inventory (a measure of depression), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (a 
measure of anxiety) and the Padua Inventory (a measure of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms). In the event the following criteria were used for inclusion in each group; (see 
the next section, entitled 'Measures' for fiirther details): 
OCD Group: Inclusion criteria: Padua score > 65 
BDI score no limits 
BAI score no limits 
Anxiety Group: Inclusion criteria: Padua score < 65 
BDI score no limits 
BAI score > 16 
Non-clinical group: Inclusion criteria: Padua score < 50 
BDI score < 15 
BAI score < 15 
The only exclusion criterion, applied across the three groups, was the presence of 
'psychotic' symptoms. 
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At the outset the aim was to include between ten and twenty participants in each group. In 
the event the results from thirty people, ten in each group, were included • in the main 
analysis. Thirty eight people were interviewed in all, but four participants were excluded 
from the OCD group due to scores below 65 on the Padua, one person was excluded from 
the anxiety group because her score was below 16 on the BAI and three people who were 
suffering from OCD were included in a small Pilot study. In addition, there were also five 
people who did not attend the research interview. 
The four participants who were excluded fi^om the OCD group, all reported having made 
significant progress in terms of 'recovery from OCD' , commenting that they would have 
reported a greater number and severity of symptoms several months earlier. Although 
reliant on subjective report of 'recovery', the data gathered from these participants raised 
some interesting possibilities. For example, it allowed some investigation as to whether 
appraisals for people who have 'recovered' from OCD are more similar to those made by 
the non-clinical group or those made by people still suffering with this disorder. 
Consequently, the decision was taken to include the data from these four people in the 
results of the study. 
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2.3.MEASURES 
Standard Measures 
The three standard questionnaires described earlier were completed by all participants in 
the study i.e. the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and 
the Padua Inventory (PI). The Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive scale (Y-BOCS) was also 
completed by people suffering from OCD. These scales were used to provide a measure of 
the levels of anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive symptoms in each of the three 
groups. The Y-BOCS is a measure of severity of OCD. 
It was necessary to include a measure of depression because the latter is associated with 
OCD, e.g. de Silva &. Rachman (1992), Turner and Biedel (1992) and with anxiety, e.g. 
Watson and Kendall (1989) and is also known to affect appraisals e.g. Beck et al (1976). A 
measure of depression, in this case the BDI, was therefore needed in order to be able to 
control for depression and/or to be able to compare levels and affects of depression between 
the three groups. 
This study also required participants to read four vignettes, each of which described a 
particular emotional situation. The four emotions were those of guilt, anger, pride and 
anxiety. In order to record the responses and appraisals relating to each of the vignettes a 
questionnaire was devised, based on the work of Manstead and Tetlock (1989). The 
questionnaire and vignettes were put together by the researcher, as will be described in the 
following section. 
The following text provides more detailed information about each of the above measures: 
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The Beck Anxiety Inventory 
The B A I is a self report measure of the severity of anxiety. It "was developed, to address 
the need for an instrument that would reliably discriminate anxiety from depression while 
displaying convergent validity" (Beck et al 1988 p.893). This 21-item scale was developed 
from an initial pool of 86 items, which were drawn from three pre-existing scales. To 
complete the inventory the client has to rate each item on a scale of severity ranging from 
'not at air to 'severely' . The inventory is said to cover somatic symptoms, cognitive 
aspects such as 'fear of the worst happening' and panic-related aspects of anxiety. 
Generally, scores of 0-7 are described as 'minimal' levels of anxiety, scores of 8-15 as 
'mild', scores of 16-25 as 'moderate' and scores of26-63 as severe. 
Beck et al (1988) carried out reliability tests for this measure and found it to have high 
internal consistency (.92) and high test-retest reliability, over one week (.75). In terms of 
validity, the discriminant and convergent validity is also reported to be good e.g. Beck et al 
(1988), Beck etal (1990). 
The B A I has been quoted as having clinical and research advantages over other self report 
measures of anxiety e.g. Dobson (1985), Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka (1986) and as well 
as being a well accepted, reasonably reliable and valid measure of anxiety, it is relatively 
quick and easy to complete. It was on the basis of these strengths that the B A I was chosen 
for use in this study. 
Having said this, there is only a limited amount of data relating to the use of the B A I with 
'normal' adults e.g. Dent & Salkovskis (1986), and Beck et al (1990) suggest that the 
BAI 's potential for detecting clinical anxiety in the non-clinical populations needs fiirther 
investigation. However, despite this, the other advantages of this measure and the fact that 
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it was being used in a research focused capacity, not- a clinical capacity, meant that the 
decision.to use this measure with all three groups remained. 
Beck Depression Inventory(BDD 
The BDI is a measure designed to assess severity of depression, originally designed by Beck 
et al in 1961. It has since become a widely accepted instrument for assessing intensity of 
depression in 'psychiatric' populations e.g. Piotrowski et al (1985) and for detecting 
possible depression in 'normal' pojDulations, e.g. Steer et al (1985). The original BDI was 
based on clinical observations and descriptions of symptoms of depression, given by clients 
who were depressed. These items were systematically consolidated into a 21 item inventory. 
Each item consists of 4 self evaluative statements, which are rated on a four point scale of 
severity. The inventory covers affective, cognitive, motivational and physiological 
symptoms of depression, although some have said that it biases cognitive symptoms e.g. 
Gotlib& Cane (1989). 
The BDI was not originally designed to screen for depression and there remains some 
debate about its reliability and validity in this. For example, Depue & ]yioore(1978) 
cautioned that high scores on the BDI may not necessarily be indicative of depression, but 
may be recording overall adjustment problems. Nevertheless, Beck et al (1990) suggest 
that a score of 15 or more may be a use&l cut-off for indicating the presence of depression 
in a non-clinical population. It was a score below this cut-off point which was adopted for 
inclusion in the non-clinical group in this study (for both measures on the BDI and the 
BAI). Generally, a total score of 0-9 indicates a 'non-depressed state', 10-19 reflects a 
'mild' level of depression , 19-26 a 'moderate' degree of depression and 26-63 a 'severe' 
level of depression. 
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In terms of reliability, the BDI has been shown to have high internal consistency in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations e.g. Beck et al (1987/88), but more variable test-retest 
results e.g. Beck et al (1987/88). It should be noted, however, that this variability may be 
due to the fact that depression is likely to change with time and/or therapy, so affecting the 
usefiilness of this type of reliability testing. 
In terms of validity it seems that "numerous studies have supported the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the BDI"(Beck et al 1988) e.g. Steer et al (1986/87). 
The BDI was chosen for this study for similar reasons to those given for using the B A I i.e. 
it is a well accepted measure, which for thepurposes of research is a reasonably reliable and 
valid measure of the severity of depression. It is also relatively quick and simple to complete 
and has potential for use with a non-clinical population. 
The Padua Inventory 
The Padua Inventory (PI) is a self - report measure of OC symptoms, where the person is 
asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 4 how much disturbance is experienced by each of the 
thoughts and behaviours listed in the Inventory. The Inventory takes about 10-15 minutes to 
complete. 
"The PI consists of 60 items describing common obsessional and compulsive behaviour and 
allows investigation of the topography of such problems in normal and clinical Ss" Sanavio 
(1988 p. 169); The scale items were originally developed from statements made by 28 
clients suffering from OCD, where the statements were those which described the 
difficulties experienced as a result of OCD. Four factors are covered by the Inventory. 
These are impaired control over mental activities; becoming contaminated; checking 
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behaviours and urges and worries of losing control over motor behaviours. The PI is the 
only self-report measure which includes, strong obsessional dimensions as distinct from ^ 
compulsive dimensions (Sternberger & Burns 1990). 
Sanavio (1988) showed this Inventory to have high internal consistency and satisfactory 
test-retest reliability over a thirty day period. The factorial structure and reliability of this 
measure has also been confirmed by others e.g. van Oppen et al (1995). In terms of validity, 
the PI is said to have good convergent and divergent validity e.g. Sanavio (1988), 
Stemberger and Burns (1990), Van Oppen et al (1995). The discriminant validity afforded 
by this scale is fiirther highlighted in this quote by Sanavio (1988 p. 169) " it (the PI) 
allows discrimination between a group of 75 outpatients vyith obsessive compulsive 
disorders and a similar group of outpatients with other neurotic disorders" . 
The PI does have some limitations, in that there appear to be no available data on the 
standardisation of the Padua on a British sample. However, Dutch norms (see page 1 in the 
Appendix) have been named as being comparable to a British 'normal' sample on the 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory and it was these norms which were used as a 
guide when setting the inclusion criteria. For the purposes of this study it is also true to say 
that it is the difference in scores between the groups which is of most significance, rather 
than the measure of clinical severity in its own right. 
The PI was chosen as a reliable, valid measure of OCD symptoms, which includes 
assessment of obsessional symptoms, and which can be used with both clinical and non­
clinical populations. 
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Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS") 
The Y-BOCS was developed to provide a measure of sisverity that could be calculated,-
independent of the type and number of obsessional symptoms (Goodman et al 1989). The 
scale was devised to be clinician rated, and to complete it the clinician has to rate severity 
of a number of specified symptoms e.g. time spent on obsessions, on a scale of 0-4. The Y -
BOCS then gives an overall severity score, but also allows for scores relating to 
obsessions and compulsions to be calculated separately. 
The inter-rater reliability and internal consistency are reported as being very good for this 
scale e.g. Goodman et al (1989), Woody et al (1995). The results of test -retest reliability 
were also good in one study (Kim et al (1990;1992),, but were less convincing in another, 
where a longer interval was used (Woody et al 1995). However, the authors of the latter 
study conclude that the reliability levels could be considered good enough for use in 
research purposes. 
In terms of validity the Y-BOCS has shown reasonable convergent validity (Goodman et al 
1989), but seems weaker in terms of divergent validity e.g.Goodman et al (1989) and 
Woody et al (1995) both found that this measure correlated with measures of depression 
and anxiety and did not adequately distinguish OCD from these other types of disorders. 
Nonetheless, the Y-BOCS has been identified as being a reliable and valid measure of 
severity of OCD in research trials and although it was developed on an American 
population, it has also been used in British studies, e.g. Insel et al (1983). 
For the needs of this study the participants were asked to complete the core assessment 
sheet as a self-report measure. This was done with the help of the researcher, but without 
the lengthy interview that would usually be included if the scale was clinician rated. Having 
this measure of severity was not considered as an essential feature of the study, but was 
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included to provide furtiier information about the participants suffering with OCD and to 
allow within-group comparisons in the OCD group should this be considered; useful. 
Despite some of its limitations the Y-BOCS was chosen as the best scale to achieve this 
measure. 
Any implications relating to the limitations on any of the measures used in this study will be 
covered more ftilly in the discussion. 
Vignettes & Appraisal Questionnaire 
Vignettes: 
Recall of emotional situations relies on retrospective recall and is individually and socially 
biased, whereas vignettes avoid reliance on retrospective material and are thought to be 
only socially biased. Therefore, the decision to use vignettes as a way of creating an 
emotional situation and/or experience more easily allowed for a comparison of appraisals in 
a variety of emotional situations, where the idiosyncratic nature of emotional experience 
was controlled to a limited extent. The use of vignette material also served to reduce, a 
little, the amount of emotional processing required of the participants, so as to reduce the 
biases or interference this may also infer. 
The choice of emotional situations was mainly made on the basis of which emotions had 
been named as having some association with OCD i.e. anger, anxiety and guilt. The fourth 
situation of pride was added as a positive emotional experience. The three other emotional 
situations are generally considered to be unpleasant and/or negative experiences. The 
inclusion of an emotional situation involving pride was made to balance this position and to 
enable comparison of appraisals with regard to an emotional situation which is generally 
regarded as a pleasant and/or positive experience. The exploration of responses to positive 
emotional experience tends to be a neglected area in clinical research, as most of the focus 
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tends to concentrate on the more obvious 'distress' in the clinical population. The decision 
to include a positive emotion is also supported by two specific points, noted fi-om the 
literature which was reviewed. The first is that Rachman (1993) reported that people with 
OCD take much less responsibility for positive events. The second is that Reynolds & 
Salkovskis (1991) found that feelings of guilt were negatively correlated with pleasant 
intrusive thoughts. 
The aim in developing the vignettes was to describe a situation which evoked the required 
emotions, in this case, emotions of guilt, anger and anxiety and pride. In order to do this the 
researcher first drafl:ed 12 vignettes, three for each emotion to be studied. The vignettes 
were all based around a fictitious story, but also included descriptions of the relevant 
emotional experience i.e. the researcher created a stimulus story, which attempted to evoke 
a particular emotional experience through the description of affective, cognitive and motor 
components commonly associated with that emotion. So, for example, one of the stories 
evoking anger was about being let down and made a fool of by ones' boss, but also included 
common descriptors of an angry feeling such as clenched fists and jaw, "feeling as i f you 
are about to bursf' and "feeling like hitting something". The original vignettes were written 
in liaison with the research supervisors. 
The next step was to identify which of the vignettes evoked the required emotions most 
effectively. With one person writing the vignettes it was considered likely that there would 
be a bias toward that person's own experience of these emotions. Consequently, in an 
attempt to control for this, nine other people were asked read the 12 vignettes and answer 
the following questions: 
1) What emotion(s) they might be left feeling if they had been in the same situation as the 
person described in the story? 
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2) What emotion they were left thinking about or feeling most strongly after reading the 
story? 
3) How strongly they thought they would feel the relevant emotion if they were iri the same 
situation as the one described in the story? (The readers were asked to rate this by 
circling a number from 1-10: 10 indicating very strongly and 1 indicating not at all 
strongly). 
The people asked to read the vignettes were all known to the researcher, but were not 
aware of any details of the study which would be likely to bias their responses. This group 
included both males and females, four and five people respectively, who ranged in age 
from 27 to 56 years. In order to control for practice effects each individual was instructed 
to read the vignettes in a different, randomised order. 
The final vignettes were chosen according to the responses given to each of the questions 
described earlier i.e. those which produced a) the most consistent responses in terms of 
questions 1 & 2 and b) gave the highest ratings in terms of strength of feeling. These 
criteria were used to ensure, as far as possible, that a fairly 'pure' and easily identifiable 
emotion was present in each situation, which in turn was likely to evoke that same feeling to 
some degree in any reader. 
In addition, Scherer (1993) stated that if one asks about hypothetical others, then one is less 
likely to access cognitive appraisals; hence the decision to write all the stories using the 
pronoun you. Also, where gender specific words were apparent two forms of the same 
vignette were used, one for each gender. The vignettes were also designed to all begin with 
the words "Imagine thaf and were all written in the present tense. Finally, each vignette 
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was subjected to a Flesch Readability test, to ensure that the readability was average, or 
below i.e. above 60 on the Flesch test. 
As well as addressing some of the issues of standardisation, between vignettes, these 
decisions were also made in an attempt to make the vignettes as 'immediate and real' as 
possible. The aim of this was to encourage the reader to identify as far as possible with the 
emotion in each scenario, whilst not being diverted or consumed by some of the factors 
e.g. extreme emotional intensity or understandable wariness, which might be experienced' if 
one was being asked to talk about 'true' experiences in detail. It was hoped that in this way 
one would elicit the 'best of all worlds' in terms of comparable, valid, but uninhibited 
responses. 
Appraisal Questionnaire 
As one studies the cognition-emotion literature it becomes clear that it is inherently difficult 
to measure appraisals sensitively and accurately. With obvious aherations, the construction 
of this questionnaire was based, to a large extent, on the work of iVIanstead and Tetlock 
(1989). These authors asked each participant to rate her/his appraisals of an identified 
emotional situation on a Likert scale. Drawing on both the named appraisals and the 
methodology used by these and other authors, e.g. Smith and .Ellsworth (1985), this 
Appraisal Questionnaire was formed, as described below: 
It was recognised that despite the careful construction of the vignettes, that different people 
may have different emotional reactions to the same story. Consequently, in order to be able 
to check that individuals were rating appraisals about the experience of similar emotions the 
first section of this questionnaire asked people to a) describe the feelings they were left with 
most strongly after reading the story and b) describe the feelings that they might experience 
52 

were they to find themselves in the situation written about in the story. A 7 point Likert 
scale was also included to measure strength of emotion. . 
From consideration of the literature and the perceived relevance to OCD, the appraisal 
dimensions chosen for this study included responsibility (self and other); threat (in terms of 
harm, both to self and others) and control (self, other and situational). Situational control 
was used to refer to whether or not the situation was perceived to be out of anyone's 
control i.e. a matter of chance. The choice of appraisals also included appraisals of 
acceptability/unacceptability (of both actions and feelings). The reasons for including, 
'responsibility', 'control' and 'threat' probably needs little further explanation, as it is fairly 
clear in the literature that these are three 'appraisal dimensions' which have been associated 
specifically with OCD. The inclusion of 'acceptability' was made with reference to the 
quote by Rachman and Hodgson (1980), see p24 of the Introduction, and was seen as 
relating to perfectionistic/high standards and beliefs relating to the 'acceptability of one's 
own thoughts and behaviours. It was also seen to relate to the idea that people with OCD 
were thought to find it difficult and/or unacceptable to express certain emotions e.g. Ryz 
(1993 ). A measure of perceived unpleasantness was also included. 
Manstead & Tetlpck (1989) used a Likert scale to measure strength of appraisals. This was 
replaced with an analogue scale in this study, in order to a) increase the sensitivity of the 
measurement and b) to allow increased individual differences to be shown e.g. Pfennings et 
al(1995) and c) to avoid the possibility of participants giving only neutral responses. The 
questionnaire asked the reader to think about how he/she would appraise the situation 
he/she had just read and to indicate his/her response by placing a cross on the corresponding 
line scale. The line scales were marked at either end to indicate a high or low level, of the 
appraisal. The response scale on which the cross was to be placed looked like this: 
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T O T A L L Y 
RESPONSIBLE 
NOT AT A L L 
RESPONSIBLE 
I I 
There were a total of fourteen appraisal dimensions, each measured on an analogue scale. 
The researcher chose to use single words to describe each appraisal dimension (see Item 5 
in the Appendix for copy of the Questionnaire). The reasons for this decision, and the 
limitations associated with it are covered in the discussion. 
The final part of the questionnaire asked the participants in each of the clinical groups to 
describe the symptoms/difficulties they were experiencing as part of OCD or anxiety 
disorder. They were also asked to rate how likely it would be for these difficulties to be 
triggered by the situation described in the story or in another situation which involved 
similar emotions. These questions were included to gather information about the subjective 
experience of symptom distress, which could be added to the objective measures and to 
create the potential for correlation of appraisal responses with symptom occurrence; albeit 
through subjective perception. 
As a final point with regard to this questionnaire, it is recognised that the reliability and 
validity of this measure were not fijlly tested (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2. for farther 
discussion of this point). 
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Demographic and Treatment Information 
If, as in cognitive theory,- one assumes that cognitive schema and appraisals are formed 
from early life experiences, then age becomes an important variable when one is researching 
these phenomena. Gender has also been shown to influence situation perception e.g. 
Torestad et al (1981) and the intellectual ability and level of responsibility a person held 
were also assumed to be variables that may influence the nature of cognitive appraisals. 
Consequently, in order to enable comparison and effects of these variables between the 
groups gender, occupation and date of birth were recorded for each participant. Occupation 
was used as a crude guide to intellectual ability and current occupational responsibility. In 
order to achieve this the researcher coded occupation according to the. following criteria: 
Level of responsibility (R) and intellectual ability (I) were each rated on a 4 point scale 
where 1 indicated a low level and 4 indicated a high level. 
Occupations were grouped and coded in the following way: 
Directors/managers/editors: R=4; 1=3 
Accountants/pharmacists/researchers/engineers: R=3; 1=4 
Teachers/nurses/fire and police service: R=3; 1=3 
Secretaries/Clerks/ administrators/sales/office workers/nursing assistants: R=2; 1=2 
People who were unemployed, but had a prior degree: R=l; 1=4 
Retired/housewife: R=l; 1=4 
If anyone was studying for a degree course as well as working the'T' score was adjusted to 
reflect this. 
It is recognised that this is a very crude procedure, which may negatively affect the results 
for people who are not working due to current mental health difficulties. However, this 
area was not a main focus of the research and so, with this in mind, this measure was 
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considered as an appropriate way of enabling some comparison of these variables between 
the groups. 
With regard to the two clinical groups, each participant was also asked to answer a number 
of other questions, such as what treatment they were currently receiving and what 
medication they were currently taking (see Item 7 in the Appendix for full details of the 
questions asked). These variables were included for the same reasoins as the previous 
demographic variables, in that they could be used to provide supplementary information 
and/or because they were assumed to have a possible influence on cognitive appraisals. 
This information was collected on a "Research Assessment Sheet" (see Item 7 in the 
Appendix for copy of this sheet). 
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P R O C E D U R E 
The procedure described below includes the pilot study and the procedure for the main 
study. 
2.4.The Pilot Study 
The vignettes and the Appraisal Questionnaires were developed by the researcher and so to 
test the face validity of measurement and to ensure that both could be easily understood by 
participants from a clinical population a small pilot study was conducted. It is recognised 
that this pilot study is very small and a larger pilot study would be recommended. The three 
participants who took part in the pilot study were all people who were suffering with OCD. 
In order to carry out the pilot study, the procedure, which will be described in the following 
pages, was followed through with the first three clients who agreed to participate. 
The completion of the pilot study enabled the following points to be confirmed: 
a) the analogue scale enabled individual differences in the responses to be recorded 
b) overall, the vignettes were evoking the desired emotional experiences (with the 
adjustments, as described below) 
c) the vignettes and Appraisal Questionnaires were easily understood (with a few minor 
adjustments as described below). 
From the results of the pilot study it became apparent that in order to detect differences in 
appraisals the vignettes would need to describe a situation where a variety of appraisals 
could potentially be triggered e.g. responsibility could be attributed to self and/or to other, 
rather than clearly being attributable in just one direction. Otherwise, each participant is 
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more likely to record tiie same response. With this point in mind, it was ensured that each of 
the vignettes was designed to include a degree of ambiguity. 
The pilot study also highlighted a few words and phases which seemed to cause confijsion 
for the participants. Where this was the case the wording was altered to be less confiising. 
2.5. The Main Study 
Once an individual had agreed to participate in the study a time was arranged for that 
person to meet with the research interviewer. Wherever possible this was arranged at the 
same community setting. However, for the convenience of clients, people were sometimes 
seen in alternative community locations. 
At the beginning of the interview participants were asked to confirm that they had read the 
Information Sheet, were given another opportunity to read it if necessary and were offered 
an opportunity to ask any questions. They were then asked to complete the consent form. 
It was also recommended that the relevant GPs were sent a standard letter (see Item 9 in the 
Appendix) and a copy of the Information Sheet, and so it was confirmed with each 
participant from the clinical groups that he/she was happy for this to happen. 
To begin the interview the researcher read the instruction sheet (see. Item 12 of Appendix 
for copy of instruction sheet). The participants were also reminded that they could ask 
questions at any point. 
Following this, participants were asked to read the first vignette and then to complete the 
Appraisal Questionnaire, immediately afterwards. This process was repeated for each of the 
four vignettes; the order of presentation of vignettes being randomised for each participant. 
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Next, participants were aslced to provide the demographic information, as described above, 
and finally they were asked to complete the standard questionnaires.. The research 
interviewer remained present throughout. 
At the end of this interview, which usually lasted between Ihour 15 minutes and Ihour 30 
minutes, the participants were given an opportunity to ask any fiirther questions and/or to 
talk about any 'uncomfortable' feelings resulting fi-om completing the questionnaires. The 
aim of this 'de-briefing' was to ensure that no participant left the research interview with 
increased negative feelings, as a result of this experience. 
Scoring 
The standard questionnaires were all scored after completion of each interview and 
recorded on a coded Results Sheet, (see item 6 in the Appendix for a copy of this sheet). 
The appraisals were scored by measuring the distance from the left end of the line to where 
the participant had marked a cross; being measured to the nearest half centimetre. These 
scores were also added to the Results Sheet. 
59 
I 
Chapters: R E S U L T S 
S.l.The Participants 
There were ten participants in each of the three groups. With regard to the two clinical 
groups the OCD group included two people who described their main symptoms as 
excessive wasliing only, three people who described their main symptoms as fear of 
contamination or excessive washing together with excessive checking behaviours; four 
people who described their main symptoms being the experience of intrusive thoughts 
and/or a fear of loss of control and one person who described his/her main symptoms as 
'hoarding'. The anxiety group included eight people who described themselves as having a 
'phobia' and two people who described themselves as having more general anxiety 
symptoms. The types of phobia included claustrophobia, agoraphobia, vomit phobia and 
social phobia. 
At this point it may be noted that there is a variety of symptom experience in each of the 
groups. This raises some research implications, which will be covered more fully in the 
discussion. 
Statistical analyses were carried out to test the difference between the three groups on a 
number of demographic variables. The details of the demographic information and the 
corresponding analyses are contained in the following tables. NB. Where the homogeneity 
of variance was equal between the three groups anova analyses were used and where this 
was not the case a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
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G R O U P Number of Males Number of Females 
OCD 4 6 
Anxiety J 7 
Non-clinical 5 5 
T A B L E 1: Gender of participants in each of the three groups. 
G R O U P R A N G E M E A N S.D. F value Sig. Value. 
OCD 27-60 42.40 12.26 .422 .660 
Anxiety 20-60 37.80 12.43 
Non-clinical 23-56 41.6 11.15 
T A B L E 2: Age of participants in each of the three groups. Participants were matched 
for age within 11 years 
G R O U P R A N G E M E A N S.D. Chi-square Sig. Value. 
OCD 9-40 23.5 11.87 14:676 .001 
Anxiety 6-25 14.7 6.86 
Non-clinical 0-9 5.9 3.70 
T A B L E 3: Level of depression in each of the three groups. The level of depression was 
measured by score on the Beck Depression Inventory. 
G R O U P R A N G E M E A N S.D. F value Sig. Value. 
OCD 4-43 23.6 11.6 22.58 .000 
Anxiety 19-48 29.4 9.11 
Non-clinical 0-14 4.00 4.22 
T A B L E 4: Level of anxiety in each of the three groups. The level of anxiety was 
measured by score on the Beck Anxiety Inventory. 
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G R O U P R A N G E M E A N S.D. Chi-square Sig. Value. 
OCD 66-134 97.30 28.3 21.047 .000 
Anxiety 4-52 33.50 17.36 
Non-clinical 0-34 18.40 10.07 
T A B L E 5: Level of O C symptoms in each of the three groups. The level of OC 
symptoms was measured by the score on the Padua Inventory. 
G R O U P R A N G E M E A N S.D 
OCD 19-30 22.00 4.3 
T A B L E 6: Severity of O C D , in the OCD group. The severity of OCD was measured by 
the score on the Yale Brown-Obsessive Compulsive Scale. 
G R O U P M E A N S.D. F value Sig. Value. 
OCD 3.00 .82 .448 .644 
Anxiety 2.70 .83 
Non-clinical 3.00 .82 
T A B L E 7: Level of intellectual ability in each of the three groups. 
G R O U P M E A N S.D. F value Sig. Value. 
OCD 2.50 .85 2.83 .077 
Anxiety 2.10 .88 
Non-clinical 3.00 .82 
T A B L E 8: Level of responsibility in each of the three groups. 
For variables of age, level of intellectual ability and level of responsibility the anova analyses 
showed no overall differences in scores on these three variables. Therefore, according, to 
these results, one can assume that the three groups are reasonably matched in these areas. 
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With regard to the levels of anxiety in the three groups, the scores on the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory fell within the 'moderate', 'severe', and 'minimal' Categories for the OCD, 
anxiety and non-clinical groups respectively. ('Minimal' is the term used to indicate the 
'norm' for this measure). The anova analysis showed a significant difference between the 
three groups and the Scheffe post-hoc analysis showed that the differences lay between each 
of the cUnical groups and the non-clinical group. There was no significant difference 
between the two clinical groups.(see page 7/8 of the Appendix for full details of this 
analysis). These results suggest that one can assume the OCD group and anxiety group to 
be have similar levels of anxiety, with the non-clinical group having significantly lower 
levels of anxiety than both of these groups. 
With regard to levels of depression in the three groups, the scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory fell within the 'moderate', 'mild' and 'non-depressed state' categories for the 
OCD, anxiety and non-clinical groups respectively. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis showed that 
the three groups were significantly different on this measure. However, a post hoc test 
showed that the only difference lay between the OCD and the non-clinical group, (see Page 
7/8 of the Appendix for full details of the analysis). The scores on the measure Of depression 
therefore seem to indicate a continuum of depression across the three groups, with the 
anxiety group falling between the other two groups. Clinically this raises some obvious, but 
important implications for interpretation of the results and the decision was therefore made 
to take into account the variable of depression throughout the analyses. 
With respect to level of OC symptoms, the OCD group scores fell above what was 
regarded as the clinical cut off point on the Padua Inventory, whereas the scores of the 
other two groups fell below it. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference 
between the three groups and the post hoc test showed this difference to be between the 
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OGD group and the other two groups. There was no significant difference between the 
anxiety group and the non-clinical group, (see page 7/8 of the Appendix for fiill details of 
the analysis). From these results one can assume that the anxiety group and the nonTClinical 
group are relatively matched with regard to OCD symptomatology, with the OCD group 
having a significantly higher level of symptoms than the other two groups. The Y-BOCS 
scores suggests that the severity of OCD for the participants in the OCD group is moderate, 
rather than severe or mild (Goodman et al 1989). 
The research study relied on being able to identify people with OCD, people with anxiety 
symptoms, but no OC symptoms and people suffering from no clinical symptoms associated 
with these disorders. The above results suggest that this distinction of groups was, in the 
main, successfiilly achieved. 
In summary, the clinical categorisation of the three groups according to the scores on the 
assessment questionnaires suggests that the OCD group had much higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology, a slightly higher level of depression and a slightly lower level of anxiety 
than the anxiety group. The non-clinical group scores fell below the clinical range on all 
these measures. 
The statistical analysis also showed that the two clinical groups differed significantly on the 
measure of OCD symptomatology, but on the measure of anxiety and depression the 
differences were not shown to be significant. The non-clinical group scores were 
significantly lower in all cases, except on the measure of depression, where, statistically 
there was no difference between the anxiety group and the non-clinical group. The latter 
result, together with reference to the raw scores, suggests a continuum of depression 
across the three groups. 
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3.2.The Emotions evoked by each of the vignettes. 
The first part of the Appraisal Questionnaire asked the participants to answer two 
questions; i.e. what feelings they were left with after reading the story and what feelings 
they might experience if they were in a similar situation themselves. This was done a) to 
focus the attention of the participants on the emotion of the situation and b) to check that 
the desired emotions were being elicited by each of the vignettes. In the majority of cases 
the answers to these two questions were very similar, with only one notable discrepancy. In 
this case, the individual could relate to the person in the story feeling proud, but could not 
imagine feeling pride in that situation for herself 
Overall, it seemed that the desired emotions of anxiety, guilt, anger and pride were very 
successfully elicited with only a few notable exceptions. In summary, 100% participants 
gave descriptions which related to anxiety, fear or nervousness in response to the anxiety 
vignette; 90% participants gave descriptions which related to guilt in response to the guilt 
vignette; 90% of participants gave descriptions which related to anger in response to the 
anger vignette and 93% of participants gave descriptions which related to pride or 
happiness in response to the pride vignette. The cases where the desired emotion was not 
evoked were as follows: 
One participant described feelings of arrogance in the situation of pride, one participant 
described feelings of worry in the situation of anger and one participant said they would not 
feel angry in this particular 'angry situation'. (It was unclear from this participants response 
whether or not he/she could relate to the character's feelings of anger) It is also true that for 
two other people the situation of pride was not perceived as a wholly positive experience 
since some negative feelings were also associated with this vignette. Finally, in three cases 
the participant did not use 'feeling words', but described thoughts or questions in his/her 
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mind. Wliere tliis is tlie case it is obviously difficult to be sure whether the desired emotion 
was actually evoked. 
At this point it also seems relevant to mention an observation made by the researcher: it 
seemed that the people suffering with OCD found it more difficult to describe the emotions, 
took longer to do so, tended to write lengthy descriptions and seemed more concerned 
about describing the 'correct' emotion. 
The reader is referred to pages 11-16 of the Appendix for flill details of the results 
pertaining to the emotions described by the participants. 
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3.3. R E S U L T S I. Results for Hypotheses la-Id 
A two-way analysis of variance, with one between subject variable (group) and fourteen 
within-subject variables (appiraisal dimensions), was carried out to test the first hypothesis. 
H Y P O T H E S I S ONE: 
Hypothesis one (la-Id) stated that in each of the situations of anxiety, anger and guilt, but 
not the situation of pride, the groups would show different profiles across the fourteen 
appraisal dimensions i.e. the 'emotional-cognitive profiles' of the three, groups would be 
parallel in the emotional situations of pride, but not in the situations of anxiety, anger and 
guilt. The fourteen appraisal dimensions are described below: 
The abbreviations in brackets are the abbreviations used in the following results tables: 
Unpleasantness (pleasure), 
Personal responsibility (sresp), 
Responsibility of others (ores), 
Personal control (scontrol), 
Control of others (ocontrol), 
Situational control (sicontrol), 
Acceptability of one's own actions according to self (sactions) 
Acceptability of one's own actions according to others (©actions), 
Acceptability of one's own feelings by self (sfeelings) 
Acceptability of one's own feelings by others (ofeelings), 
'Harm to self (sharm) 
'Harm to others' (oharm) 
Benefit to self (sbenefit) 
Benefit to others (obenefit). 
The following pages give a graphical representation of the resuhs relating to each of the 
above hypothesis (la-Id), along with details of each of the anova analyses. 
NB. A higher score indicates a lower level of the appraisal in question e.g. a very high 
score on the appraisal of personal responsibility means that very little personal 
responsiblity is perceived 
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GRAPH la - To show diflerences between the three groups on all the appraisal 
dimensions, in the situation of anxiety 
KEY: 
Pleasure = Unpleasantness 
Sresp = Personal responsibility 
Ores = Responsibility of others 
Scontrol = Personal control 
Ocontrol = Control of others 
Sicontrol = Situational control 
Sactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to self 
Oactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to others 
Sfeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings by self 
Ofeelings = Acceptabihty of one's own feeUngs by others 
Sharm = Harm to self 
Oharm = 'Harm to others' 
Sbenefit = Benefit to self 
Obenefit = Benefit to others 
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E F F E C T Df F Sig. 
Appraisal effect 13 7.389 :000 
Group effect 2 .149 .863 
Appraisal by group 26 2.160 .001 
Appraisal effect: 
depression controlled 
13 3.5 .000 
Group effect: 
depression controlled 
2 .356 .704 
Appraisal by group: 
depression controlled 
26 2.048 .002 
T A B L E 9: To show results of repeated measures anova in the situation of anxiety. 
The above analysis showed a significant interaction between group and scores on the 
appraisal dimensions. This suggests, as does observation of the graph (Graph la), that the 
three groups show different 'emotional-cognitive profiles' as measured by the fourteen 
appraisal dimensions, in the situation of anxiety. Therefore, Hypothesis l a is supported. 
This effect remained when the variable of depression was controlled for in the analysis. 
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Appraisal Dimensions 
GRAPH lb- To show difTerences between the three groups on all the appraisal 
dimensions, in the situation of guilt 
KEY: 
Pleasure « Unpleasantness 
Sresp = Personal responsibility 
Ores = Responsibility of others 
Scontrol = Personal control 
Ocontrol = Control of others 
Sicontrol = Situational control 
Sactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to self 
Oactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to others 
Sfeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings by self 
Ofeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings by others 
Sharm = 'Harm to self 
Oharm = "Harm to others' 
Sbenefit = Benefit to self 
Obenefit = Benefit to others 
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E F F E C T Df F Sig 
Appraisal Effect 13 19.502 .000 
Group Effect 2 1.405 .263 
Appraisals by group 26 2.048 .002 
Appraisal Effect: 
depression controlled 
13 6.869 .000 
Group Effect: 
depression controlled 
2 1.663 .210 
Appraisal by group: 
depression controlled 
26 1.794 .001 
T A B L E 10: To show results of repeated measures anova in the situation of guilt 
The above analysis showed a significant interaction between group and scores on the 
appraisal dimensions. This, along with observation of the graph (Graph lb) suggests that 
the groups show different 'emotional-cognitive profiles', as measured by the fourteen 
appraisal dimensions, in the situation of guilt. Therefore, Hypothesis lb is also supported. 
This effect remained, and in fact increased in significance, when the variable of depression 
was controlled for in the analysis. 
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14 
Appraisal 
GRAPH Ic - To show difTerences between the three groups on all appraisal 
dimensions in the situation of anger 
KEY: 
Pleasure = Unpleasantness 
Sresp = Personal responsibilitj' 
Ores = Responsibibt\ of others 
Scontrol = Personal control 
Ocontrol = Control of others 
Sicontrol = Situational control 
Sactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to self 
Oactions = Acceptability of one's own acUons according to others 
Sfeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings by self 
Ofeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings by oUiers 
Sharm = 'Harm to self 
Ohann = 'Harm to others' 
Sbenefit = Benefit to self 
Obenefit = Benefit to others 
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Appraisal Effect 13 19.046 .000 
Group Effect 2 .548 .585 
Appraisal by group 26 .989 .483 
Appraisal Effect: 
depression controlled 
13 7.394 .000 
Group Effect: 
depression controlled 
2 .727 .494 
Appraisal by group: 
depression controlled 
26 1.217 .219 
T A B L E 11: To show results of repeated measures anova in the situation of anger 
The above analysis showed no significant interaction between group and scores on the 
appraisal dimensions. This, along with observation of the graph (Graph Ic) suggests that the 
group do not show different 'emotional-cognitive profiles', as measured by the fourteen 
appraisal dimensions, in. the situation of anger. Therefore, Hypothesis Ic is not supported-
This effect remained non-significant when the variable of depression was controlled for in 
the analysis. 
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Appraisal Dimensions 
GRAPH Id - To show difTerences between the three groups on all appraisal 
dimensions in the situation of pride. 
KEY: 
Pleasure = Unpleasantness 
Sresp = Personal responsibility 
Ores = Responsibility of others 
Scontrol = Personal control 
Ocontrol = Control of others 
Sicontrol - Sinjational control 
Sactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to self 
Oactions = Acceptability of one's own actions according to others 
Sfeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings according to self 
Ofeelings = Acceptability of one's own feelings according to others 
Sharm = 'Harm to self 
Oharm = "Harm to others' 
Shenefit = Benefit to self 
Obenefit« Benefit to oUiers 
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E F F E C T Df F Sig 
Appraisal Effect 13 57.30 .000 
Group Effect 2 5.021 .015 
Appraisal by Group 26 1.044 .409 
Appraisal Effect: 
depression controlled 
13 21.819 .000 
Group Effect: 
depression controlled, 
2 3.577 .044 
Appraisal by Group: 
depression controlled 
26 1.477 .066 
T A B L E 12: To show results of repeated measures anova in the situation of pride 
The above analysis showed no significant interaction between group and scores on the 
appraisal dimensions. This, along with observation of the graph (Graph Id) suggests that 
the groups do not show different 'emotional-cognitive profiles', as measured by the 
fourteen appraisal dimensions in the situation of pride. Therefore, hypothesis Id is 
supported. The interaction effect remained non-significant when depression was controlled 
for in the analysis. 
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3.4. R E S U L T S n. Results for Hypotheses 2-6 
Hypotheses 2-6 make specific predictions about the group differences on specific appraisal 
dimensions. To test these hypotheses one-way anovas were first carried out to confirm a 
difference between the three groups, on the appraisal dimension in question, and then 
contrast t-tests were used to test the specific, a priori predictions, when appropriate. A 
summary of these analyses is given below, along with a description of the results, as they 
relate to each hypothesis. Where the variance between the groups was unequal the results 
which reflect this are the ones reported. Also, unless otherwise stated, it can be assumed 
that the data, on any given variable was not found to be skewed. 
(Unless otherwise stated, the reader is referred to pages 23-25 of the Appendix for the 
details of any analysis results which are not reported in the following text). 
H Y P O T H E S I S T W O : 
Hypothesis two stated that the OCD group would perceive more personal responsibility 
than the other two groups in situations of anxiety arid guilt (part 2), but not in situations of 
anger and pride (part 2a). 
The resuhs of the one-way anova showed a significant, between group difference on this 
appraisal in the situations of anxiety, guilt and pride. When the co-variate depression was 
controlled for in the analysis, this difference disappeared in the situations of guilt and 
pride, but remained in the situation of anxiety. Given the presence of a group difference, 
contrast t-tests were carried out to ascertairi whether this difference lay in the predicted 
positions. 
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GROUP CONTRASTS t df Sig. 
OCD with Anxiety -.472. 27 .640 
OCD with Non-clinical -2.782 27 .010 
Anxiety with Non-clinical -2.310 27 .029 
TABLE 13: To show results of contrast t-tests for appraisal of perceived personal 
responsibility in the situation of anxiety. 
GROUP CONTRASTS t df Sig. 
OCD with Anxiety -1.282 27 .211 
OCD with non-clinical -3.123 27 .004 
Anxiety with non-clinical -1.841 27 .077 
TABLE 14: To show results of contrast t-tests for appraisal of perceived personal 
responsibility in situations of guilt. 
GROUP CONTRASTS t df Sig. 
OCD with Anxiety 2.608 27 .015 
OCD with Non-clinical 1.620 27 .117 
Anxiety with Non-clinical -.988 27 .332 
TABLE 15: To show results of contrast t-tests for appraisal of perceived personal 
responsibility in situations of pride. 
(nb. The data for the anxiety groups was found to be skewed in the situation of pride, so, as 
parametric tests were used a little caution in the interpretation of these results is probably 
advised.) 
In the situations of anxiety and guilt the t-test resuhs show the scores in the OCD group to 
be significantly different to the scores in the non-clinical group, as predicted. The difference 
is also in the predicted direction. However, the results show no difference between scores 
in the two clinical groups. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is only partly supported. 
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In addition, the significant difference between the anxiety group and the non-clinical group, 
in the situation of anxiety, also seems worthy of note. Also, the nature of the raw scores 
suggests a continuum of scores on this appraisal, with the OCD group perceiving the 
most personal responsibility, the anxiety group scores falling in the middle and the non­
clinical group perceiving the least personal responsibility. 
In the situation of pride, there was a significant difference between the two clinical groups, 
the anxiety group perceiving significantly more personal responsibility than.the OCD group. 
There was no significant difference between the groups in the situation of anger, but with 
the presence of the significant difference in the situation of pride this means that part 2a of 
this hypothesis is again only partly supported. 
Although no specific hypotheses were made about the appraisal of'responsibility of others', 
the was the obvious place to comment on the observation that the mean raw scores on this 
appraisal showed the OCD to perceive less responsibility, than the other two groups, in the 
situation of guilt. (The differences between the groups did not reach statistical significance; 
see page 28 of the Appendix for details of this additional analysis). 
H Y P O T H E S I S T H R E E : 
Hypothesis three stated that the two clinical groups would perceive less personal control 
than the non-clinical group in situations of anxiety(part 3), the OCD group would perceive 
less personal control in the situation of guilt (part 3a), with no differences between the three 
groups in situations of anger and pride (3b): 
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The one-way anova did not show any significant differences between the three groups, in 
any of the emotional situations, which means that part 3b is supported, whilst parts 3 & 3a 
are not. 
Again no specific hypotheses were made with respect to the appraisal 'control of others', 
but the mean raw scores on this appraisal dimension suggest that the OGD group perceived 
greater control of others in the situation of anxiety, and greater situational control in the 
situation of guilt (However, the differences between the groups did not reach statistical 
significance; see Page 28 of the Appendix for results of this additional analyses) 
H Y P O T H E S I S F O U R : 
Hypothesis four stated that in the situations of anger and guilt the OCD group would find 
the feelings of anger and guilt less acceptable than the other two groups. This appraisal 
dimension has two aspects, one relating to acceptability according to self and one relating to 
acceptability according to others. 
The results of the anova analyses showed no significant differences between the groups, on 
any aspect of this appraisal, in either of the situations of guilt or anger. Hypothesis four is 
therefore not supported. 
However, although weakened by the absence of statistically significant differences, the 
pattern of the raw scores again seems worthy of a mention. The mean scores in the OCD 
group suggest this group found the feeling of guilt to be the least acceptable, as expected, 
but the feeling of anger to be most acceptable when compared to the other two groups, the 
opposite of what was expected. In fact it was the anxiety group that found the feeling of 
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anger to be the least acceptable. The non-clinical group scores fell in the middle in each 
case. , -
H Y P O T H E S I S F I V E : 
Hypothesis five stated that the OCD group would find their own actions less acceptable, in 
the situation of guilt, than in the other two groups. This appraisal dimension has two 
aspects, one relating to acceptability according to self and one relating to acceptability 
according to others. 
The only significant difference shown by the one-way anova was on the appraisal of 
"acceptability of action according to self, in the situation of guilt. Given the presence of a 
group difference, contrast t-tests were carried out to ascertain whether this difference lay in 
the predicted position. 
G R O U P S t df P 
OCD with Anxiety 3.141 27 .004 
OCD with Non-clinical .989 27 .332 
Anxiety with Non-clinical -2.152 27 .040 
T A B L E 16: To show results of t-tests for appraisal of 'acceptability of one's own 
action according to. self in the situation of guilt. 
The t-test results showed the scores in the OCD group to differ from the scores in the 
anxiety group. The difference was also in the predicted direction. However, this 
hypothesis cannot be fully accepted because there was no significant difference between the 
OCD group and the non-clinical group. In addition, there was an unpredicted difference 
between the anxiety group and the non-clinical group on this appraisal. 
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H Y P O T H E S I S SIX: 
Hypothesis six stated that the two cHnical groups would perceive more 'harm to self than 
the non-clinical group, in the situation of anxiety (part 6), the OCD group will perceive 
more 'harm to self than the other two groups, in the situation of guilt (part 6a). It also 
stated that there would be no differences on this appraisal dimension in the situations of 
pride and anger (part 6c). 
The distribution of the data on this appraisal dimensions was skewed, in the anxiety group. 
As a parametric analysis was used some caution should perhaps noted in the interpretation 
of these results. However, with such a highly significant difference it is unlikely that this 
effect is due to chance. 
The resuhs of the one-way anova showed significant differences between the groups in the 
situations of anxiety and guilt, but not in the situations of anger and pride. When depression 
was controlled for in the analysis this effect remained in the situation of anxiety, but 
disappeared in the situation of guilt. Given the presence of a group difference, contrast t-
tests were carried out on these scores to ascertain whether these differences lay in the 
predicted positions. 
GROUPS t df Sig. 
OCD with Anxiety 1.365 26 .184 
OCD with Non-clinical -2.296 26 .030 
Anxiety with Non-clinical -3.624 26 .001 
T A B L E 17: To show results of contrast t-tests for appraisal of perceived harm to self 
in the situation of arixietv 
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GROUPS t df Sig 
OCD with Anxiety -.322 27 .750 
OCD with Non-clinical -3.029 27 .005 
Anxiety with Non-clinical -2.707 27 .012 
TABLE 18: To show results of contrast t-tests for appraisal of perceived harm to self 
in the situation of guilt 
The t-tests showed that part 6 and part 6c of the Hypothesis are supported, as the scores in 
both clinical groups were significantly different to the scores in the non-clinical group in the 
situation of anxiety and there were no differences on this appraisal in the situations of anger 
and pride. In the situation of anxiety, the difference between the anxiety group and the non­
clinical group on this appraisal is significant at a higher level, than the difference between 
the OCD group and the non-clinical group. The differences were also in the predicted 
direction. 
However, part 6b of this hypothesis cannot be firlly supported because the scores in the 
anxiety group, as well as the OCD group, were shown to be significantly different to those 
in the non-clinical group, in the situation of guilt. Two fiirther points are also worthy of 
note; first that the latter effect was more significant for the OCD group difference, than 
the anxiety group and the second that, in the situation of guilt, the group differences are lost 
when depression is controlled for in the anialysis. 
Below is a brief, overall summary of the results pertaining to hypotheses 2-6: 
The three appraisal dimensions where either or both the clinical groups were seen to differ 
significantly fi-om the non-clinical group were those of perceived personal responsibility, 
perceived harm to self and acceptability of one's own actions according to self 
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People suffering with OCD, and people suffering with high levels of anxiety, in the absence 
of OC symptoms, perceived-.more personal responsibility in situations of anxiety than people 
in the non-clinical group. Although the significance of the effect is similar in each case it is 
slightly greater for the OCD group. People suffering with OCD also perceived more 
personal responsibility in the situation of guilt, than people in either of the other two 
groups. 
With respect to the appraisal perceived harm to self, the two clinical groups perceive more 
harm to self than the non-clinical group, in both the situations of anxiety and guilt. On this 
appraisal, in the situation of anxiety, the effect is more significant for the anxiety group. 
However, in the situation of guilt, the group differences disappear when depression is 
controlled for in the analysis. 
Finally, in the situation of guilt, people suffering from OCD perceived their own actions to 
be as acceptable as people in the non-clinical group, whereas the anxiety group found their 
own actions to be more acceptable. 
H Y P O T H E S I S S E V E N : 
Hypothesis seven stated that appraisals of high levels of harm to self and appraisals of high 
levels of personal responsibility will be significantly correlated with perceived likelihood of 
the occurrence of symptoms of OCD. It also stated that only appraisals of high levels of 
perceived harm to self will be correlated with perceived Ukelihood of the occurrence of 
symptoms of anxiety. 
A Pearson product moment correlation was carried out to test this hypothesis: 
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Key relating to following table: 
Syriipt = Perceived likelihood that symptoms will occur in the specific situation described in 
the vignette. 
Sympt2= perceived likelihood that symptoms will occur in other situations which evoke the 
emotion in question. 
Group 
O C D Anxiety 
Appraisal Dimension Sympt Sympt2 Sympt Sympt2 
Personal responsibility: 
Situation of anxiety 
-.011 -.153 -.245 -.307 
SelfHarm: 
Situation of anxiety 
.902** .781** .071 .051 
Personal responsibility: 
Situation of guilt 
.483 .640* -.189 -.142 
Self harm: 
Situation of guilt 
.841** .789** .326 .093 
Personal responsibility 
Situation of anger 
.241 .278 -.110 .083 
Self harm: 
Situation of anger 
.117 .047 .075 .418 
Personal responsibility: 
Situation of pride 
-.268 .429 .060 -.535 
Self harm: 
Situation of pride 
.007 .132 -.480 -.219 
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
T A B L E 19 : To show correlation between appraisals of personal responsibility and 
perceived harm to self with perceived likelihood of occurrence of symptoms, in the 
two clinical groups, in the situations of anxiety, guilt, anger and pride. 
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The results relating, to hypothesis seven are reliant on self-reported likelihood of symptom 
occurrence, but with this in mind, they show significant correlations between perceived 
symptom likelihood in the OCD group with the appraisal of perceived self'harm in both 
situations of anxiety and guilt and the appraisal of perceived self responsibility in situations 
of guilt. These correlations are as predicted, but the hypothesis can only be partly supported 
because there were no significant correlations in the anxiety group. 
With respect to the results regarding perceived personal responsibility, the correlation only 
existed when participants were asked to decide whether symptoms would occur in other 
situations of guilt; there was no significant correlation relating to the specific situation 
described in the vignette. The situation where both of these appraisals are correlated with 
symptoms is that of anxiety. 
In summary, appraisals of perceived harm to self seem to be linked to OC symptomology in 
both situations of anxiety and guilt, but appraisals of responsibility seem to be linked to OC 
symptomology in situations of guilt, not anxiety and then, it seems, only in certain types of 
situations, not necessarily the situation of guilt used in this study. With respect to the 
anxiety group, appraisals of self harm were not linked to symptoms of anxiety, in the 
absence of the symptoms of OCD. 
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3.5. RESULTS HI: Results from the four participants who had 'recovered' from 
ocp. 
Four of the participants gave self reports that they were somewhat 'recovered' from OCD. 
The scores on the Padua Inventory (PI)also confirmed that the scores of these participants 
fell outside the clinical range. There were obviously no previous PI score with which to 
compare this, but it was, nevertheless, taken as supportive evidence that these four people 
were, indeed, 'recovered'. 
This data was used to assess how, or indeed if, the nature of appraisals was seen to change 
when someone moves from a person who suffers from OCD to someone who is 'recovered' 
from this disorder. In this case this was done by comparing each appraisal score, for each 
participant who had 'recovered', to the mean score of the clinical OCD group. 
The tables below give a summary of the most notable changes in appraisal scores for the 
'recovered' OCD group, when compared to the OCD mean group scores. The resuhs are 
only reported where the appraisals of all, or three out of the four, participants were seen to 
change in the same direction. For frill details of this data the reader is referred to pages 19-
20 of the Appendix. 
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Appraisal Dimension How it changed in comparison to the 
mean scores in the OCD group 
Unpleasantness Perceived more pleasure in this situation 
Personal responsibility Perceived about the same level of personal 
responsibility 
Control of others Percdived others as having less control 
'Harm to self Perceived more 'harm to self 
Benefit to others Perceived less benefit to others. 
TABLE 20: To show the differences on the appraisal dimensions bet^ veen the four 
participants who had 'recovered' from OCD and the OCD group, in the situation of 
anxiety. (NB. Only those differences where all, or three oid of the four participants 
changed in the same direction are given) 
Appraisal Dimension How it changed in comparison to the 
mean scores in the OCD group 
Acceptability of actions according to others. Actions more acceptable to others. 
Acceptability of feelings according to others Feelings more acceptable to others. 
Control of others Perceived others as having less control 
'Harm to self Perceived less 'harm to self 
Benefit to self Perceived more benefit to self 
TABLE 21: To show the differences on the appraisal dimensions betiveen the four 
participants who had 'recovered' from OCD and the OCD group, in the situation of 
guilt. (NB. Only those differerices where all, or three oiU of the four participants changed 
in the same direction are given) 
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Appraisal Dimension How it changed in comparison to the 
mean scores in the O C D group 
Unpleasantness Perceived less unpleasantness. 
Responsibility of others Perceived more responsibility of others. 
Control of others Perceived others as having more control 
Personal control Perceived less personal control 
Situational control Perceived less situational control. 
'Harm to self . Perceived less 'harm to self 
T A B L E 22: To show the differences on the appraisal dimensions between the four 
participants who had 'recovered' from O C D and the O C D group, in the situation of 
anger. (NB. Only those differences where all, or three oid of the foin-participants changed 
in the same direction are given) 
Appraisal Dimension How it changed in comparison to the 
mean scores in the O C D group 
Unpleasantness Perceived less unpleasantness. 
Personal responsibility Perceived more personal responsibility 
Responsibility of others Perceived others as having less responsibility 
Control of others Perceived others as having less control 
Personal control Perceived more personal control 
Benefit to others Perceived more benefit to others 
Acceptability of actions according to self Actions more acceptable to self 
Acceptability of actions according to others Actions more acceptable to others 
Acceptability of feelings according to self Feelings more acceptable to self 
'Harm to others' Perceived less 'harm to others' 
T A B L E 23: To show the differerices on the appraisal dimensions between the four 
participants who had 'recovered' from O C D and the O C D group, in the situation of 
pride. (NB. Only those differences where all, or three oid of the four participants changed 
in the same direction are giveii) 
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Chapter 4: DISCUSSION 
The Purpose of the Study: 
The main purpose of tiiis study was to test and explore certain aspects of a variety of 
psychological theories and perspectives, which have been influential in the understanding of 
anxiety and OCD. It was also hoped that through doing this the results would be of help in 
fiirther expanding the understanding OCD, a disorder which is acknowledged to be 
complex in its make-up. 
4.1. The 'Emotional Cognitive Profiles' 
This study showed the 'emotional-cognitive profiles' to be different between the three 
groups in the situations of anxiety and guilt. This supports the theoretical stance that the 
processing of information relating to the experience of guilt and/or anxiety is important in 
the maintenance of anxiety and/or OCD. It also supports the argument that to understand 
OCD one also needs to understand the nature of anxiety and guilt as it is experienced by 
this cUent group. However, it is also of interest that no differences were found between the 
group 'profiles' in the situations of anger and pride. 
One way to interpret these findings is that the presence of OCD and/or anxiety is more 
closely associated with feelings of anxiety and guilt, than it is with anger and pride. In 
relation to some of the Hterature this is perhaps not such a surprise and, indeed, provides 
support for the idea that OCD is probably an anxiety disorder, and speculative support for 
the notion that OCD is a disorder of both guilt and anxiety e.g. Rosen (1975). 
However, some of the literature suggests a specific relationship between anger and OCD 
e.g. Rachman (1993), which leaves us with the question of why there were no differences 
in the 'emotional-cognitive profiles' between these groups, in this emotional situation. One 
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possible reason for this may be found if one looks at the type of anger being experienced: 
The vignette used in this study described what is unlikely to be considered, as anything other 
than 'justified anger' and the suggestion is that a difference in the three 'profiles' would be 
observed if this emotion were to be replaced with 'unjustified anger'. A fialler discussion of 
this point can be read later on in this section. 
There were no significant differences between the group 'emotional-cognitive profiles' in 
the situation of pride, as hypothesised. However, the original hypothesis did not reflect the 
fact that the two clinical groups would be so much more depressed than the non-clinical 
group. In hindsight, given the level of depression in the three groups one might also have 
expected a difference in the 'profiles' in this situation. Incidentally, the fact that no 
difference was shown, provides some support for the idea that people suffering fi-om 
depression can relate to positive thoughts, even if in the reality of their own lives they find 
such thoughts difficult to attend to (Edwards and Dickerson 1987), or, alternatively, the 
results could be suggesting that the effect of depression is reduced when combined with 
high levels of anxiety or OCD. 
It seems that the nature of 'emotional-cognitive profiles', in the situations of guilt and 
anxiety at least, are important in the understanding of OCD, but in order to take this 
understanding fiirther one needs to know more about the nature of these 'profiles' and how 
they differ between the groups. 
4.2. The Role of 'inflated responsibility' and the experience of Guilt 
The second hypothesis makes predictions about the differences between the three groups in 
the appraisal of perceived personal responsibility. The results showed that in the situation of 
anxiety, both the OCD group and the anxiety group perceived significantly higher levels of 
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personal responsibility than the non-clinical group. When depression was controlled for in 
the analysis, the effect was seen to be stable. Consequently, it seems that when the emotion 
of anxiety is evoked, the perception of "inflated (personal) responsibility" is not a feature 
specific only to OCD, but is perhaps characteristic of people who are suffering fi-om 
'moderate/severe' levels of anxiety. In turn, this suggests that, the basic premise on which 
Salkovskis's cognitive-behavioural model of OCD is based i.e. 'inflated responsibility' for 
perceived harm to self and /or others, may also not be specific to OCD alone. In addition, 
the results support a suggestion, recently made by others e.g. Rachman et al (1995), that 
the relationship between 'inflated responsibility' and OCD is situation specific, and 
according to these results, perhaps more specifically, is also emotion-specific. 
Therefore, it seems that Salkovskis's cognitive-behavioural model is describing processes 
central to the experience of anxiety in people suffering fi^om OCD, but that, in itself, it is 
perhaps not specific enough to explain the whole story; So what is? One suggestion is that 
the answer lies with the related experience of guilt. 
When the experience of guilt was evoked, it was only the OCD group, that perceived more 
personal responsibility than the non-cHnical group. Therefore, i f one assumes that the 
clinical groups have similar levels of depression, as the statistical resuhs indicated, this 
result offers some support for the idea that guilt is an emotion which has a particular 
relationship with OCD e.g. Rosen (1975) and, in addition, suggests that "inflated 
responsibility", when related to feelings of guilt, is a feature specific to this disorder. 
However, if one is to assume that the two clinical groups have slightly different levels of 
depression, as categorisation of the groups according to BDI scores indicated, it becomes 
more likely that the effect on the appraisal of personal responsibility in the OCD group is 
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being influenced by the associated levels of depression. Indeed, tliis latter position is 
supported, as the difference between the groups, on measures of this appraisal, disappeared 
when depression was controlled for in the analysis. One is thereft)re more likely to argue 
that "inflated (personal) responsibility" , in situations of guilt, is a feature specific to low 
mood, rather being specific to OCD and/or anxiety alone i.e. low mood being assumed to 
increase the level of perceived personal responsibility for negative outcome. 
The latter explanation would fit with the psychoanalytic theory of depression, which 
conceptualises depression as internalised guilt, e.g. Abramson and Freud (1911/17). It 
would also fit with the learned helplessness theory of depression where the individual 
attributes positive outcome to external factors and negative outcomes to internal factors 
e.g. (Abramson et al 1978), but where does this leave the role of responsibility and guilt in 
the understanding of OCD? Is it merely a combination of appraisals associated with varying 
levels of anxiety and depression which causes this disorder to develop, or is there something 
else, something more specific? Intuition suggests the latter, but in an attempt to answer this 
question further, the discussion will now be turned to the results of hypothesis four; a part 
of which examined the group differences in the acceptability of feelings of guilt. 
Hypothesis four predicted that people with OCD would find feelings of guilt less acceptable 
than the other two groups, but the results of this study did not support this difference. 
Why might that be? An obvious explanation is that the feeling of guih is not any less 
acceptable for this client group, which, in turn, would suggest that the psychodynamic 
formulation that OC symptoms are a result of the desire to avoid feelings of guilt are also 
not supported. A second explanation is the reduced effect of the small sample size. 
However, there are two other possibilities, which relate back to the nature of the emotion 
being experienced. Firstly, the emotional descriptions associated with the guilt vignette. 
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suggest that in addition to guilt, it also evoked feelings of anxiety. So, it may be the latter 
feelings which are influencing, the ratings of acceptability: given the nature of the story, it 
would not be a surprise if feelings of anxiety were appraised as very acceptable. Secondly, 
the vignette described a certain type of guilt experience i.e. the experience of guilt about an 
event which has already happened. In other words the vignette describes 'guilt for the 
present', with very little 'anticipated guilt for the future'. A suggestion here is that the 
acceptability of guilt would have been less had it been in connection with an event which 
had not yet occurred, but only existed in thought and in the fljture; in other words, if the 
level of anticipated guilt had been greater. This idea would make a link with the experience 
of intrusive thoughts, which are so often a dominant feature of OCD, the thought providing 
the context of anticipated guilt. In this way 'neutralisation' can then be conceptualised as a 
response to the 'unbearable anxiety' related to anticipated negative outcome, combined with 
the possibility of feeling 'unbearably guilty' for that outcome. But how is this linked to the 
appraisal of "inflated responsibility"? 
As was highlighted in the introduction, it is not a great conceptual leap to move fi-om 
talking about guih to talking about responsibility. The two seem intuitively and inherently 
linked. However, as all interesting relationships the link is not as simple as all that! Guilt 
was described eariier as occurring when one violates one's own 'internal rules' or personal 
standards. Therefore, if one has not violated one's 'internal rules', it becomes possible to 
feel responsible for a negative outcome, without feeling guilty. Based on these definitions, 
responsibility, alone, seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient feature of guilt, with guilt 
being a possible but not automatic reaction to the appraisal of responsibility. If one takes the 
position that guilt is, indeed, a feature specific to OCD, this leads to the suggestion that 
people suffering with OCD have stricter, more easily violated 'internal rules', which are 
somehow associated with being more responsible for 'negative outcomes', than people 
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who, are not suffering from this disorder: explaining why 'inflated responsibility' was 
observed in this group, but not the anxiety group in the situation of guih. At this point it 
still leaves open the questions, how is this different from depression and how do these 
'internal rules' develop? 
Intrusive thoughts have been shown to be part of 'normal' cognitive experience, but what 
is becoming more evident is that people with OCD feel more responsible for both the 
content of the thought and the thought itself, than people who are not suffering with this 
disorder e,g. Freeston et al (1992), Clark (1992). One interpretation of this is that people 
with OCD feel guilty about the occurrence of thought, associated with anxiety about what 
having such thoughts means, but perhaps more importantly they believe the negative 
content of the thought as being more likely to come true and that they will be responsible 
for it when it does (in other words the likelihood of a negative outcome, for which they are 
responsible is greater in this group than a non-OCD client group). A suggestion here is that 
this results in the experience of anxiety (fi-om the 'threat' of a negative outcome, and the 
increased likelihood this will happen) plus anxiety related to 'anticipated guilt' (from the 
belief that one is responsible for the negative outcome). This, in turn leads to 'the need to 
do something about it' and the resulting OC symptoms, i.e. there is an increase in the 
present anxiety and anticipated guilt if one does not do something to prevent the perceived 
negative outcome. In conclusion, this formulation brings many theories together; those of 
'inflated responsibility' e.g. Salkovskis (1985/89), those of OCD being symptomatic, of a 
desire to avoid guilt e.g. Rosen (1975) and those of 'exaggerated threat appraisals' & 
perceived increase in the probability of a negative outcome e.g. Carr (1974). It also 
maintains the link with anxiety, which is so obviously present in the presentation of this 
disorder. The appraisals of responsibility make this different from a formulation of 
depression e.g. Salkovskis (1985/89), as does the idea that the guih is related to the fixture; 
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Guilt and responsibility associated with depression is often linked to the past e.g. van Oppen 
& Amtz (1994). 
So, to the question of how the 'internal rules' related to responsibility develop and, why the 
feelings of anxiety and guilt reach such a point where the OC symptoms, severely 
distressing in their own right, occur as away of dealing with this psychological position. 
From a psychodynamic perspective a suggestion might be that 'anticipated guilt' is linked to 
unresolved feelings of guilt and/or anger. If this were true one might expect 
psychotherapeutic intervention, alone, to be more effective than the evidence seems to 
suggest e.g. Jenike (1990). However, it seems tome that the answer to questions such as 
these will be better understood if one combines behavioural, cognitive and psychodynamic 
perspectives/treatments, rather than trying to concentrate on proving the worth of only one. 
So, with this point in mind, where do the anxiety, guilt and beliefs about 'responsibility' 
come from? This is where the discussion will be turned to the results relating to hypothesis 
three. This hypothesis looked at the role of perceived control. 
4.3. Control: Is it linked to Responsibility and Guilt, and if so how? 
The third hypothesis predicted that the two clinical groups would perceive less personal 
control in the situations of anxiety and that the OCD group would perceive less personal 
control in the situation of guilt, predictions which were not, in fact, supported. These 
results, therefore, do not support the theory that appraisals of perceived control are linked 
to the presence of anxiety disorder or OCD. In many ways this is a somewhat surprising 
result, as much of the literature suggests that a loss of control is associated with anxiety 
and OCD e.g. Chambless & Gracey (1989). 
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However, one explanation for this lack of difference might be that it is not the actual 
appraisal of control which is important, but perhaps the meaning of this appraisal. So, for 
example, compared to people from a non-clinical population, people suffering from anxiety 
or OCD, may perceive the same level of control in any given situation, but their secondary 
appraisals may then result in them feeling more or less at risk, or, more or less responsible. 
An alternative explanation is that the results reflect the fact that in this specific type of 
emotional situation, the appraisal of control actually does not differ between the three 
groups. This again leads one to look more specifically at the nature of the anxiety and 
guilt being experienced: 
The anxiety vignette looked specifically at performance related anxiety and so perhaps the 
resuhs on this appraisal dimension would be different if one considered a different form of 
anxiety e.g. non-performance related anxiety. Indeed, performance-related anxiety may be 
viewed as the anticipation of a negative outcome, or uncertainty about outcome of an 
event which actually is in one's own control,-whereas non-performance related anxiety e.g. 
anxiety about being alone in the home can being be more easily linked to a feelings of not 
being, in control. An interesting avenue for fiiture research? 
With respect to guilt, different forms of guilt are not so obvious. One form of specific guilt 
may be that which is linked to omission bias e.g. Salkovkis et al (1995) but this vignette 
was constructed to include this by using a situation where the person did not do something, 
as opposed to having done something. This brings us back to the idea of 'anticipated guilt' . 
It has already been suggested that the guilt vignette did not focus on guilt of the fliture i.e. 
the "what ifs..." and "I'd feel really awful ifs..." in relation to an event which has not yet 
happened. In this vignette the accident had already happened. So, again a suggestion is that 
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the three groups, would have differed in their perception of personal control if greater levels 
of'anticipated guilt' had been present. More specifically, one would hypothesise that the 
OCD group would perceive significantly more personal responsibility when 'anticipated 
guilt' is experienced. The results of hypothesis seven also support the idea of a specific type 
of guilt being important in the aetiology of OCD. These results showed that the perceived 
likelihood of the occurrence of symptoms was correlated with situations of guilt in general, 
but not with the specific situation of guilt used in this study. 
At this point attention is turned to the appraisal dimensions of perceived control of others 
and perceived situational control. No specific hypotheses were made in relation to these 
appraisals, but the pattern of raw scores on these measures suggest that compared to the 
other two groups, the OCD group perceived greater control of others, in the situation of 
anxiety, and greater situational control inthe situation of guilt. 
Although the differences in scores, between the groups, did not reach statistical significance, 
this observation suggests that people suffering with OCD associate guilt with being 
responsible in a situation that is out of anyone's control and anxiety with being responsible 
in a situation that is controlled by others. It is here that control can be linked to the 
appraisals of responsibility and guilt, and in so doing be used in an attempt to answer the 
earlier questions about the origins of the anxiety, the guilt and the beliefs relating to 
personal responsibility: 
As a child, a time when the situation is inherently in the control of others, the suggestion is 
that children who later suffer with OCD, experience life in such a way that they are made 
to feel very responsible, guilty and anxious for negative outcomes which are totally out of 
their control. In this way they develop a learned sense of responsibility and guilt for negative 
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outcomes (and possibly all outcomes), which if combined with learned anxiety for making 
sure things 'turn out OK' , may then form the basis for the development of "inflated 
responsibility", perfectionism and the need to avoid negative outcomes. In comparison with 
other clinical groups, one would therefore speculate that people suffering from other 
emotional disorders would not learn the same combination of associations. Returning to the 
psychodynamic idea, the 'unresolved guih and/or anger' can then be conceptualised as the 
unconscious guilt associated with 'never getting it right' in the eyes of important others 
and/or the anger for being asked to perform the impossible tasks of 'getting it right all the 
time'. 
The two process theory of control (Rothbaum et al 1982) can also be applied to this 
formulation. Rothbaum suggests that if one finds one cannot change the world to fit oneself, 
instead of relinquishing control, one tries to change oneself to fit the world. Using this 
model, it could be argued that a person with OCD is stuck in the first stage of still trying to 
change the world to fit their beliefs e.g. by using compulsive behaviours and rituals as a way 
of trying to control outcome. The suggestion then follows that the core belief that one is 
responsible for negative outcomes, however out of one's control they might be in reality, is 
playing a part in maintaining the position that one 'ought to be able to change the world'. In 
this way s person with OCD might also be thought of as trying to fit themselves into an 
'unrealistic/imagined world' of being able to control all outcomes. 
However, another pause for reflection again brings to mind questions about the relationship 
between OCD and depression. For example, is the high incidence of depression associated 
with OCD linked to the 'guilt' involved for being responsible for negative outcomes in the 
past? This takes us back to one of the earlier questions, which asked whether or not OCD 
is somehow made up of a combination of features of anxiety and features of depression. The 
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intuitive answer and the above discussion suggest that the relationsliip between these 
emotional disorders is not as simple as that, but the resuhs of this study seem to suggest it 
as a possibility. The following discussion focuses on the relationship between depression 
and OCD: 
4 . 4 . D e p r e s s i o n 5 O C D and anxiety: the relationship between them. 
Depression has been associated with OCD by many e.g. Turner and Biedel (1992), has been 
found to increase uncontroUability of negative thoughts e.g. Clark (1992) and in a service 
evaluation carried out by the present author, was also found to reduce following treatment 
of OCD in a group of five people (MacCallam 1995). 
Relating back to this study, results of hypothesis two showed a significant difference 
between the three groups on the appraisal of personal responsibility in the situation of pride. 
Given the levels of depression in the three groups, one would probably have predicted this 
difference to lie between the OCD group and the non-clinical group. Interestingly, the 
difference lay between the two clinical groups. One possible explanation for this is that 
although slightly more depressed than the non-clinical group, the anxiety group were the 
most able to relate to thoughts and feelings of pride (even if in the reality of their own lives 
they are not so able to attend them). This fits with the common clinical perception of 
people prone to anxiety, that they are people who are oft:en afraid of not meeting the 
standards set by themselves and/or others, but that if they do meet them are ofl:en able to 
acknowledge and 'celebrate' that achievement in some way (even if this only in the short-
term and is not assimilated into the self concept), but I digress...! 
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It is also true, as was the case with the anxiety vignette, that the pride vignette focused on 
performance-related pride, and so again different results may be achieved if this were to be 
replaced with non-performance related.pride. 
But how do these results inform our understanding of OCD^ and the relationship of OCD 
and depression? The fact that OCD can occur in the absence of depression and the fact that 
depression can either increase or decrease OC symptoms, e.g. Turner and Biedel (1992) 
suggests this is a complex area for discussion. Overall, the results of hypothesis two 
suggested that people with OCD and depression perceive more responsibility, than people 
with anxiety and depression and people from a non-clinical population in the situations of 
anxiety and guilt and less in the situation of pride. As described earlier one explanation for 
this is that this effect is mainly due to the associated levels of depression. One way to test 
the 'truth' of this explanation would be to repeat this study, either with a comparison group 
of people suffering with severe depression, in the absence of OCD, and/or a group of 
people presenting with OCD, in the absence of high levels of depression. In this way it 
would help ascertain whether the 'inflated' and 'deflated' responsibility, in response to the 
emotions of guilt and pride, is a feature specific to OCD or whether, indeed, it is more 
closely associated with low mood. 
The relationship between OCD, anxiety and depression is again raised if one considers the 
results pertaining to hypothesis six. This hypothesis looked at the role of perceived harm to 
self in anxiety and OCD: 
As predicted it was found that both clinical groups perceived significantly higher levels of 
harm to self than the non-clinical group in situations of anxiety. This same effect was also 
found to be the case in situations of guilt. As with the appraisal of personal responsibility. 
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when depression was controlled for, the effect was stable in the situation of anxiety, but 
disappeared in the situation of guih. 
These results support the theory that exaggerated appraisals of harm/threat to self in 
situations of anxiety is a feature of anxiety e.g. Clark (1989) and, in addition, suggest that 
this appraisal is exaggerated in the situation of guih, for these two clinical groups. 
However, what these resuhs do not support is the idea that the appraisal of self harm is 
specifically related to guih and/or the responsibility associated with guilt, in people suffering 
with OCD. In addition, the influence of depression again suggests that, in the situation of 
guilt, this appraisal is more closely associated with low mood, than with anxiety or OCD 
alone. 
The fact that there were differences in two of the four emotional situations, on the appraisal 
dimension of perceived self harm, suggests that it is an appraisal which is particularly 
significant in the thinking of these two clients groups. However, the fact that there were no 
differences on this appraisal in the situation of anger continues to support the position that 
the appraisals, important in the aetiology of these emotional disorders, are situation and/or 
emotion specific, rather than being a general feature of anxious thinking. 
But how does this all of this relate to our understanding of relationship between OCD, 
anxiety and depression? It seems that in the situation of anxiety, perceived harm to self and 
perceived personal responsibility are significantly influenced by levels of anxiety and in the 
situation of guilt, by levels of depression. Therefore it is arguable that, overall, the 
differences between the two clinical groups on these two appraisal dimensions, are 
dependant on the affect of depression. In itself this again raises the questions, whether or 
not OCD is somehow a combination of the two other emotional disorders i.e. anxiety and 
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depression?, and whether or not the "inflated responsibility" thought to be associated with 
OCD (Salkovskis 1985/89) is actually due to the differential levels of depression in this 
group? 
The previous discussion went some way to arguing that the relationship between OCD, 
anxiety and depression is not that simple, but we will now look to the role of anger to 
continue this discussion flirther: 
4.5.The role of anger in O C D ; the role of anger in the 'recovery' from O C D 
Hypothesis four predicted that the OCD group would find feelings of anger to be less 
acceptable in this situation, than the other two groups, which, in fact was not found to be 
the case. Consequently, this does not support the idea that the experience of this emotion is 
less acceptable for people suffering with OCD. This, in turn, is not supportive of the theory 
that OC symptoms are an attempt to deal with feelings of anger, as suggested by others 
e.g. Ryz (1993) and as described earlier in the discussion. However, this result brings us to 
a point where we will again look at the importance of the specific nature of the emotional 
experience of anger: 
In this study the emotional vignette described anger which was unlikely to be seen as 
anything other than 'justified' and the proposal is that anger may be perceived as less 
acceptable if it is interpreted as being more 'unjustified'. An example of this might be anger 
at one's parents, when the parents are very clear about the fact that they are trying to help 
you. 
At this point it also becomes relevant to refer to the results of the four participants who 
were 'recovered' fi-om OCD. What is interesting in these individuals is that when the 
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appraisal scores are compared to tliose of the OCD group, the most consistent changes i.e. 
changes on the measure of any given appraisal which fnoved in the same direction for all 
four participants, were noted to be in the situation of anger. In summary, the people 
'recovered' from OCD perceived the situation of anger to be less pleasant, perceived others 
having more of the responsibility and control, oneself having less control, there being less 
situational control and less perceived harm; to self At first glance one might assume that 
this is a more realistic perception of legitimate anger. However, when one compares these 
scores to the mean scores in the non-clinical group one finds that the changes which have 
moved the 'recovered' individuals closer to the non-clinical groups are perceived pleasure, 
perceived responsibility of others and perceived harm to self 
Incidentally, the fact that perceived harm to self is one of the appraisals to see a positive 
change in those 'recovered' from OCD supports the threat/appraisal theory of 
anxiety/OCD. However, four clients is a small number of participants on which to base any 
generalisations, and it still begs the question, why were these changes most consistently 
observed in the situation of anger? 
The four participants in this group presented with a variety of OC symptoms and so this 
question cannot be answered by attributing the changes to 'recovery' from a certain type 
of symptom. It is also true that the results fit with the clinical observation that people 
recovered from OCD, tend tp improve in assertiveness and in their ability to express anger 
e.g. Rachman (1993), but why then was no difference found between the OCD and non-
cHnical groups in appraisals in the situation of anger in the main study? One obvious reason 
for this lack of effect is that the differences in appraisals, in the situation of anger, are not 
as marked as in the situations of guilt and anxiety , and so are not apparent with the small 
sample sizes used in this study. However, an alternative explanation is that 'recovery' from 
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GCD is associated with increased ability to deal with 'unjustified' anger, but that this shift 
then generalises to changes in the appraisal of 'justifiable anger'. It is also possible to link 
this explanation back to the formulation described earlier. The first link is through, the idea 
that a person with OCD may be harbouring 'unresolved anger'. The second link is that in 
the same way that there is a learned association between guilt, responsibility , anxiety and 
negative outcome, there is also an absence of learning about how to express anger and- an 
'internalised rule' that it is 'harmfl^l^ad' to express anger inappropriately (particularly 
toward important others). 
At this point a summary of the proposed formulation as it has developed throughout the 
discussion will be given: 
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4.6. The Proposed Formulation of O C D : 
Early learned associations, which become internalised rules and/or forces 
1.Responsibility, associated with strong feelings of guilt, for negative outcomes (including outcome 
which are, in reality totally out of that person's control) 
2. Associated with (1), the belief that one is powerful enough, and should, be able to control and 
influence outcome (related tp die 'pivotal power' of responsibilitj') 
3.. Perceived self harm, associated with strong feelings of anxiety, for negative outcomes 
4.Leamed inabilitj' to express anger and belief that it is 'harmful' to do so. 
Anxiety and Depression 
The anxiety conies from the threat of perceived negative outcomes, particularly when the belief that 
die negative outcome will occur is high. Tlie depression comes from the failure of effortful attempts 
to always control outcome (effortful attempts to control all outcomes will inevitably fail because it 
is an impossible task; die world and others can be unpredictable places, but the person with OCD 
finds it difficult to incorporate this knowledge into their belief system). 
Leads to: 
1 .Increased frequency of intmsive thoughts, through anxiety 
2. hicreased uncontrollabilit}' of intmsive thoughts, through depression 
Intrusive thoughts become more pronounced 
(may disappear from awareness once a learned chain of responses has become 'automatic') 
Beliefs about responsibilitj'/'pivotal responsibility' and thought-action fusion are triggered or further 
triggered at this point. 
1.Further increase in the perceived likelihood of a negative outcome 
2. Further increase in aiLxiety to a point where it is 'unbearable' 
3.Further increase in' anticipated guih' to a point where it is 'unbearable' 
4.Furtlier increase in die need to 'do somediing about it', to die point where it becomes impossible to 
resist.(related to beliefs of responsibility, combined wth desire to avoid feelings of guilt and 
anxiety). 
OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMS 
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In the above formulation, there would be a feedback loop from obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms to anxiety and depression. This is based on the theories that a) compulsions 
and/Or obsessive rituals serve to maintain anxiety and b) that the failure of effbrtftil 
strategies can result in depression. One of the things this formulation does not address is 
why the symptoms of OCD usually tend to be focused in specific areas e.g. checking only 
certain things. An avenue of exploration I will leave as a recommendation for fiiture 
research. 
The discussion will now move on to explore the resuhs of hypothesis five: 
4.7. The 'acceptability' of actions. 
Hypothesis five stated that in the situation of guilt, the OCD group would perceive their 
actions as less acceptable than the other two groups. In the event this prediction was not 
supported by the results and indeed the significant difference was found to lie between the 
anxiety group and the other two groups; the anxiety group perceived their actions as more 
acceptable in this situation. This hypothesis was based on evidence such as that of Purdon 
and Clark (1992) who proposed that the belief that a thought could lead to unacceptable 
behaviour is a predictor of OCD. The non-significant difference therefore leads one to 
question whether it is not the acceptability of the behaviour itself, but what that means for 
the person which is the more important factor. For example, a behaviour may be seen as 
equally unacceptable, but provoke a greater sense of 'harm to self for someone suffering 
from OCD than in someone who is not suffering with this disorder i.e. there is a greater 
violation of'internal rules'. 
Theoretical explanations for why the anxiety group have a significantly different perception 
of this appraisal are unclear, which leads one to question whether there were differences in 
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interpretation of tliis particular appraisal, between the groups.(see section 5.2. for further 
reflection on this point). 
4.8, The relationship between personal responsibility, 'harm to self and symptoms 
For the OCD group there was a correlation between the perceived likelihood of the 
occurrence of symptoms and the appraisals of perceived harm to self and perceived personal 
responsibility in the situation of anxiety and perceived personal responsibility in the situation 
of guih. This result is as predicted and can be construed as offering support for Salkovskis's 
idea that OC symptoms are linked to both these appraisals. These results go one step further 
in suggesting that the combination of these two appraisals is only significant to the 
experience of guilt, and is not a general feature of thinking in OCD, which can be applied to 
all emotional experiences. Again this highlights guilt, and its associated appraisals of 
responsibility as an emotion central to experience of OCD. 
However, there was not the predicted correlation between these appraisals and perceived 
likelihood of symptom occurrence in the anxiety group. Theoretically, the reason for this is 
not obviously apparent, except for the speculation that people with OCD are more 
consciously aware of the situations in which OC symptoms are likely to be experienced i.e. 
people suffering from OCD may associate OC symptoms with feelings of anxiety and guilt, 
which in turn is associated with perhaps the less conscious appraisal of 'exaggerated threat' 
appraisals and 'inflated responsibility'. One therefore wonders whether the association of 
symptoms with emotions was a less obvious association for this group of people suffering 
whh anxiety only. However, with results based on only a limited amount of self-reported 
data this area constitutes a recommended area for fiiture research. 
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4.9, G C D : a narrow view of oneself? 
This is added merely to cover one other observation of the data; 
The pattern of raw scores on the appraisal of 'other responsibility' showed that the OCD 
group attributed less responsibility to others than the other two groups, in the situation of 
guih. Although the statistical differences between the scores were not significant this 
suggests that the gap between level of responsibility attributed to self and level of 
responsibility attributed to others is greatest in the OCD group. This is not so apparent in 
the other emotional situations. This kind of observation would fit with the theoretical 
position that people suffering with OCD have a more extreme view of themselves e.g. 
Millar (1980)^ but suggests that, on this appraisal, it is only in relation to situations evoking 
guilt; fiirther support for a specific role of guilt, and its associated appraisals of 
responsibility in OCD 
4.10. Some Conclusions? Where does this leave us? 
In conclusion, it seems that "inflated responsibility" is not a feature specific only to OCD, 
people suffering from other anxiety disorders are also found to make such an appraisal. 
However, what can be tentatively suggested from these results is that the perception of 
"inflated responsibility" is a more wide spread feature of thinking in OCD, associated with 
the emotion of anxiety, but also with the emotion of guih. In other words, a suggestion that 
OCD affects a greater part of one's emotional life than other anxiety disorders might do. 
One interpretation of this is that, clinically, people with OCD are more affected by 
depression, an emotional disorder where the impact and influence of the feelings of guilt is 
reasonably well documented and accepted e.g. Abramson and Freud (191.1/17). However, 
another more complex formulation has been offered which combines anxiety, depression 
and OCD in one model, through a number of different processes involving learned anxiety, 
responsibility and guilt for a negative outcome, where that outcome is, in reality, out of 
one's control, (see section 4.6., page 105). 
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The Unks made in the formulation are similar to those made by Salkovskis in his cognitive-
behavioural model, but in this case guih is more clearly highlighted as a specific factor, and 
is considered as more than just 'feeling responsible' for negative outcome. Although not 
clearly illustrated by the results of this study a suggestion is that 'the guilt' also has to do 
with 'not being good enough' and not 'living up to standards'. The proposed formulation 
also suggests a possible route via which the belief that one is responsible for outcome might 
develop. 
Overall, this research has focused on a number of psychological theories and perspectives. 
The results have not supported an attempt to provide evidence for one particular theory, as 
opposed to any other, but what they have supported, to some extent, is the proposal that 
these theories may need to be viewed together to inform our understanding of OCD as a 
whole experience. 
Finally, the results and discussion of this study seem to lead to three areas, in particular, 
which I would like to highlight as warranting fiirther investigation. The first two are closely 
linked, the fhst being the need to know more about the nature and role of the experience of 
guilt in OCD and the second being the need to explore what it means to someone with OCD 
to feel 'responsible'. The third area is the need to explore the relationship between OCD 
and depression still fiirther. 
109 

Chapter 5: Suggested Improvements and Future Research 
In this section some of the Umitations of this research study will be described, along with 
suggestions for how the study could have been improved and ideas for fature research. The 
section will be split into three parts. The first part will concentrate on limitations of the 
study as a whole, including discussion relating to the nature of the participants and the use 
of the standard questionnaires, the second part will include a critical review of the measure 
developed by the researcher and the third part will summarise some ideas for future 
research. 
5.1. General Methodological Issues, the Nature of Participant Inclusion and the use 
of Standard questionnaires 
The first limitation, one which is probably mentioned by many time-limited studies, is the 
fact that only small numbers of participants were used i.e. ten in each group. Such small 
numbers limit the reliability of the study, but, on the other hand, probably means that the 
significant results which were obtained reflect fairly powerfiil effects. 
The difficulties in identifying a sufficient number of people, particularly people suffering 
from OCD were anticipated, and from the outset an attempt was made to lessen this 
difficulty by approaching two Health Authorities, rather than the more usual one. 
Nevertheless, despite this attempt to overcome this problem , a larger sample size remains 
as a recommendation which would improve this study. 
A second limitation is the small size of the pilot study and the fact that all the participants in 
this study were people suffering from OCD. The need for a larger, more comprehensive 
pilot study was recognised, but remains a recommendation which would improve a repeat of 
this study. One fiirther improvement would be, either to develop a procedure which 
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produced a "better match" of participants and/or to carry out more detailed analysis on the 
individual differences or within-group differences in the study e.g. differences, related to 
gender. However, a larger clinical population and sample size would probably be necessary 
to achieve these, recommendations satisfactorily. 
At this point it also seems relevant to mention the reasons for including a 'phobic anxiety' 
comparison group. Phobic anxiety was initially chosen as a comparable disorder because 
'phobia' is classified as a specific anxiety disorder, in much the same way as OCD. 
However, the methodology did not include a formal assessment of whether or not the 
people in the clinical groups met the D S M IV criteria for OCD or phobic anxiety; 
differentiation of the groups reUed on measurement of anxiety using the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory. The method used met the needs of this study, but alternative measures which 
would have allowed a more specific assessment of phobic symptoms, along with symptoms 
of OCD are the SCL 90 and the Hopkins Symptoms Checklist (Derogatis et al 1972). 
It is also true to say that in both groups several type of OCD and /or anxiety are present and 
as the study developed it became apparent that the score on the BAI , together with scores 
on the PI, became the main assessment tools used to discriminate for participant inclusion 
in the two clinical groups (rather than presence or absence of more specific clinical features 
or categorisation according to strict D S M IV criteria). Although not perfect, a distinction 
based on these scales was considered to be appropriate for investigating the differences in 
appraisals between the three chosen groups. However, the main implication of these points 
is that a) inclusion in the groups may not have been as well controlled, nor probably as 
narrow, as it might have been and b) the results cannot be applied to one type of symptom 
or disorder only, but can only be reliably interpreted in relation to group discrimination, as 
measured by these standardised measures. 
I l l 

One slight note of caution in relation to this is that the Padua Inventory does not have 
norms which are based in the British population.. This is not uncommon for many of the 
standardised measures which are used in clinical practice e.g. Jacobson (1988), but does 
means that one cannot be absolutely certain that the chosen cut-off score is the score 
which delineates the point of differentiation between clinical and non-clinical 
symptomatology for fhis population. This does not necessarily affect the results of the 
study since the groups were significantly different on this measure, but is a note of caution 
in terms of generalising the OCD group results to a British clinical population. 
A final point relating to the nature of the participants comes from observation that there is 
considerable variance in scores on the standardised measures, particularly in the OCD 
group. The statistical analysis adopts the group mean scores, but this obviously misses a lot 
of valuable information relating to individual differences. Recommendations to overcome 
this would either be to ensure a sample where less variance is apparent, or to have achieved 
a larger sample, where individual differences could have been more easily analysed. A third 
possibility would be to adopt a qualitative methodology, where such individual and social 
differences are more readily acknowledged e.g. Sherrard (1997). 
A final, general comment is that the research design encompassed a wide range of 
psychological and theoretical perspectives, using a wide range of cognitive appraisals and a 
range of emotional experiences. This has certain advantages such as offering a broad picture 
of a complex problem, allows comparison of appraisals in a variety of specific emotional 
situations, rather than examining the nature of appraisals in response to only one emotional 
experience and promotes some speculation as to whether or not certain appraisals are 
general or specific features of thinking for people suffering with anxiety or OCD. 
However, it has the disadvantage that it probably lacks the depth and specificity to confirm. 
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or not, any one given theory or model. An alternative approach would have been to 
concentrate on only one theory, measuring only a few appraisal dimensions e.g. testing 
Salkovskis's cognitive-behavioural model more specifically, by measuring only the appraisal 
dimensions of personal responsibility and harm to self 
5.2. Review of the Appraisal Questionnaire 
Appraisal Questionnaire: 
The development of this questionnaire was based on work of other authors e.g. Manstead 
& Tetlock (1989), but used analogue, rather than Likert scales to provide increased 
sensitivity and responsiveness of the information gained e.g. Pfennings et al (1995). 
However, the use of the analogue scale measurement presents certain limitations in itself 
Firstly, it requires the participant "to conceive of the line as a representation of personal 
experience of an abstract concept". (Wewers and Lowe 1990 p.233), is totally dependent 
on the participant's interpretation of the maximal value (Wewers and Lowe 1990) and, in 
the absence of precise definitions, it necessitates individual interpretation of the. concepts 
being measured, with no check on which dimension of a construct is being considered by 
the participant. The reason for mentioning these points is that it raises questions about the 
reliability, validity and comparability of the data, which, as with any study, need to be 
borne in mind in the interpretation of the results. 
In relation to this, the terms used to label the analogue scales were not operationally 
defined, mainly becalise it was believed that, overall, the terms used could be considered 
as having fairly universal meanings. In support of this position is the quote that "The 
majority of studies that manipulate control provide no formal definition of the concept, but 
rely on the reader's common sense understanding of the word..." Thompson (1981). 
Nevertheless, even though the lack of precise definitions is apparently not unique to this 
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study, the researcher would still recommend their introduction as an improvement. The 
same recommendation could also be made in relation to other terms used in the 
questionnaire e.g. use of the term "others". 
A final point about the analogue scales is that the poles of each appraisal dimension were 
not always labelled with precisely the same terminology e.g. very and totally were used 
interchangeably, depending on the appraisal. This necessitates caution in relation to the 
resuhs of hypothesis one and a recommended' improvement to this study is a 
standardisation of the labelling of the poles. 
However, having pointed out the disadvantages of the use of the analogue scale, the fact 
that each emotional situation produced a different type of profile, the fact that there were 
highly significant differences between appraisal dimensions ( as one would expect from the 
review of the cognition-emotion literature), the fact that the significant results fitted pre­
existing theories in the OCD literature, despite there only being a small sample size, and the 
fact that the variance on each dimension was, in the main, equal in each of the groups 
suggests that this was a reasonably successful measure and was successful, overall, in 
tapping into the cognitive-emotional appraisals in a variety of emotional situations. 
However, there are some fiirther points about the questionnaire which need to be discussed 
and raised as potential improvements if a similar measure were to be used in the fiiture. 
As others have done, e.g. Mauro et al (1992) only one measure of each dependent 
variable/appraisal dimension was taken in each emotional situation. This means that the 
response variation is likely to be smaller for each appraisal, but that a broader understanding 
of each appraisal term, e.g. the term "responsibility", is less likely to be captured. It also 
means that if this one question is misunderstood by anyone then that measure becomes less 
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reliable and less valid for that particular participant. With more than one question relating tO 
the same appraisal dimension, then one misunderstood question is likely to be offset by the 
responses on the others and/or allow measurement of different aspects of the same concept. 
The introduction of several questions relating to one concept is recommended as one way of 
improving this study. 
Additional considerations relating to this questionnaire are firstly that the questions were 
phrased in a way that asked the reader to consider the situation as a whole. This was based 
on the assumption that this would most closely reflect 'real life' experience, but does not 
allow for a more detailed analysis of how appraisal and emotions might change minute to 
minute or which aspects of the story were most salient to which individuals. The latter 
might be an area worthy of consideration in fiiture research. In fact, some researchers have 
already begun to question what aspects of any given experience are most important to 
individuals suffering from different emotional disorders e.g. Freeston et al (1996) suggest 
the importance attached to thoughts is the most salient aspect in OCD. 
The questionnaire and the vignette stories could also be added to or changed to incorporate 
some of the other features which have been identified as important in the aetiology of OCD 
and anxiety. For example, to specifically include items relating to the experience of and 
response to intrusive thoughts or items relating to the perceived ability to cope (a 
secondary appraisal associated with the experience of emotion, particularly anxiety). 
The construction of this questionnaire was based on previous research, but, a final point, as 
mentioned in the 'Methods' section, is a recommendation that the psychometric properties 
of this questionnaire be investigated more thoroughly and effectively with tests of reliability 
and validity. This was a task not possible within the constraints of this project. 
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5.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As stated before three obvious areas for future research are to. understand the nature of guih 
more fully, to explore further the relationship between depression and OCD and to examine 
what it means for someone suffering with OCD to 'be responsible'. However, there are a 
number of other avenues for fiiture research, which also come to mind at this point: 
One suggestion for future research, is to look more closely at the process of making 
appraisals, as well as examining what the final appraisals actually are. This could include an 
investigation of the situational triggers associated with certain appraisals as well as 
exploration of nature and process of the cognitive processing itself Smith et al (1993) also 
point out that knowing about appraisals can help us infer things about emotions and vice 
versa, but what we still need to investigate further is where from, and how, these 
emotional-appraisals develop. In essence this highlights the need to explore meaning, rather 
than symptoms in the absence of meaning. From a cognitive perspective this would involve 
detailed exploration of core beliefs. 
In this study the focus was on very general appraisals e.g. looking at responsibility as one 
concept. A second recommendation for future research is that the. focus be made more 
specific. For example, focusing only on the aspects of responsibility which are thought to be 
most significant in the aetiology of OCD i.e. thought-action fusion as an aspect of 
responsibility e.g. Rachman (1985); Rachman et al (1995) and pivotal responsibility e.g. 
Rheaume et al (1995), focusing only on one theoretical perspective e.g. the cognitive -
behavioural model of OCD, or focusing only on one symptom e.g. the nature of intrusive 
thoughts. It is also true that this study only looked at responsibility for and control of 
116 

action/behaviour and in, addition fiiture research should perhaps continue to widen this 
focus to responsibility and control of thought or mental processes. 
Another suggestion, apparent from the previous discussion, is the idea of looking at the 
affect of less 'pure' and/ or more ambiguous emotions, in order to ascertain whether the 
specific nature of the emotional experience is, indeed, important in the aetiology of 
emotional disorders e.g. anticipatory guilt or anger which is perceived as unjustified. 
Much of the recent research into OCD has focused on the experience and responses to 
cognitive intrusions e.g. Freeston et al (1996), Clark and Purdon (1993), Rachman (1994) 
Intrusive cognitive experiences, in this case memories, have also been associated with 
severity of depression (Kuyken and Brewin 1994); another way in which these two 
disorders could possibly be linked. So, a comparison of the nature of, and responses to 
cognitive experience in both these disorders seems to be obvious choice for future research. 
Finally, as a parting comment I would like to quote Lewis (1936) who said that "obsessional 
problems cover so wide a field that it is difficult to examine them without examining the 
nature of man". A fascinating, but challenging journey for psychological theory, 
understanding and practice.... 
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is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please carefully read each item in the list. Indicate how much you have been bothered by each 
)m during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY, by placing an X in the corresponding space in the column next to each symptom. 
1. Numbness or tingling. 
2. Feeling hot. 
p. Wobbliriess in legs. 
^. Unable to relax. 
^. Fear of the worst happening. 
5. Dizzy or lightheaded. 
\l. Heart pounding or racing. 
b. Unsteady. 
?. Terrified. 
k Nervous. 
1. Feelings of choking. 
2. Hands trembling. 
3. Shaky 
4. Fear of losing control. 
5. Difficulty breathing. 
6. Pear of dying. 
7. Scared. 
8. IJndigesdon or discomfort in abdomen. 
9. Faint. 
0. Face flushed. 
1. Sweating (not due to heat). 
NTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL CORPORATION' 
>/ Harcourt Brace & Company 
- S A N ANTONIO-
Ortiodo • Bolton. New Vofk * Oucaco . 5jn Fnncwco • AUviti • Oallii 
S»n Oicso. Philidclphii • Auttin . Vtut VAlflh - Toroolo . London 
'right © 1990.1987 by Aaron T. Beck. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, 
ding photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. BAI is a registered trademark of The Psychological 
oration. Printed in the United States of America. 18 19 20 2i 22 23 24 25 A B C o E 09018425 
Date:: 
M a r i t a l Status:. -Age: . . Sex:. 
3Cupation:. Education: 
l i s quest ionnaire consis ts of 21 groups of statements. Af te r reading each group of statements carefully, 
rcle the number (0, 1, 2 or 3) next to the one statement i n each group w h i c h best describes the way you 
ive been fee l ing the past week, including' today. K several statements w i t h i n a group seem to apply equal ly 
8ll, c i rc le each one. B e sure to read a l l the statements i n each group before m a k i n g your choice. 
I do not feel sad. 
I feel sad. 
I a m sad a l l the t ime and I can't snap out of i t . 
I a m so sad or unhappy that I can't stand i t . 
I am not part icular ly discouraged about the 
future. 
I feel discoura,ged about the future. 
I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that 
things cannot improve. 
I do not feel l i ke a failure. 
I feel I have failed more than the 
average person. 
A s I look back on m y hf e, aU I can see is 
a lot of failures. 
I feel I a m a complete failure as a person. 
I get as m u c h satisfaction out of things as I 
used to. 
I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything 
anymore. 
I a m dissatisfied or bored w i th everything. 
I don't feel part icular ly guilty. 
I feel gui l ty a good part of the t ime. 
I feel qmte g i i i l ty most of the t ime. 
I feel gui l ty a l l of the time. 
I don't feel I a m being punished. 
I feel I may be pimished. 
I expect to be punished. 
I feel I a m being pimished. 
I don't feel disappointed i n myself. 
I a m disappointed i n myself. 
I am disgusted w i th myself. 
I hate myself. 
11 
8 ° I don't f e e l l am any worse than 
anybody else. 
1 I am cri t ical of myself for m y weaknesses 
or mistakes. 
2 I blame myselEaU the time for m y faults. 
^ I blame myself for ever3^hing bad 
that happens. 
9 0 I don't have any thoughts of k i l l i n g myself. 
1 I have thoughts of k i l l i n g myself, but I 
wotxld not carry them out. 
2 I would l ike to k i l l myself. 
3 I w o u l d k i l l m y s e l f i f Ihadthechance . 
10 o 
1 
I don't cry any more than usual . 
I cry more now than I used to. 
I cry a l l the time now. 
I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry 
even though I waxit to. 
I am no more irri tated now than I ever am. 
I get annoyed or irr i tated more easily than 
I used to. 
I feel irri tated a l l the time now. 
I don't get irri tated at a l l by the things that 
used to irritate me. 
12 0 I have not lost interest i n other people. 
1 I am less interested i n other people than 
I used to be. 
2 I have lost most of m y interest i n 
other people. 
3 I have lost a l l of my interest i n other people. 
1 3 ° I make decisions about as wel l as 
I ever coiild. 
1 I put off mak ing decisions more than 
I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty i n m a k i n g 
decisions than before. 
3 I can't make decisions at a l l anymore. 
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14 0 
15 0 
ie 
17 
18 
I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
I am. worried that I a m lookmg oid or 
unattractive. 
I feel that there are permanent changes 
m m y appearance that make me look 
unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly. 
I can work about as we l l as before. 
It takes an extra effort to get started at 
doing something 
I have to push myself very hard to do 
anything. 
I can't do any work at a l l . 
I can sleep as we l l as usual . 
I don't sleep as we l l as I used to. 
1 wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual 
and f ind i t hard to get back to sleep. 
I wake up several hours earlier than I 
used to and cannot get hack to sleep. 
I don't get more t i red than usual . 
I get t i red more easily than I used to. 
I get t i red from doing almost anything. 
I a m too t ired to do anythmg. 
M y appetite is no worse than usual . 
M y appetite is not as good as i t used to be. 
M y appetite is much worse now. 
I have no appetite at a l l anymore. 
19 0 I haven't lost much weight, i f any, lately 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
I am purposely t ry ing to lose weight by 
eating less. Yes N o 
20 0 I am no more worried about m y health 
than usual . 
1 I a m worried about physical problems 
such as aches and pams; or upset 
stomach; or constipation. 
2 I a m very worried about physical 
problems and it's hard to th ink of 
much else. 
3 I am so worried about m y physical 
problems that I cannot th ink about 
anything else. 
21 0 I have not noticed any recent change 
i n my mterest i n sex. 
1 I am less interested i n sex than I used 
to be. 
2 I am much less interested i n sex now. 
3 I have lost interest i n sex completely 
. Subtotal Page 2 
, Subtotal I^ge 1 
Total Score 
T P C 0528-001 20 B 
The Padua Inventory 
Instructions: The following statements refer to thoughts and. behaviours which rhay occur to everyone 
in everyday life. For each statement, choose the reply which best seems tp fit you and the degree of 
disturbance which such thoughts or behaviours may create. Plate your replies as follows: 
0 - not at all 
1 - a little 
2 - quite a lot 
3 - a lot 
4 - very much 
Name Date 
0 1-- 2 3 4 
1. I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money Q Q O O • 
2. 1 think even slight contact with bodily secretions (perspirations. 
saliva, urine etc.) may contaminate my clothes or somehow harm me Q Q Q iZl Q 
3. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by 
strangers or by certain people Q Q Q Q Q 
4. I find it difficult to touch rubbish or dirty things Q Q Q Q Q 
5: I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination . . O [D CD D O 
6. I avoid using public telephones because I am afraid of contagion and disease . . D Q D O 'O 
7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary . •. Q' O O CH D 
8. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think 
I may be dirty or 'contaminated' Q Q Q CD D 
9. If I touch something I think is 'contaminated' I immediately have to wash 
or clean myself • • • • • 
10. If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to wash 
myself or change my clothing . . .., Q D CD O D 
11. When doubts and wonies come to my mind. I cannot rest until I have 
talked them over with a reassuring person O Q d O D 
12. When I talk I tend to repeat the same things and the same sentences 
several times • • • • • 
T H E P ' \ D U A [ I N V E N T O R Y 
13 I tend to ask peoole lo repeat me same things to me several times 
consecutively even thougn I aid understand what they said the firsrtime LJ 2 Q Cj iZl 
14. I feel obliged to tallow a particular oraer~in dressing, undressing and 
wasning myself , . - O C I i L I i n C ] 
IS Before going to sleep I have ro do certain things in a certain order . . dl [U Cj IH d] 
16. Before going to bed I have to hang up or fold my clothes in 
a special way D D • • D 
17 I fee! I have to repeat certain numoers for no reason . O, EH (ZI IZI Cj 
18. I have to do things several times before I think they are properly done Q, CI iZ! O [j 
19 I tend to keep on Checking,things more often than necessary Q Q CI! di iZ] 
20 I check and recheck gas and water taps and light switches after 
turning them_ off. . . . , D D EH D CI 
21. I return home to check doors windows drawers etc.. to make sure they 
are properly] shut. . C i n D D D 
22. I keep on checking forms documents.-cheques etc. in_detail. to make sure 
I have filled them in correctly CI' CI CI CI CI 
23. I keep on going back-to see that matches cigarettes etc are properly 
extinguished 
24. When I handle money I count and recount it several times D- C I O C I CI 
25 i check letters careiufly many times before posting them CI C I C J C j I j 
26 I find It difficult to take decisions even about unimportant matters . C I C J CI CI C I 
27 Sometimes I am not sure I have done things which in fact I know 
I have done . . • • • • • 
28. I have the impression that I will never be able to explain things clearly 
especially when talking about important maners that involve me \ ! C I C ] CI Ci 
29 After doing something carefullv I still have the impression 1 have either 
done It badly or not finished it . . CI CJ D Ci C i 
30. I am sometimes late because I keep on doing ceaain things more often than 
necessary . • • • • • 
31 I invent doubts and problems about most Of the things 1 do I | CI I I CI CI 
32. When I start thinking of cenain things I become obsessed with them Cj CI O CI U 
33 Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot 
get nd or them . CI C I O D Q 
T H E P A D L ' A I N V E N T O R Y 
0 1 2 3 4 
34. Obscene or dirty words come into my mind and I cannot get rid of ttiem CD CD CD CD CD 
35. iVIy brain constantly goes its own way and I find it difficult to attend to.. 
what is happening round me CD CD CD CD CD 
36. I imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent-mindedness or 
minor errors which I make CD CD CD CD CD 
37. i think or worry at length about having hurt someone without knowing it D CH CD- CD CD 
38. When 1 hear about a disaster. I think it is somehow my fault D O D D D 
39. I sometimes worry at length for no reason that I have hurt myself or 
have some disease Q D CD CD Q 
40. I sometimes start counting objects for no reason CD CD O O CD 
41. I feel I have to remember completely unimportant numbers :CD CD CD D CD 
42. When I read I have the impression I have missed something important and 
must go back and reread the passage at least two or three times . . . . . . . . CD CD D CD CD 
43. I worry about remembering completely unimportant things and make an effort 
not to forget them • • • • • 
44. When a thought or doubt comes into mymind. I have to-examine it.from all 
points of view and cannot stop until I have done so ; CD CD CD CD CD 
45. In certain situations I am afrajd of losing my self-control and doing 
embarrassing things • • • • • 
46. When I look down-from a bridge or a very high window. I feel an impulse to 
throw myself into space 
47. When I see a train approaching I sometimes think I could throw myself 
under its wheels • • • • • 
48. At certain moments I am tempted to tear off my clothes in public CD CD CD CD CD 
49. While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into 
someone or something CD CD CD CD CD 
50. Seeing weapons excites me and makes me think violent thoughts CD CD C D Q CD 
51. I get upset and worried at the sight of knives, daggers and other 
pointed objects • • • • • 
52. I sometimes feel something inside me which makes me do things which are 
really senseless and which I do not want to do • • • • ' • 
53. I sometimes feel the need to break or damage things for no reason . . • • • • • 
• 4 
T H E P \ D L , \ I N V E N T O R Y 
0 1 2 3 4 
54 i sometimes have an imoulse to steal other people s belongings, even if 
they are or no use to me • • • n • 
55 i am sometimes almost irresistibly temoted to steal something rrom the 
suoermarket . • • • • • 
56 1 sometimes have an impulse lo hurt deienceless children or animals • • • • • 
57 1 feel rhave to make soeciat gestures or walk in a certain way • • • • 
58 in certain situations ! feel an impulse to eat too much even if 
I am then ill . . . . . . • • • • • 
59. When 1 hear about a suicide or a cnme I am uoset for a long time and 
find it difficult to stop thinking about it • n • • • 
60 ! invent useless womes about germs and diseases . . . . . • • • • 
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1 . C a n y o u d e s c r i b e t h e f e e l i n g s y o u a r e l e f t w i t h m o s t 
s t r o n g l y a f t e r r e a d i n g t h i s s t o r y ? 
l a . C a n y o u n a m e t h e f e e l i n g s y o u m i g h t e x p e r i e n c e i f y o u w e r e 
i n t h e s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n t h e s t o r y ? 
2 , O n a s c a l e o f 1 - 7 h o w s t r o n g w o u l d y o u s a y t h e s e f e e l i n g s 
w o u l d b e ? 
N a m e o f t h e f e e l i n g : 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
S T R O N G S T R O N G 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
N a m e o f t h e f e e l i n g : 
V E R Y N O T A T A L L 
S T R O N G S T R O N G 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
N a m e o f t h e f e e l i n g : 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
S T R O N G S T R O N G 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
I w o u l d n o w l i k e y o u t o a n s w e r s o m e o t h e r q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e 
s t o r y y o u h a v e j u s t r e a d . F o r e a c h q u e s t i o n t r y a n d i m a g i n e 
w h a t i t w o u l d b e l i k e t o b e i n t h e s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 
s t o r y . T h e r e i s a l i n e s c a l e a f t e r e a c h q u e s t i o n . P l e a s e m a r k 
a c r o s s o n t h e l i n e i n t h e p o s i t i o n w h i c h w o u l d b e s t i n d i c a t e 
y o u r r e s p o n s e t o e a c h q u e s t i o n ? A n e x a m p l e i s g i v e n b e l o w : 
E X A M P L E : 
H o w l o u d d o y o u t h i n k t h e m u s i c n e e d s t o b e a t a p a r t y 
E X T R E M E L Y E X T R E M E L Y 
L O U D Q U I E T 
I K- 1 
T h e c r o s s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s p e r s o n l i k e s t h e m u s i c t o b e 
r e a s o n a b l y l o u d , b u t n o t e x t r e m e l y l o u d . 
P L E A S E T U R N T O T H E N E X T P A G E F O R T H E Q U E S T I O N S R E L A T I N G T O T H E 
S T O R Y Y O U H A V E J U S T R E A D . 
1 
1 . How. p l e a s a n t d o y o u t h i n k t h i s s i t u a t i o n w o u l d b e f o r y o u ? 
E X T R E M E L Y E X T R E M E L Y 
U N P L E A S A N T - P L E A S A N T 
I 1 
2. I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s i t u a t i o n h o w r e s p o n s i b l e w o u l d y o u 
c o n s i d e r y o u r s e l f t o b e f o r w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g i n t h i s s t o r y ? 
T O T A L L Y NOT A T A L L 
R E S P O N S I B L E R E S P O N S I B L E 
I _ _ _ _ , 
3. H o w r e s p o n s i b l e w o u l d y o u c o n s i d e r o t h e r p e o p l e t o b e f o r 
w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g i n t h i s s t o r y ? 
T O T A L L Y NOT A T A L L 
R E S P O N S I B L E R E S P O N S I B L E 
1 _ _ ^ I 
4 . I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s t o r y h o w a c c e p t a b l e w o u l d y o u c o n s i d e r 
y o u r a c t i o n s a n d b e h a v i o u r t o b e ? 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
A C C E P T A B L E A C C E P T A B L E 
I _ _ , 
5 . H o w a c c e p t a b l e d o y O u t h i n k o t h e r p e o p l e w o u l d c o n s i d e r y o u r 
a c t i o n s ; a n d b e h a v i o u r t o b e ? 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
A C C E P T A B L E A C C E P T A B L E 
1 ^ _ _ _ 1 
I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s t o r y a f e e l i n g o f w a s 
d e s c r i b e d 
6 . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n h o w a c c e p t a b l e w o u l d y o u s a y i t i s t o b e 
f e e l i n g t h i s w a y ? 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
A C C E P T A B L E A C C E P T A B L E 
1 1 
7. H o w a c c e p t a b l e d o y o u t h i n k o t h e r p e o p l e w o u l d s a y i t i s f o r 
y o u t o b e f e e l i n g t h i s w a y ? 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
A C C E P T A B L E A C C E P T A B L E 
8. I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s i t u a t i o n h o w m u c h c o n t r o l w o u l d y o u t h i n k 
o f y o u r s e l f a s h a v i n g o v e r w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g i n t h e s t o r y ? 
T O T A L NO 
C O N T R O L C O N T R O L 
9. K o w m u c h c o n t r o l w o u l d y o u t h i n k o f o t h e r p e o p l e a s h a v i n g 
o v e r w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g i n t h e s t o r y ? 
T O T A L - N O 
C O N T R O L C O N T R O L 
1 0 . H o w s t r o n g l y w o u l d y o u b e l i e v e t h a t w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g i n 
t h e s t o r y i s o u t o f a n y o n e ' s c o n t r o l ? 
V E R Y NOT A T A L L 
S T R O N G L Y S T R O N G L Y 
1 1 . I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s i t u a t i o n w o u l d y o u i m a g i n e t h e o u t c o m e o f 
t h i s s t o r y a s b e i n g h a r m f u l o r b e n e f i c i a l f o r y o u ? 
V E R Y N O T A T A L L 
H A R M F U L HART'IFUL 
V E R Y 
B E N E F I C I A L 
NOT A T A L L 
B E N E F I C I A L 
1 2 . W o u l d y o u i m a g i n e t h e o u t c o m e o f t h i s s t o r y a s b e i n g 
h a r m f u l o r b e n e f i c i a l f o r o t h e r s ? 
V E R Y 
H A R M F U L 
NOT A T A L L 
H A R M F U L 
V E R Y 
B E N E F I C I A L 
NOT A T A L L 
B E N E F I C I A L . 
F o r g e t t i n g a b o u t t h e s t o r y f o r . a m o m e n t , c o u l d y o u n o w b r i e f l y 
d e s c r i b e t h e m a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s / s y m p t o m s y o u e x p e r i e n c e a s p a r t 
o f O C b / p h o b i a / a n x i e t y : 
1 3 . I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s t o r y h o w l i k e l y d o y o u t h i n k i t w o u l d b e 
t h a t y o u w o u l d b e g i n t o e x p e r i e n c e a n y o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s y o u 
h a v e d e s c r i b e d a b o v e ? 
E X T R E M E L Y NOT A T A L L 
L I K E L Y L I K E L Y 
1 4 . I n t h i s i m a g i n e d s i t u a t i o n a f e e l i n g o f ; 
w a s d e s c r i b e d . H o w l i k e l y d o y o u t h i n k i t w o u l d b e f o r y o u t o 
b e g i n t o e x p e r i e n c e a n y o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s y o u h a v e d e s c r i b e d 
i f y o u w e r e f e e l i n g t h i s w a y i n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s ? 
E X T R E M E L Y 
L I K E L Y 
NOT A T A L L 
L I K E L Y 
Y A L E - D R O W N OB.SF..S.STVF C O M P U L S I V E S C A L E (9/89) 
Y-BOCS T O T A L (add ilems 1-10) 
P A T I E N T N A M E . 
P A T I E N T ID 
D A T E _ 
R A T E R 
1. TIME SPENT OSf OBSESSIONS 
None 
0 
Mi ld 
1 
Moderate 
2 
Severe 
3 
Extreme 
4 
lb. OBSESSION-FREE INTERVAL 
(do not add to subtotal or total score) 
No Symptoms 
0 
Long 
1 
Moderately 
Long Short 
2 3 
Extremely 
Short 
4 
2. INTERFERENCE FROM OBSESSIONS 0 1 2 3 4 
3. DISIRESS OF OBSESSIONS 0 1 2 3 4 
4. RFSISTANCE 
Always 
resists 
0 1 2 3 
Completely 
yields 
4 
Complete 
control 
Much 
control 
Moderate 
control 
LitUe 
control 
No 
control 
5. C O N T R O L OVER OBSESSIONS 
OBSESSION SUBTOTAL (add items 1-5) 
• None Mi ld Moderate Severe Extreme 
6. TIME SPENT O N COMPULSIONS 0 1 2 3 4 
6b. COMPULSION-FREE INTERVAL 
(do not add to subtotal or total score) 
No Symptoms 
0 
Long 
1 
Moderately 
l/jng Short 
2 3 
Extremely 
Short 
4 
7. INTERFERENCE FROM COMPULSIONS 0 1 2 3 4 
8. DISIRESS F R O M COMPULSIONS 0 " 1 2 3 .4 
9. RESISTANCE 
Always 
resists 
0 1 2 3 
Completely 
yields 
4 
Complete 
control 
Much 
control 
Moderate 
control 
Little 
control 
No 
control 
10. C O N T R O L OVER COMPULSIONS 
COMPULSION SUBTOTAL (add items 6-10) 
11. INSIGHT INTO O-C SYMPTOMS 
Excellent 
0 1 
Absent 
4 
None Mild Moderate Severe Extreme 
12. A V O I D A N C E 0 1 2 3 4 
13. INDECiSIVENESS 0 1 2 3 4 
14. P A T H O L O G I C FFSPONSIBILITY 0 1 2 3 4 
15. S L O W N E S S 0 1 2 3 4 
16. PATHOLOGIC DOUBTING 0 1 2 3 4 
17. G L O B A L SEVERTTY 0 1 2 .3 4 5 6 
18. G L O B A L IMPROVEMENT 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
19. RELIABILITY EXCELLENT = 0 G O O D = l FAIR = 2 POOR = 3 
B R I E F DESCRIPTION OF SYMPTOMS: CODE: 
ANGER 
PRIDE 
GUILT 
• 
ANXIETY 
R E S E A R C H A S S E S S M E N T I N F O R M A T I O N 
1 . D a t e o f b i r t h : 
2 . S E X F e m a l e / M a l e 
3 . O C C U P A T I O N 
4 . P l e a s e g i v e a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m a i n p r o b l e m a t i c 
s y m p t o m s b e i n g e x p e r i e n c e d b y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t . 
5 a . T h i n k i n g b a c k t o t h e f o u r s t o r i e s y o u h a v e j u s t r e a d , c a n 
y o u s a y w h i c h s t o r y w o u l d b e m o s t l i k e l y t o t r i g g e r a n y o f t h e 
s y m p t o m s / d i f f i c u l t i e s y o u h a v e j u s t d e s c r i b e d ? 
b . W h i c h s t o r y i s l e a s t l i k e l y t o c a u s e t h o s e d i f f i c u l t i e s ? 
6 . P l e a s e i n d i c a t e a n a p p r o x i m a t e l e n g t h o f t i m e t h e 
p a r t i c i p a n t h a s b e e n e x p e r i e n c i n g s y m p t o m s o f o b s e s s i v e 
c o m p u l s i v e d i s o r d e r o r p h o b i c d i s o r d e r ? 
y e a r s m o n t h s 
7. W h a t " t r e a t m e n t " h a s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t p r e v i o u s l y r e c e i v e d 
r e g a r d i n g t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d f o r w h a t l e n g t h o f t i m e ? 
8, W h a t " t r e a t m e n t " i s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t c u r r e n t l y r e c e i v i n g ? 
9. I f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t c u r r e n t l y t a k i n g a n y m e d i c a t i o n ? Y E S ? N O 
I f Y e s p l e a s e w o u l d y o u l i s t t h e c u r r e n t m e d i c a t i o n b e l o w . . 
I N F O R M A T I O N S H E E T 
I t i s k n o w n t h a t i n a n y g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i n d i v i d u a l p e o p l e m a y 
t h i n k i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s . T h i s c a n t h e n a f f e c t h o w e a c h p e r s o n 
m i g h t f e e l o r b e h a v e . T h e r e f o r e , b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p e r s o n ' s 
t h o u g h t s i t c a n a l s o h e l p u s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n s 
a n d e m o t i o n s . 
T h i s i s t r u e f o r p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c i n g s y m p t o m s o f o b s e s s i v e 
c o m p u l s i v e d i s o r d e r ( O C D ) , p h o b i a o r w o r r y i e . f i n d i n g - o u t h o w 
s o m e o n e m i g h t t h i n k i n a v a r i e t y o f s i t u a t i o n s m a y h e l p u s 
l e a r n m o r e a b o u t w h y t h a t p e r s o n r e s p o n d s i n a c e r t a i n w a y . I f 
w e c a n i n c r e a s e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e t h i n g s , w e a r e t h e n 
a l s o i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o i m p r o v e a n y h e l p w h i c h c a n b e 
o f f e r e d . 
I n t h i s s t u d y w e w a n t t o l o o k a t h o w p e o p l e s u f f e r i n g f r o m 
" o b s e s s i v e c o m p u l s i v e d i s o r d e r a n d p e o p l e s u f f e r i n g w i t h p h o b i a 
o r a n x i e t y / w o r r y m i g h t t h i n k , i n a f e w s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s s h o u l d 
h e l p u s t o l e a r n m o r e a b o u t w h y d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e m i g h t d e v e l o p 
d i f f e r e n t S 3 m p t o m s , b u t p e r h a p s m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y h o w t o t r e a t 
d i f f e r e n t s y m p t o m s m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y . 
I f y o u a g r e e t o t a k e p a r t i n t h i s r e s e a r c h w e w o u l d b e a s k i n g 
y o u t o r e a d a n u m b e r ' o f d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s . Y o u w o u l d t h e n b e 
a s k e d t o r a t e t h e s e s t o r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o h o w y o u m i g h t t h i n k i n 
s u c h a s i t u a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e m a y b e a s t o r y w h e r e 
s o m e o n e h a s j u s t w o n t h e l o t t e r y a n d y o u m i g h t b e . a s k e d t o 
r a t e h o w p l e a s a n t a n e x p e r i e n c e t h i s i s ? ! 
E a c h p e r s o n w i l l b e a s k e d t o s t u d y f o u r d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s , 
r a t i n g s e v e r a l t h i n g s f o r e a c h o n e . S o m e o f t h e s t o r i e s w i l l 
p r o b a b l y n o t b e a s e a s y t o r a t e a s i n t h e e x a m p l e , b u t t h e r e 
w i l l a l w a y s b e a r e s e a r c h e r w i t h y o u t o a n s w e r a n y q u e s t i o n s . 
F o r e a c h s i t u a t i o n y o u w i l l a l s o b e a s k e d t o t h i n k a b o u t h o w 
l i k e l y s u c h a s i t u a t i o n w o u l d b e t p t r i g g e r t h e s y m p t o m s t h a t 
y o u s o m e t i m e s e x p e r i e n c e . 
Y o u w i l l a l s o b e a s k e d t o g i v e v e r y b r i e f , o u t l i n e i n f o r m a t i o n 
( n o d e t a i l ) a b o u t y o u r m a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d a n y h e l p y o u 
h a v e / a r e r e c e i v i n g , t o c o m p l e t e t w o v e r y s h o r t q u e s t i o n n a i r e s 
a b o u t h o w y o u h a v e b e e n f e e l i n g o v e r t h e p a s t w e e k a n d t w o . 
s h o r t q u e s t i o n n a i r e s a b o u t h o w o f t e n a n d h o w m u c h y o u 
e x p e r i e n c e c e r t a i n t h o u g h t s o r b e h a v i o u r s . A l l i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l 
b e a n o n y m o u s a n d c o n f i d e n t i a l a n d w i l l o n l y b e u s e d i n r e l a t i o n 
t o t h i s r e s e a r c h s t u d y . 
T h e i n t e r v i e w w i l l p r o b a b l y l a s t a b o u t 1 -1^ h o u r s , b u t y o u 
w o u l d b e a b l e t o t a k e a b r e a k i f y o u w i s h e d t o d o s o . Y o u 
w i l l a l s o b e p r o v i d e d w i t h t e a o r c o f f e e 1 
A t t h e e n d o f t h i s i n t e r v i e w s o m e p e o p l e w i l l b e a s k e d i f t h e y 
w o u l d b e w i l l i n g t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n a n o t h e r h a l f h o u r i n t e r v i e w . 
T h i s s e c o n d p a r t w o u l d i n v o l v e y o u d i s c u s s i n g t h o s e s t o r i e s y o u 
t h o u g h t w o u l d b e m o s t o r l e a s t l i k e l y t o t r i g g e r t h e s y m p t o m s 
y o u e x p e r i e n c e . Y o u w i l l b e a s k e d t o t h i n k c a r e f u l l y a b o u t 
t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s a n d t o t a l k a l i t t l e b i t a b o u t w h a t y o u m i g h t 
b e t h i n k i n g o r f e e l i n g i n e a c h c a s e . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t b y t h e e n d o f t h i s i n t e r v i e w y o u w i l l h a v e 
b e g u n t o u n d e r s t a n d o r t h i n k a b o u t y o u r o w n s i t u a t i o n a l i t t l e 
d i f f e r e n t l y . T h i s c a n o f t e n b e h e l p f u l , b u t c a n s o m e t i m e s b e 
a l i t t l e b i t u n s e t t l i n g i f y o u d o n o t h a v e t h e c h a n c e t o t a l k 
a b o u t i t w i t h a n y o n e e l s e . T h e r e s e a r c h e r w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e t o 
a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s a n d w i l l a l s o o f f e r s o m e t i m e a t t h e e n d o f 
t h e i n t e r v i e w i f y o u w a n t e d t o t a l k a b o u t a n y t h i n g f r o m t h e 
i n t e r v i e w . 
I h o p e t h i s h a s g i v e n y o u a c l e a r i d e a o f w h a t w o u l d b e 
i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e s e a r c h , b u t I w o u l d b e v e r y h a p p y t o a n s w e r 
a n y r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n s o r c o n c e r n s . I c a n b e c o n t a c t e d a t t h e 
n u m b e r g i v e n b e l o w . 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t y o u a r e a w a r e t h a t t a k i n g p a r t i s 
v o l u n t a r y . A l s o , i f y o u a g r e e t o t a k e p a r t y o u w i l l s t i l l b e 
a b l e t o w i t h d r a w y o u r c o n s e n t a t a n y t i m e . T h i s c a n b e d o n e 
w i t h o u t y o u h a v i n g t o g i v e a r e a s o n a n d w i t h o u t i t a f f e c t i n g 
a n y o t h e r c o n t a c t y o u m i g h t h a v e w i t h t h e s e r v i c e . 
T h a n k y o u f o r t a k i n g t h e t i m e t o r e a d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . I h o p e 
i t h a s h e l p e d y o u m m a k i n g a d e c i s i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r o r n o t t o 
g i v e s o m e m o r e o f y o u r t i m e t o t h i s w o r k . I l o o k f o r w a r d t o 
s p e a k i n g w i t h y o u . 
T h a n k y o u . 
B e s t w i s h e s . 
J a c k i e M a c C a l l a m 
T r a i n e e C l i n i c a l P s y c h o l o g i s t 
C o n t a c t N u m b e r : 0 1 1 7 9 2 8 6 5 5 1 ( A m e s s a g e c a n a l w a y s b e l e f t f o r 
me o n t h i s n u m b e r i f I am n o t p e r s o n a l l y a v a i l a b l e ) 
C o n t a c t A d d r e s s ; P s y c h o l o g y D e p a r t m e n t 
B a r r o w H o s p i t a l 
B a r r o w G u e r n e y 
B R I S T O L 
U B H T 
T E A C H I N G C A R E 
Mental Health Services 
Barrow Hospital 
Barrow Gumey 
Bristol BS19 3SG 
iPIcase ring direct line number: 
D e a r D r . 
R E : 
I am w r i t i n g t o i n f o r m y o u t h a f , w h o I b e l i e v e i s a 
p a t i e n t o f y o u r s , h a s a g r e e d t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e r e s e a r c h 
. p r o j e c t I a m c a r r y i n g o u t a s p a r t o f m y D o c t o r a l D e g r e e i n 
C l i n i c a l P s y c h o l o g y . 
I h a v e e n c l o s e d a n i n f o r m a t i o n s h e e t w h i c h b r i e f l y o u t l i n e s t h e 
r e s e a r c h a n d g i v e s a n i n d i c a t i o n o f w h a t w i l l b e i n v o l v e d f o r 
t h i s c l i e n t . A n y i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e s t u d y w i l l b e t i m e l i m i t e d 
a n d w i l l o b v i o u s l y n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e s e r v i c e o n e w o u l d 
n o r m a l l y r e c e i v e f r o m P s y c h o l o g y . H o w e v e r , i f y o u h a v e a n y 
f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s o r a r e C o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f 
t h i s p e r s o n I w o u l d b e v e r y h a p p y t o d i s c u s s t h i s f u r t h e r . 
I f y o u w i s h t o c o n t a c t me a m e s s a g e c a n b e l e f t a t t h e a b o v e 
n u m b e r , s h o u l d I n o t b e a v a i l a b l e , a n d I w i l l c a l l y o u b a c k a s 
s o o n a s p o s s i b l e . 
T h a n k y o u . 
B e s t w i s h e s 
J a c k i e M a c C a l l a m 
T r a i n e e C l i n i c a l P s y c h o l o g i s t 
.Xhe-United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 
Hospital miinher 01275 392811 
C O N S E N T F O R M 
R E : C o g n i t i v e A p p r a i s a l s i n A n x i e t y D i s o r d e r s ( W a y s o f 
t h i n k i n g w h e n y o u a r e f e e l i n g a n x i o u s ) 
R e s e a r c h e r : J a c k i e M a c C a l l a m , T r a i n e e C l i n i c a l P s y c h o l o g i s t . 
• P l y m o u t h U n i v e r s i t y 
I h a v e r e a d t h e l e t t e r a n d i n f o r m a t i o n s h e e t w h i c h e x p l a i n s t h e 
a b o v e r e s e a r c h a n d h a v e u n d e r s t o o d t h e i r c o n t e n t . 
I a l s o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t m y i n v o l v e m e n t w i l l i n n o w a y a f f e c t a n y 
o t h e r c o n t a c t I m i g h t h a v e w i t h t h i s s e r v i c e a n d t h a t a n y 
i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l b e c o n f i d e n t i a l a n d o n l y u s e d i n r e l a t i o n t o 
t h i s r e s e a r c h s t u d y . 
I a m a w a r e t h a t I c a n w i t h d r a w my i n v o l v e m e n t a t a n y p o i n t , 
w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o g i v e a r e a s o n a n d w i t h o u t t h i s a f f e c t i n g a n y 
f u t u r e s e r v i c e s I m i g h t r e c e i v e . 
I a m w i l l i n g t o t a k e p a r t i n t h i s s t u d y a n d a g r e e t o b e a 
p a r t i c i p a n t . 
N a m e : 
S i g n a t u r e 
D a t e : 
S i g n a t u r e o f r e s e a r c h e r ; 
SOUTHMEAD HEALTH 
A N A T I O N A L H E A L T H S E R V I C E T R U S T 
30 July 1996, Administration Department 
Trust Headquarters 
Southmead Hospital 
Bristol BS10 5NB 
Tel: (0117) 959 5207 (direct line) 
Fax:(0117);959 0902 
Ms J Maccallam 
9 EgertonBrow 
Bishopston 
Bristol 
BS7 8HW 
Dear Ms Maccallam 
PRO.TECT 36/96: COGNITTVR APPRAISALS IN A ETY DISORDER 
I am pleased to inform you that following its meeting" on 5 June 1996, the Medical Research 
Ethics Committee has approved your application in respect of the above project. 
Approval is given on the understanding that:-
a) Any ethical problems arising in the cotirse of the project wil l be reported to the Ethics 
Comutnittee; 
b) Any change in the protocol wil l be reported tothe Ethics Committee; 
c) A n annual progress report wil l be submitted and a brief final report on completion. 
Yours sincerely 
Mrs S B Bowman 
Secretary 
Southmead Medical Research Ethics Committee 
• i 
A University of Bristol Associated Teaching Trust 
U B H T 
T E A C H I N G C A R E 
Trust Headquarters 
Marlborough Street 
Bristol BS13NU 
Fax 0117 925 6588 
01 October 1996 Please ring direct line number: 
0117 928 3613 
Mrs JMaacallam 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
9, Egerton Brow 
Bishopston 
Bristol 
BS7 8HW 
Dear Mrs Maccallam 
E3462 Cognitive appraisals and anxietv disorders 
I am pleased to advise that the revised information sheet submitted with yourletter dated 1st 
August was considered by the Research Ethics Committee at their meeting held on 27 
September, 1996 and approval given. 
Yours sincerely 
0 , aJcl0u^ 
Naaz Nathoo 
Secretary to the Research Ethics Committee 
The United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 
Tel on? 929 0666 Minicom 0117 934 9935 
What I am going to ask youto do is read a number of stoiies. They are quite short, but 
some do describe some quite difiBcult situations and emotions: 
After reading each story I am then going to ask you tO answer a number of questions. 
When you are answering the questions try and iinagine what it would be like to be the 
person in thestory. There are no right or wrong answers - the questions are just asking 
people to think about how they might thmk or feel. Try to answer .with your first 
response and not to spend too much time on each question. 
Please ask if there, is anything which, is not clear or anything you. are not sureabout -1 
can be available throughout the whole session i f you would find' that helpfhl. Also, i f 
you want to take a break at any time please feelfi'ee to do. so. 
After reading the stories I would then like to ask you a few questions about your 
situation and to askyou to complete some tick box questionnaires. 
Please remember if there is anything you do not wish, to answer please leave it out and' 
please, stop i f you decideyou do not want to continue with the interviisw. 
Do' you have any- questions, a this- stage and: would'; you: Uke tea or coflFee now or 
later;......... T H A N K Y O U . 
'Norm' Scores on the Padua Inventory: 
SAMPLE n Mean SD 
Dutch: male 188 25.8 20.8 
female 242 29.4 20.7 
American male 294 42.1 26.3 
female 384 41.0 25.4 
Itahan male 489 53.6 27.7 
female 478 62.5 29.2 
TABLE A l : To Show means and standard deviations of the PI scores in an Italian, 
American and Dutch non-clinical sample. 
Clinical Sample n mean SD 
OCD male 35 83.6 34.8 
female 40 98.6 32.3 
Other 'Neurotic' 
disorders 
male 35 50.2 28.9 
female 40 66.5 32.4 
TABLE A2 : To Show mean and standard deviation of PI scores in an Italian clinical 
population. 
1 
I 
/ 
Copy of Anxiety Vignette: 
Imagine that you work for a small firm and have been asked to do a short talk for a group 
of people at your work place. You are not keen on speaking in public, but you don't feel 
you can say no. You are told that there will probably be about 25 people there. The thought 
of 25 people makes you feel a little bit anxious and wobbly, but you decide it will be OK 
You will only have to talk for a short time,. You have never done anything like this before, 
but you don't think too much else about it until the day of the talk. Then, suddenly, you find 
yourself in a large hall, which feels like an empty barn. You are starting to feel a bit nervous 
when you begin to realise how many people are coming into the hall. The more people you 
see, the more worried you start to feel. Your stomach begins to turn over and you begin to 
feel a bit restless. Surely all these people aren't coming to your talk You pluck up 
courage to ask how many people are expected - up to 60 people is the reply - no-one had 
said that there might be this many people... On hearing this you feel your whole body begin 
to shake. You are perching nervously on the edge of your seat. You don't think yoii are 
going to be able to do this... Your mouth has become dry and you can't seem to 
concentrate on one thing at a time. Your eyes keep switching from one thing to another. 
You see a chair and desk being set up - this must be for you. How awfiil... You don't 
know what you are going to do ... you can't sit in front of all these people and give a talk. 
You try to look at your notes but they don't seem to make any sense. You notice each 
person as they sit down; some seem to look annoyed already. You begin to wring your 
hands and wonder what on earth you should do... You feel so nervous... what if you can't 
get any words out,. What if you go completely blank and nothing comes out of your mouth. 
You are feeling worse and worse, but just don't know how to calm yourself down. You 
hadn't thought you would feel this worried or anxious... Everyone was being seated., they 
were all going to think you were awfiil, but are you going to have to start talking in a 
minute.. How on earth are you going to cope...? 
2 
Copy of Guilt Vignette 
Imagine you tiave a very good friend; someone you. liave known for many years and 
someone you are very fond of This friend is very fond of you too. A few weeks ago your 
friend had asked you if you would help out with some decorating. At the time you had 
promised to help, especially as you knew some bits of the house were difficult for one 
person to reach on her own. You arranged a day when you would go round and help and 
said you would see her then. This day soon arrives, but you are so busy with you gardening 
that it totally slips your mind that you are supposed-to be helping your friend. You haven't 
forgotten on purpose, you just did not think of it. You are still busy in you garden, in the 
afternoon, when you hear the phone ring. You answer it to be given the. awftil news that 
your friend is in hospital and unconscious. She had fallen of f the ladder whilst decorating. 
She had banged her head very severely and had only been found because a neighbour had 
heard the crash and had gone round to help. The doctors at the hospital are not sure of the 
extent of you r friends injuries and are still completing tests. As soon as you hear this news 
you suddenly remember that you were supposed to have been helping you friend with her 
decorating today. You immediately get a sinking feeling in your stomach and begin to feel a 
bit sick and a bit frantic. You begin to think that if you had only gone round to help your 
friend that this would not have happened. You feel so guilty. If you hadn't been so 
concerned with getting your own jobs done you friend would not be in hospital now... 
What i f she doesn't recover? You keep thinking that you could have prevented this. You 
knew that some of the decorating was a bit tricky.... You should have remembered and 
gone round.. You didn't mean for this to happen...., but you feel so guilty, like the bottom 
is about to fall out of you stomach. You want to put things right, turn the clock back, but 
the lumpy, sick feeling is getting worse.. What are you going to do...? Would your friend 
ever forgive you? You really hadn't meant for this to happen... but you can't help feeling so 
bad and so guilty. 
3 

Copy of Anger Vigniette: ® 
Imagine you are someone who works really, hard, putting you heart and soul into your 
work. You are working on a project, but need the help of your boss to complete it. Your 
boss is very difficult to get hold of and does not return you r calls. You have left lots, of 
messages and tried to arrange times when you could meet up, without success. Whenever 
you see the boss, he is polite, but is always too busy to talk. This begins to annoy you, but 
you don't know what to do about it. Anyway, there is a big meeting arranged where all the 
top bosses are to get together. You go along and you and your boss are asked about why 
the project is not complete. You begin to feel awkward because you will have to explain 
about the problems you have been having with you boss. However, before you can say 
anything your boss has launched into a long story about how you have been having 
difficulty in managing you work time at work and that this is why the project had been 
slowed up. He says nothing about himself You also hear your boss lie about the meetings 
saying he had arranged them but that you have not turned up to them...! You cannot 
believe what you are hearing. Your boss has lied to save his own skin. How dare he? You 
can feel your face going red, your fists clenching and your jaws locked tight together. How 
dare the boss show you up in front of all these people? What a low down thing to do. To 
top it all you are called to see one of the managers after the meeting and given a verbal 
warning. This makes you feel even more angry, but you are unable to say anything. AS you 
leave the room you can feel the anger boiling... you want to shout and scream. You are 
absolutely fiirious: angry at your boss for being so deceitful and unfair, angry at the others 
for not realising what has gone on.. Are they really that stupid?., and angry at yourself Why 
the hell didn't you say something? Your boss shouldn't be allowed to get away with this. 
No-one was going to treat you like this and get away with it. You feel like hitting 
something., like you will burst if you don't. Your jaw is tight., you feel as if you are about 
to scream., you are so angry...fljrious. 
4 
Copy of Pride Vignette: 
Imagine tliat your life long ambition is to run a marathon. You are determined to do this, 
but none of your family or friends think you will make it. They keep teUing you that you are 
too old and that you will never be able to get fit enough. This makes you even more 
determined and you begin your training for a marathon the following year. You train hard 
every week throughout the year, until finally the big day arrives and you are on the starting 
line. By this time everyone is behind you and lots of people are there to support you. It is a 
tough race and there are times when you feel so tired that you wonder if you are going to 
make it. However, something keeps you going and you eventually find yourself approaching 
the finish line. You have done it. You feel exhausted, but elated. You have just run a 
marathon... Al l your family and friends come up to congratulate you, giving you hugs, 
saying how well you have done. You feel so good about yourself You have done well and 
have proved everyone wrong. You can feel you r body swelling with pride, like you want to 
walk with your head held high for everyone to see. Not everyone could have done what you 
have done. Against all odds you have achieved the ambition of a life time. This day you will 
be proud to remember. AS these thoughts fill your mind you feel a tingly, warm feeling 
inside. You can't stop beaming. You showed courage and determination, even when things 
got tough - you feel so proud of that. At that moment you feel as i f you could run another 
marathon, or at least run down the street, waving your arms and shouting out 'I've done 
it...!' You have never felt so proud 
5 
Details of the Flesch Readability tests: 
Vignette Number of words Flesch Reading ease 
Anxiety 430 83.6 
Guilt 410 82.5 
Anger 417 84.7 
Pride 309 79.8 
TABLE A 3 : To Show the Number of Words and the Flesch Reading Ease for each 
vignette. 
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Details of the Descriptive data for each Participant. 
Non-Clinical Group: 10 subjects (5 females, 5 males) 
SEX A G E PAiDUA BDI 
male 34 20 8 
female 50 • 27 9 
female 45 16 7 
male 23 16 9 
male 54 0 1 
female 50 30 7 
female 30 18 9 
female 55 34 8 
male 32 9 0 
male 43 14 1 
R A N G E R A N G E R A N G E 
23-56 0-34 0-9 
BAI 
6 
2 
7 
2 
1 
5 
14 
1 
0 
2 
R A N G E 
0-14 
Anxietv Group: 10 subjects (7 females, 3 males) 
SEX A G E P A D U A BDI B A I 
female 37 4 7 19 
male 46 20 20 37 
male 57 42 21 29 
female 38 46 12 19 
female 19 33 16 32 
female 40 13 7 48 
female 23 52 6 20 
femaile 32 50 21 34 
male 31 51 25 30 
female 55 24 12 26 
R A N G E 
20-60 
R A N G E 
4-52 
R A N G E 
6-25 
R A N G E 
19-48 
7 
OCD Group: 10 Subjects (5 females. 5 males) 
SEX A G E P A D U A BDI BAI Y-BOCS 
female 65 65 38 13 20 
female 41 110 9 4 20 
female 27 101 11 22 19 
female 60 66 28 22 20 
female 43 134 36 44 30 
male 34 70 10 18 19 
male 35 104 40 27 ~ 
female 43 67 20 21 20 
male 46 122 26 39 21 
male 30 134 17 26 29 
R A N G E R A N G E R A N G E R A N G E R A N G E 
27-60 66-134 9-40 4-43 19-30 
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Details of the Statistical Analyses carried out on the Descriptive Data 
Name of Measure df F Sig(p) 
BDI 2 11.517 .000 
B A I 2 22.576 .000 
PI 2 43.707 .000 
A G E 2 .422 .660 
Responsibility 
related to occupation 
2 2.830 .077 
Intellectual ability 
related to occupation 
2 .448 .644 
TABLE A4 : To Show Results of Anova analyses for measures of depression, anxiety, 
symptoms of OCD, level of responsibility and level intellectual ability. 
Group Comparisons Mean Difference. Std Error Sig 
Anxiety with 'Controls 25.40 3.962 .000 
OCD with 'Controls' 19.60 3.962 .000 
C C D with Anxiety -5.80 3.962 .357 
TABLE A5 : To Show Results of Scheffe Post hoc analysis for the Measure of Anxiety. 
Name of Measure Chi-square df Sig. 
BDI 14.676 2 .001 
PI 21.047 2 .000 
TABLE A6 : To Show Results of Kruskal-Wallis test for the Measures of Depression 
and OC Symptoms. 
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Group Comparisons Mean Difference Std Error Sig. 
Anxiety witii 'Controls' 8.8 3.667 .074 
OCD with 'Controls' 17.60 3.667 .000 
OCD with Anxiety 8.80 3.667 .074 
T A B L E A 7 : To Show Results of Scheffe Post hoc analysis for the Measure of 
Depression . 
Group Comparisons Mean Difference. Std Error Sig 
Anxiety with 'Controls 15.1 8.959 .229 
OCD with 'Controls' 78.90 8.959 .000 
OCD with Anxiety 63.80 8.959 .357 
T A B L E A S : To Show Results of Scheffe Post hoc analysis for the Measure of O C 
Symptoms. 
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Details of the wording used by each Participant to Describe the emotions that were 
evoked by each of the four vignettes. 
Pp OCD GROUP A N X I E T Y GROUP 'CONTROL' GROUP 
1 Apprehension, determination, 
fear of looking a fool. 
Pounding heart, restless, 
confused 
Anxious, angry, 
despair 
2 Fear, Unprepared, sickness Anxiety, fear, feai- of 
humiliation 
Awful, nervous, 
pressure 
3 Nervous, self conscious, 
inadequate 
Nervous, panic Terrified, nervous, 
shaky 
4 Panic, nervous Fear, anxious Nervous, anxiety 
5 Fear, anxiety, nervous, 
embarrassment 
Panic Nervous, anxious 
6 Extremely nervous Fear, anxiety, dread Panic, nervous, 
wanting to calm things 
down 
7 Fear, self hatred Panic Panic, feeling ill 
8 Panic, trapped, helpless Fear, panic, tension Nervous, anxiety, 
worry 
9 Fear, sickness, wanting to get 
away 
Fear, nervous, wanting to 
escape 
Anxiety, fear, lack of 
concentration, 
fixistration 
10 Anxiety Anxious, panic Worry, anxiety, fear of 
'drying up' 
TABLE A9 : A summary of the words each Participant used to describe the emotions 
which were evoked by the Anxiety Vignette. 
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Pp OCD GROUP ANXTFTY GROUP ' C O N T R O L ' G R O U P 
1 Guilt, fretting, anxiety Heart pounding, sick, crying Guilt, worry, fear 
2 Guilt, fear Regret, guilt, recrimination Rationalise that it is was 
no-one's fault, fate. 
3 Fear, guilt, anxiety Guilt, worry Guilty, upset 
4 Guilt, disappointment in self Worry, guilt Guilt, concern, remorse 
5 Guilt Guilt, anger Guilt, anxiety 
6 Guilt, anxiety Guilt, worry Guilt, concern, sure 
friend will understand 
7 Guilt, shame, embarrassment Guilt, panic, upset Very guilty, 
embarrassed 
8 Concern, worry, guilt Guilt Guilt, despair 
9 Guilt, panic, fear, anxiety Guilt, upset Guilt, responsibility 
10 Guilt, worry, upset Why didn't friend make 
contact? 
Guilt, anxiety, cross 
with self 
TABLE AlO: A summary of the words each Participant used to describe the emotions 
which were evoked by the Guilt Vignette. 
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Pp OCD GROUP A N X I E T Y GROUP 'CONTROL' GROUP 
1 Anger, injustice, frustration Tense, hot, wanting to shout Anger, fiiistration, loss 
of pride 
2 Anger, misunderstood, 
helpless 
Frustration, anger, vulnerable Anger, annoyed, 
betrayed 
3 Anger, de-motivated Put upon, angry, emotional Angry, resentfiil, 
frustrated 
4 Seething very annoyed, 
humiliated 
Wouldn't have reacted in this 
way, confidence in work 
ability. 
Anger, frustration, 
despair 
5 Anger, impatience Furious Anger, fiustration 
6 Anger, shame, anxiety Frustration, humiliation, 
anger 
Anger, fiustration, 
disappointment 
7 Anger, contempt, cold Anger, frustration Helpless, angry 
8 Anger, desire for justice Anger, fiustration, tension Frustration, anger 
9 Anger, frustration, 
injustice, desperation 
Anger Anger, fixistration, 
injustice 
10 Sick, worry, let down Upset, hurt, angry Anger, injustice 
TABLE A l l : A summary of the words each Participant used to describe the emotions 
which were evoked by the Anger Vignette. 
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Pp OCD GROUP ANXIF.TYGROUP 'CONTROL'GROUP 
1 Pride Positive experience, but 
crowds would be negative 
Happy, proud, relief 
2 Euphoria invincibility Elation Pride, glad it's over 
3 Extreme pride Elation, satisfaction, pride Elation, pride 
4 Pride, happiness Pride, sense of 
achievement 
Excitement, elation 
5 Embarrassed, relief, pride Nervous, happy, panic pride, elation, good 
6 Arrogance, complacency Elated, happy, pride Achievement, good 
7 Pride, achievement, elation Pride, satisfaction Happy, satisfied, 
proud 
8 Relief, self congratulations Satisfaction, achievement, 
pride 
Tearful, emotional, 
proud 
9 Pride, achievement, up yours! Elation, pride, happy Proud, satisfied 
10 Couldn't imagine feelings in 
this situation. 
Content, happy, pride Pride, satisfaction, 
purpose 
TABLE A12: A summary of the words each Participant used to describe the emotions 
which were evoked by the Pride Vignette. 
A descriptive summary of the information tabled above is given below: 
Anxiety Situation: 
OCD group; Eight participants used, the words anxiety and/or nervousness and/or 
described physical symptoms of anxiety to describe the emotions associated with this 
situation. Often a combination of these phrases was used and this would sometimes include 
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the words panic and fear. The two other people used the words fear and/or panic in the 
absence of the words anxiety or nervousness. 
Anxiety Group: Seven participants used the words anxiety and/or nervousness and/or 
described physical symptoms of anxiety to describe the emotions associated with this 
situation. Often a combination of these phrases was used and, as in the OCD group, this 
would sometimes include the words panic and fear. The three other people used the words 
fear and/or panic in the absence of the words anxiety or nervousness. 
Non-clinical Group: All ten participants described feelings of nervousness and/or anxiety 
and/or described physical symptoms of anxiety relating to describe the emotions associated 
with this situation. As with the other groups a combination of terms was often used and 
this also included use of the word panic. 
Guilt Situation: 
OCD Group: All ten participants used the word guilt to describe the emotion associated 
with this situation. However, this was sometimes combined with another feeling such as 
anxiety, fear, worry, embarrassment and upset. 
Anxiety Group: Eight of the participants described the emotions associated with this 
situation using the word guilt, but again this was sometimes combined with another feeling 
such as worry, upset and also anger in this case. One of the other two participants 
described physical feelings of anxiety e.g. heart pounding and the tenth participant didn't 
describe a feeling, but was left asking the question of why the friend had not telephoned. 
Non-clinical Group: Nine out of the ten participants used the word guilt to describe the 
emotions associated with this situation. This was sometimes combined with another feeling, 
as was described for the other two groups. The tenth person did not describe feelings but 
said they would try to rationalise the situation as something which could happen to anyone. 
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Anger Situation: 
OCD Group: Nine out of tlie ten participants used tlie words anger or extreme annoyance 
to describe the feelings associated with this situation. This was often combined with other 
feelings, such as fioistration, injustice and helplessness. The tenth person described feeling 
worried and let down. 
Anxiety Group: Eight participants used the word angry/anger and one person described 
physical sensations of anger to describe the feelings associated with this situation. Again, 
this was often combined with feelings of frustration. The last participant said that they 
would not have reacted with anger, but would have felt confident enough about his/her 
work to show the boss to be in the wrong. 
Non-clinical Group: All ten participants used the words angry or anger to describe the 
emotions associated with this situation, a description which, again^ was usually combined 
with feelings of frustration. 
Pride Situation: 
OCD Group: Six participants used the word pride and one person used the words self 
congratulations to describe the emotions associated with this situation. This was sometimes 
associated with other feelings such as achievement and, in one case, relief Of the other 
three people one person described feelings of euphoria, one person described feelings of 
arrogance and one person said they were left with feelings of pride for the character in the 
story, but couldn't imagine being in this situation themselves. 
Anxiety Group: Seven out of the ten participants used the word pride to describe the 
emotions associated with this situation, often combined with feelings of happiness or 
satisfaction. Out of the other three participants, one person described feelings of elation, in 
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the absence of the word pride and the two other people described positive feelings of 
happiness, but also described negative feelings of nervousness and panic. 
Non-clinical Group: Eight participants used the word pride and/or proud to describe the 
emotions associated with this situation, which was often combined with feelings of 
satisfaction and happiness and, again in one case, relief The other two participants 
described good feelings of elation and achievement, but in the absence of the word pride. 
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Details of the mean raw scores for each participant in the OCD, anxietv and non­
clinical groups, on each appraisal dimension 
GROUP Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
OCD 3.2 7.0 8.85 9.55 5.05 4.3 6.15 
Anxiety 4.1 9.95 9.4 9.55 10.1 4.1 6.0 
Non-clinical 8.5 6.8 8.05 10.8 7.05 3.3 5.15 
GROUP Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
OCD 7.8 8.2 8.35 6.4 10.95 11.3 5.0 
Anxiety 8.05 8.4 11.0 3.9 9.3 10.2 1.5 
Non-clinical 5.1 6.75 14.95 10.72 9.19 12.5 6.2 
TABLE A13: To Show Mean Raw Scores for each group, on each Appraisal 
Dimension, in the Situation of Anxiety 
GROUP Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
OCD 2.75 11.05 8.2 6.7 10.05 3.85 5.25 
Anxiety 4.7 7.2 10.5 9.1 7.3 2.85 5.35 
Non-clinical 7.5 7.45 7.6 7.1 7.65 3.1 4.6 
GROUP Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
OCD 10.9 10.05 13.3 2.95 13.05 4.15 1.65 
Anxiety 5.5 6.6 12.35 3.45 13.50 2.56 1.65 
Non-clinical 9.2 9.25 10.55 7.65 10.65 6.25 2.65 
TABLE A14: To Show Mean Raw Scores for each group, on each Appraisal 
Dimension, in the Situation of Guilt 
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GROUP Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
OCD 9.05 5.3 10.9 9.7 5.3 2.2 3.85 
Anxiety 8.35 2.7 10.85 12.4 4.2 3.05 4.15 
Non-clinical 9.2 4.4 8.6 11.05 6.45 2.75 5.5 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
OCD 6.75 8.15 12.25 4.85 11.35 6.55 1.35 
Anxiety 5.00 6.95 13.25 2.10 8.45 9.95 1.60 
Non-clinical 7.40 9.7 10.33 4.56 8.64 9.2 2.35 
TABLE A15: To Show Mean Raw Scores for each group, on each Appraisal 
Dimension, in the Situation of Anger 
Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
OCD 4.3 10.15 3.2 11.2 9.85 1.7 2.9 
Anxiety 1.0 11.9 1.6 12.2 10.8 1.1 0.9 
Non-clinical 2.25 8.40 2.95 11.65 10.0 2.3 3.75 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
OCD 3.55 4.25 2.6 13.8 7.25 13.25 12.75 
Anxiety 1.05 2.35 1.83 12.95 6.2 12.6 9.65 
Non-clinical 2.25 3.15 2.8 12.72 6.56 12.85 9.85 
TABLE A16: To Show Mean Raw Scores for each group, on each Appraisal 
Dimension, in the Situation of Pride 
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Details of the mean raw scores for each of the four participants, who were 'recovered' 
from OCD. ^ 
Sresp Ores. Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
4.88 6.38 9.5 8.38 7.88 4.38 7.13 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
6.25 8.5 12.38 5.25 10.25 11.12 5.63 
T A B L E A17: To Show the Mean Raw Scores, on all the Appraisal Dimensions, for 
the Four Participants who had 'recovered' from OCD, in the Situation of Anxiety 
Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
4.00 11.0 7.00 6.75 12.38 6.13 5.88 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
10.5 9.13 9.25 • 4.75 12.5 5.13 1.25 
TABLE A18: To Show the Mean Raw Scores, on all the Appraisal Dimensions, for 
the Four Participants who had 'recovered' from OCD in the Situation of Guilt 
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Sresp OVQS Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
11.87 2.88 12.5 11.87 2.63 2.13 5.5 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm Obene Oharm Pleasure 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
3.88 6.38 12.75 4.75 7.5 7.87 2.00 
TABLE A19: To Show the Mean Raw Scores, on all the Appraisal Dimensions, for 
the Four Participants who had 'recovered' from OCD, in the Situation of Anger 
Sresp Ores Scont Sicont Ocont Sfeel Ofeel 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
2.25 11.25 2.38 10.25 12.13 3.00 3.75 
Sact Oact Sbene Sharm .Obene Oharm Pleasure 
Four participants, 
'recovered' from 
OCD 
3.25 5.38 7.00 13.25 8.5 7.87 11.38 
TABLE A20: To Show the Mean Raw Scores, on all the Appraisal Dimensions, for 
the Four Participants who had 'recovered' from OCD, , in the Situation of Pride 
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Details of Statistical Analyses used to test Hypotheses la-Id 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 7.389 .000 
Group 2 .149 .863 
Group X Appraisals 26 2.16 .001 
T A B L E A21: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Anxiety 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 3.5 .000 
Group 2 ..356 .704 
Group X Appraisals 26 2.048 .002 
TABLE A22: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Anxiety, when depression is controlled for in the analysis. 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 19.502 .000 
Group 2 1.405 .263 
Group X Appraisals 26 2.048 .002 
T A B L E A23: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of Guilt 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 6.869 .000 
Group 2 1.663 .210 
Group X Appraisals 26 1.794 .011 
TABLE A24: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Guilt, when depression in controlled for in the analysis 
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Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 19.046 .000 
Group 2 .548 .585 
Group X Appraisals 26 .989 .483 
T A B L E A25: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Anger 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 7.394 .000 
Group 2 .727 .494 
Group X Appraisals 26 1.217 .219 
T A B L E A26: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Anger, when depression is controlled for in the analysis. 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 57.3 .000 
Group 2 5.021 .015 
Group X Appraisals 26 1.044 .409 
TABLE A27: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Pride 
Source df F Sig 
Appraisals 13 21.819 .000 
Group 2 3.577 .044 
Group X Appraisals 26 1.477 .066 
T A B L E A28: To Show Results of Repeated Measures Anova for the Situation of 
Pride, when depression is controlled for in the analysis. 
Details of Statistical analyses carried out to test Hypotheses 2-6 
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Emotional Situation df F Sig. 
Guilt 2 4.93 .015 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.59 .223 
Anxiety 2 4.43 .022 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 3.83 .035 
Anger 2 .075 .928 
Anger: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .135 .874 
Pride 2 3.466 .046 
Pride: when pride was 
controlled for 
2 4.580 .020 
TABLE A29: To Show Results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of Personal 
Responsibility in the Situations of Guilt, Anxiety, Anger and Pride 
Emotional Situation df F Sig. 
Guilt 2 1.26 .302 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.71 .201 
Anxiety 2 .245 .784 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .482 .623 
Anger 2 1.776 .188 
Anger: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .575 .570 
Pride 2 1.560 .229 
Pride: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.469 .243 
TABLE A30: To Show Results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of Personal 
Control in the situations of Guilt, Anxiety, Anger and Pride. 
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Aspect of Appraisal "according to self "according to others" 
Emotional Situation df F Sig df F Sig 
Guilt 2 .273 .763 2 .126 .882 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .310 .736 2 .098 .907 
Anxiety 2 .208 .813 2 .189 .829 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .219 .805 2 .030 .971 
Anger 2 .229 .797 2 .639 .536 
Anger: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .161 .852 2 : 3.146 .060 
Pride 2 1.780 .188 2 4.002 .030 
Pride: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 2.190 .132 2 6.286 .006 
TABLE A30: To Show Results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of 'acceptability 
of feelings' according to self and others in the Situations of Guilt, Anxiety, Anger 
and Pride. 
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Aspect of Appraisal "according to self "according to others" 
Emotional Situation df F Sig df F Sig 
Guilt 2 5.159 .013 2 1.901 .169 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 4.638 .019 2 2.153 .136 
Anxiety 2 1.525 .236 2 .528 .596 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .517 .602 2 .563 .576 
Anger 2 .802 .459 2 .1.147 .333 
Anger: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .802 .459 2 1.781 .188 
Pride 2 2.785 .080 2 1.121 .341 
Pride: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 2.153 .136 2 .807 .457 
T A B L E A31: To Show Results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of "acceptability 
of actions according to self and others in the Situations of Guilt, Anxiety, Anger and 
Pride. 
Emotional Situation df F Sig 
Guilt 2 5.54 .010 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 2.91 .073 
Anxiety 2 6.67 .005 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 5.75 .009 
Anger 2 1.585 .224 
Anger: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 2.233 .128 
Pride 2 .431 .655 
Pride: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .251 .780 
TABLE A31: To Show results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of 'Harm to Self 
in the Situations of Guilt, Anxiety, Anger and Pride. 
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Details of Statistical analyses carried Out to test Hypothesis 7 
Appraisal 
Dimension 
Group Likelihood of symptoms in 
this emotional situation 
Likelihood of symptoms in 
other related emotional 
situations 
Harm to self OCD .781** .902** 
Personal 
responsibility 
OCD -.153 -.011 
Harm to self Anxiety .071 .051 
Personal 
responsibility 
Anxiety -.245 -.307 
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
TABLE A32: To Show Results of a Pearson Product moment Correlation for the 
appraisals of personal responsibility and perceived harm to self in the situation of 
Anxiety. 
Appraisal 
Dimension 
Group Likelihood of symptoms in 
this emotional situation 
Likelihood of symptoms in 
other related emotional 
situations 
Harm to self OCD .841** .789** 
Personal 
responsibility 
OCD .483 .640* 
Harm to self Anxiety .326 .093 
Personal 
responsibility 
Anxiety -.142 -.189 
*indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
**indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
TABLE A33: To Show Results of a Pearson Product moment Correlation for the 
appraisals of personal responsibility and perceived harm to self in the situation of 
Guilt. 
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Appraisal 
Dimension 
Group Likelihood of symptoms in 
this emotional situation 
Likelihood of symptoms iri 
other related emotional 
situations 
Harm to self OCD .117 .047 
Personal 
responsibility 
OCD .241 .278 
Harm to self Anxiety .075 .418 
Personal 
responsibility 
Anxiety -.110 .083 
TABLE A34: To Show Results of a Pearson Product moment Correlation for the 
appraisals of personal responsibility and perceived harm to self in the situation of 
Anger. 
Appraisal 
Dimension 
Group Likelihood of symptoms in 
this emotional situation 
Likelihood of symptoms in 
other related emotional 
situations 
Harm to self OCD .132 .077 
Personal 
responsibility 
OCD -.268 .429 
Harm to self Anxiety -.480 -.219 
Personal 
responsibility 
Anxiety -.060 -.535 
T A B L E A35: To Show Results of a Pearson Product moment Correlation for the 
appraisals of personal responsibility and perceived harm to self in the situation of 
Pride. 
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Details of other Statistical analyses referred to in the text 
Emotional Situation df F Sig 
Guilt 2 .833 .446 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.069 .358 
Anxiety 2 .307 .738 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .101 .904 
TABLE A35: To Show results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of Situational 
Control in the Situations of Guilt and Anxiety. 
Emotional Situation df F Sig 
Guilt 2 .963 .395 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 .617 .547 
Amciety 2 2.692 .086 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 2.549 .098 
TABLE A36: To Show results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of Perceived 
Control of Others in the Situations of Guilt and Anxiety. 
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Emotional Situation df F Sig. 
Guilt 2 2.225 .127 
Guilt: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.961 .161 
Anxiety 2 1.451 .252 
Anxiety: when depression 
was controlled for 
2 1.793 .187 
T A l B L E A37: To Show results of One-way Anova for the appraisal of Responsibility 
of Others in the Situations of Guilt and Anxiety. 
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Details of Missing Data 
Anxiety Situation: 1 missing value on appraisal of 'harm to self, in the non-clinical group 
2 missing values on appraisal of 'benefit to self, n the non-clinical 
group 
Guilt Situation: No missing values 
Anger Situation: 1 missing value on 'benefit to self, in the non-clinical group 
2 missing values on 'benefit to others', in the non-clinical group 
Pride Situation: 1 missing value on 'benefit to others', in the non-clinical group 
1 missing value on 'harm to self, in the non-clinical group 
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